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Abstract
This thesis presents a methodology based on simulations and invariants for proving timing
properties of real-time, distributed systems. This methodology is used to prove tight time
bounds for two systems, a leader election protocol for a ring of processes, and Fischer's
timing-based mutual exclusion algorithm. A framework for verifying these proofs using the
Larch tools is also developed, and the proof for Fischer's algorithm is checked within this
framework.
Many formal methods have been developed for proving the correctness of untimed dis-
tributed systems. However, real-time systems often have subtle timing dependencies that
are difficult to analyze and reason about. Furthermore, for many real-time systems, cor-
rectness is insufficient; it is important to satisfy certain performance requirements. It is
necessary, therefore, to extend the formal models and techniques to the timed setting.
We use a timed automaton model, together with simulations which establish that one
automaton implements another. The methodology presented here exploits the strengths of
simulation-based techniques, and is demonstrated to be applicable to real-time systems, for
proving performance, as well as correctness, properties. The resulting proofs are rigorous
and systematic, and have a hierarchical structure that appears to scale reasonably to large
systems. In addition, they are amenable to automated verification.
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Title: Professor of Computer Science and Engineering
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A variety of formal methods have been developed to analyze distributed systems, and prove
they satisfy basic correctness properties. For real-time systems, it is also often important to
establish timing properties, which guarantee the performance of these systems. Sometimes,
even the correctness of the system may depend on these timing properties. Unfortunately,
real-time systems often have subtle timing dependencies that are difficult to analyze, and
proofs of these properties have typically been ad hoc. (See [LS93], which contains sev-
eral examples of such proofs.) This thesis develops a methodology for analyzing real-time
systems.
One family of methods that has been used successfully for analyzing untimed, or asyn-
chronous, systems is based on the notion of a simulation, which establishes a correspondence
between the given system and a more abstract system that specifies the allowable behavior.
Specifically, a system is described as a state machine, and its behavior is the externally ob-
servable aspects of the sequence of steps it performs in a particular execution. A simulation
is a correspondence between the states of a system and the states of its specification such
that any step of the system appears identical to some sequence of steps of the specification
that preserves the simulation. In this case, every behavior of the system is also a possible
behavior of its specification, and we say that the system implements its specification.
Together with invariance assertions, simulations have been used by many researchers
to verify the correctness of a wide variety of asynchronous systems, some quite complex
and subtle. They have used many different specification methods, including temporal logic,
automata, CCS, and UNITY [LS84, LT87, CM88, WLL88, Lyn89b, Mil89, Nip89, Gaw92,
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AL91, SLL93a, KMP93].
Techniques based on simulations yield rigorous, formal proofs, which typically have a
systematic decomposition into independent pieces. This structure makes proofs easier to
read and to check, both directly and using automated tools. In addition, because the system
and its specification are expressed in the same way, as an abstract program or machine,
simulation-based techniques allow layered or hierarchical proofs, where a system is proven
to have certain properties using a sequence of abstract machines beginning with one that
describes the given system and ending with one that describes the desired properties, in
which every abstract machine implements its successor.
More recently, simulation-based techniques have been extended to timed systems, pro-
viding a formal and systematic approach to proving timing properties [LA92, AL92].1 These
techniques have been demonstrated on small examples, and the style and difficulty of the
proofs are comparable to those of typical inductive assertional arguments. The local nature
of the checks suggests that this method may scale well to more complex systems. However,
it is important to test this hypothesis, by providing concrete evidence with larger examples,
and to develop a framework that exploits the strengths of simulation-based techniques, and
mitigates its shortcomings.
In particular, a methodology that exploits the strengths of simulation-based techniques
and indicates possible simulations would be very helpful. For example, Lynch and Attiya
make explicit their strategy for finding simulations with their definition of progress function
collections. Guidelines for picking appropriate intermediate specifications would also be
very useful. A good methodology will yield modular, hierarchical proofs, with intermediate
specifications and simulations that capture the intuition behind the algorithm.
Also, the proofs in [LA92] are rather lengthy and involve much tedious checking. This
seems to be an inevitable consequence of the demand for more formal reasoning. It is
important to understand how the length and complexity of the proof increases with the
system being studied. It is desirable, of course, to minimize this as much as possible
without sacrificing rigor. General theorems can capture common arguments, and eliminate
repetitive work, as well as expose additional structure. For common system components,
such as channels, standard transformations may produce simpler intermediate specifications.
If simulations are given in a standard form, this too can be exploited.
1The strong possibilities mappings of [LA92] define a simulation.
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Another promising prospect is the development of automated tools. Automated tools
can be used to mechanically verify a proof, which provides added confidence in the cor-
rectness of a proof by eliminating the possibility of human error in the manipulation of
formal expressions. Some tools can infer "trivial" steps, and so reduce the need to check by
hand the straightforward, uninteresting parts of the proof. These parts are usually omitted,
anyway, from the discussion of the proof, since they are not instructive. Nonetheless, to
have a complete proof, it is important to check that they are correct. If the tool is "smart"
enough, it may even deduce the desired claim without any guidance. If it cannot, it may
provide information indicating its difficulty, which may be helpful in constructing the proof.
This thesis builds primarily on the work by Lynch and Attiya [LA92]. To describe
timed systems, we use a variation of the timed automaton of Merritt, Modugno, and Tuttle
[MMT91], which we call the MMT automaton. An MMT automaton consists of an I/O
automaton [LT89, LT87], together with a boundmap, which specifies the timing assumptions
for the system. Following Lynch and Attiya, we incorporate the timing conditions into the
state, to yield an I/O automaton of a particular form, which we call a timed automaton.2
We then define a class of simulations, the timed forward simulations, which only considers
the admissible behaviors, those in which time is unbounded, which correspond to the real
behaviors of the system.
We use these simulations, together with invariant assertions, to prove correctness and
timing properties of two systems, a simple message-passing protocol due to LeLann, Chang,
and Roberts [LeL77, CR79] for leader election on a ring of processes, and Fischer's timing-
based mutual exclusion algorithm using a single shared read-write register [Lam87, Fis85].
For both algorithms, we use intermediate specifications to obtain hierarchical proofs, and
we extract general heuristics for finding these intermediate specifications.
We also use the Larch tools [GH93] to verify the proof for Fischer's algorithm, building
on the work by S6ylemez [S5y94], formalizing the basic model and techniques in the Larch
Shared Language (LSL), and verifying the proofs using an enhanced version of the Larch
Prover (LP) [GG91, Pog95]. This elaborates on work described in [LSGL94]. In this proof,
we also try to encapsulate commonly used arguments in lemmas, to make the proof more
modular, and to expose some general principles that may be useful in other proofs.
2This is different from the timed automaton of [MMT91]. Our terminology also differs from that of
[LA92], and reflects later usage, such as in [Lyn93, LSGL94].
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Related Work
Other models and techniques for handling time and proving timing properties have been
developed. Lynch and Vaandrager have developed a very general notion of a timed au-
tomaton, and they describe a wide variety of simulation-based techniques for this model
[LV91, LVarb]. Abadi and Lamport [AL92] demonstrate how timing properties can be
expressed using Lamport's Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA) [Lam91], and thus, the meth-
ods developed for TLA, including simulations, can be immediately applied. Their use of
simulations, however, is more restricted, and they did not address how timing properties,
specifically, can be approached systematically. Many others, including Haase [Haa81], Tel
[Tel88], Shaw [Sha89], Harel, Lichtenstein, and Pnueli [HLP90], Alur and Dill [AD90], and
Shankar and Lam [SL87, Sha92], also use models that incorporate timing information into
the state, but none of them use simulations in their proofs. Shankar uses a model almost
identical to ours, except that there are no explicit time passage steps.
Other methods for modelling timed distributed systems include temporal logic [AL92],
process algebras [DS89, Wan91, NS91], and Petri nets [CR83].
Several different approaches to proving timing properties have also been proposed, many
of them based on augmented temporal logics. The earliest work used bounded temporal oper-
ators [BH81, KVdR83], but scattered examples of an explicit clock approach, presented sys-
tematically by Ostroff [Ost89], also can be found. Henzinger, Manna, and Pnueli [HMP94]
compare these two styles. More recently, Alur and Henzinger [AH89] presented an approach
called temporal quantification, embodied by their new logic, TPTL.
Automatic verification motivated much of the design of recent temporal logics, so an im-
portant consideration was that they be decidable. Harel, Lichtenstein, and Pnueli [HLP90]
presented a decidable restricted explicit clock logic. Alur and Henzinger's TPTL is also
decidable, and in another paper [AH90], they explore the trade-off between complexity
and expressiveness. All these logics use discrete time (i.e., the natural numbers), since
extensions to dense time domains are undecidable. Alur, Courcoubetis, and Dill [ACD90],
however, present a logic based on "branching time" computation tree logic (CTL), rather
than on linear time, with a dense time domain. These logics are all intended to be used
with model-checking verification procedures, introduced by Clarke and Emerson [CE81], in
which a system is modelled by a finite state machine, and every reachable state is verified
12
to satisfy the desired property.
There are many other approaches to automatic verification. For example, Wang, Pet-
tersson, and Daniels [WPD94] present a method based on solving a system of constraints on
the clock variables of a process algebraic specification. Our approach is to follow as closely
as possible the formal reasoning we already use to convince ourselves, and use a general
purpose theorem prover to verify our steps [SGG+93, S6y94, LSGL94]. Engberg, Gronning,
and Lamport [EGL92], and Shankar [Sha93] also take this approach, though Shankar uses
PVS rather than LP.
Outline of the Thesis
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 contains some background and
motivation for those unfamiliar with formal reasoning for distributed systems in general,
and simulations in particular. The theoretical foundations, the models and techniques
used in this thesis, together with some very simple illustrative examples, are developed in
Chapter 3. The next two chapters explore in detail some larger, more interesting examples.
Particular attention should be paid to how these proofs are organized, as this illustrates
the methodology. In Chapter 4, a timing analysis for LeLann, Chang, and Roberts election
protocol for asynchronous ring networks is presented. Chapter 5 examines Fischer's timing-
based mutual exclusion algorithm, a nontrivial test case which illustrates techniques for
reasoning about time. In addition to correctness, an upper bound on the time to reach the
critical region is proved. The timing analyses in these chapters provide the only rigorous
proofs we know of for the time bounds of these algorithms. Chapter 6 considers the use of
the Larch tools to develop and verify simulation proofs, and evaluates their use in verifying
the proof of the Fischer algorithm. Chapter 7 concludes with some discussion about our
experiences, and future directions.
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Chapter 2
Background and Motivation
This chapter introduces and attempts to motivate the choices made in this thesis, in terms
of models, methods, and tools.
2.1 Formal Reasoning for Distributed Systems
2.1.1 What is a Distributed System?
As computers have become more widespread, distributed systems have become the stan-
dard computation environment. A distributed system is a collection of sequential processes
running concurrently, which must coordinate with each other in order to solve a problem.
Unlike a sequential computer, a distributed system cannot easily be described by specifying
its output on a particular set of input; the interaction between the processes must also be
considered. Thus we characterize distributed systems by the behaviors they can exhibit.
Coordination necessitates interprocess communication, which is typically expensive com-
pared with steps taken locally by individual processes. Distributed systems have different
mechanisms for communicating, and there is usually some uncertainty, such as message de-
lay, or possible loss or damage of data, that is associated with communication. Since there
are multiple independent processes, the possibility of failure of one or more of the processes
must also be accounted for, and it is important to understand how the system as a whole
behaves in the presence of such failures.
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2.1.2 The Need for Formal Reasoning
Distributed systems, and the problems we wish them to solve, can and often are described
informally. They may arise in the real world, or be an abstraction of some observed phe-
nomenon, and thus have no a priori formal specification. Reasoning informally about these
systems is often helpful, but to make clear, precise claims about them, it is important to
have a formal model in which to express and reason about them.
There are two basic reasons for using formal methods. First, good formal descriptions
make any assumptions about the system explicit, and any claims about it precise. Formal
proofs also make our reasoning very precise, indicating which facts are needed to deduce
each step in the proof. Thus, formal methods distinguish the essential features of a system
from the details of a particular implementation. This can be especially useful for extending
or generalizing the models and claims, and is helpful in understanding the system better.
Second, formal proofs can be checked more easily. For very simple systems, informal
reasoning may be clear enough, but when the reasoning is subtle or very complex, it is
difficult to argue convincingly without some formal notation that can be checked carefully.
A good formal proof can be examined in small chunks, which can be verified individually,
and then pieced together to get the desired result. It can also be made progressively more
detailed and explicit as the need arises. This makes it easier to localize and understand any
difficulties.
These reasons are especially compelling for distributed systems, for which we lack a
reliable intuitive understanding. Even apparently simple systems may exhibit a complex
variety of behaviors, some unanticipated. Good formal models help develop our intuition
about how distributed systems work.
2.1.3 Operational vs. Assertional Reasoning
Since distributed systems are characterized by their behavior, a property of the system is
a statement that is true of any behavior exhibited by that system. It is possible to reason
directly about the behavior of a system operationally, that is, as it unfolds. This often
corresponds naturally with how we might reason informally. However, since a distributed
system can exhibit a wide variety of behaviors with little natural structure, it is difficult to
1 This is an empirical observation supported by many researchers in the field [CM88, LL90, Sch93].
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check that all behaviors have been considered.2 Furthermore, minor modifications to the
algorithm often result in some vastly different behaviors, requiring proofs to be substantially
rewritten. This results in proofs that tend to be ad hoc, and difficult to follow carefully,
and which cannot easily be modified to prove properties about similar systems.
Assertional methods attempt to overcome these problems by focusing on how the system
is affected by individual steps that it can take. That is, the system is described by a
state machine, and properties are expressed as assertions about states rather than about
behaviors. The states are often viewed as a collection of state variables modified by the
actions of the machine, which captures the intuition that individual steps often only affect
part of the system.
The most important assertional technique is invariance reasoning. An invariant is an
assertion that is true of every state reachable by some execution of the system. This is
usually proved inductively on the length, that is, the number of steps, of an execution, by
showing that the initial states satisfy the invariant, and that every action maintains it. This
typically allows invariance proofs to be decomposed straightforwardly into several simpler
pieces which, taken together, establish the invariant. Thus, the difficult, and interesting,
aspect of invariance proofs is discovering the "right" invariant. This requires insight about
the system, and usually, once expressed, the invariant is helpful in understanding the system.
Safety and Liveness
When using assertional reasoning, we distinguish properties as expressing either safety or
liveness. Intuitively, a safety property is a claim that nothing bad has happened, while a
liveness property is a claim that something good eventually happens. 3 Safety depends upon
the history of an execution; liveness, on the future.
Some properties have both safety and liveness aspects. For example, in the leader
election problem, where a single leader must be selected from a collection of processes, that
"at most one leader is selected" is a safety property, and that "some leader is selected" is
a liveness property. At any point in an execution, it is easy to see whether safety has been
violated or liveness has been satisfied, but not so easy to determine that safety will not
be violated, nor that liveness will not be satisfied. Safety properties can be expressed as
2Again, this is a subjective empirical claim supported by many researchers [LL90, CM88, Lam93b].
3Alpern and Schneider define these precisely in [AS85].
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assertions about the states,4 but liveness properties cannot be. Thus, it is generally much
easier to prove safety than liveness.
2.2 Models for Distributed Systems
In the study of computation, it is useful to distinguish between the machine, that is, the
computer or network of computers, and the program executing on the machine. The ab-
stract, formal description of the machine is the model, while the abstract program is the
algorithm. A complete formal description of the system consists of the algorithm expressed
in the formal model.
2.2.1 Desiderata
A good model for any class of objects should be expressive, accurate, and tractable. That
is, it should be easy to describe any object in that class in terms of the model; conclusions
derived from the model should reflect truths about the object; and it should be possible to
derive interesting properties from the model. Thus, a good model should expose important
attributes, and conceal irrelevant details. Different models do not necessarily represent
different objects; they may present different views of the same object. So there is not one
correct model, but rather, the choice of model depends on the questions one asks.
In particular, since distributed systems are characterized by their behaviors, this should
be reflected by the model; the externally observable aspects of the model should be dis-
tinguishable. Since distributed systems are often constructed from subsystems, the model
should support some notion of composition, which allows systems to be put together to form
larger systems, in a way that corresponds with our intuition. The model must also reflect
the communication mechanism, and the cost and uncertainties associated with it, as well
as the behavior of the system in the presence of failures.
2.2.2 Modelling Time in Distributed Systems
A fundamental issue in distributed computing is modelling timing uncertainties, which
become important when the processes need to coordinate their actions with each other and,
4In some cases, it is necessary to augment the state with auxiliary variables which record the history of
the execution.
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for real-time systems, with the environment. These uncertainties arise from many factors,
such as the current load on the computer, the medium for interprocess communication, the
reliability of this medium, and the distance separating the computers, and can affect not
only the time to communicate, but also the local step times of individual processes.
Synchronous and Asynchronous Models
The simplest possibility, the completely synchronous model, ignores these uncertainties, and
assumes the processes all take steps together, in distinct rounds, where processes simply
wait until all the processes have had a chance to take a step before proceeding to the next
round. This greatly simplifies the analysis of distributed systems, and many problems have
been studied in this context [LS93]. In these models, the time complexity of an algorithm
is usually measured by the number of rounds of communication it takes.
On the other extreme, asynchronous models make no timing assumptions, forbidding
protocols from using any timing information. This provides a robust model, where algo-
rithms do not depend on any timing conditions that a particular system may not satisfy.
Also, for most systems we are interested in, where communication is expensive compared
with taking local steps, the timing uncertainty for message delivery is also likely to be
large, making it difficult, if not impossible, to synchronize computation using communi-
cation. Thus, this model is quite realistic as well, and a lot of research on distributed
algorithms has been done in this context [Dij65, Lam74, LT87, Gaw92, LS93]. In this case,
the time complexity an algorithm is measured by the number of steps it takes.
However, these models cannot be used for systems which use timing restrictions to rule
out certain behaviors, and thus achieve simpler or chaaper solutions for some problems.
Moreover, research in the asynchronous setting has yielded many impossibility results, usu-
ally giving lower bounds on the resources required to solve certain problems [Lyn89a, BL93].
Many of these results arise in the context of fault-tolerance, where the system is required
to solve the problem, even though components may fail in some specified fashion.
Partially Synchronous Models
In recent years, there has been an increased interest in introducing a formal notion of time
into distributed models (e.g., [BH81, SL87, DS89, Ost89, Wan91]), and a methodology
for proving timing properties. By taking advantage of timing restrictions, a distributed
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system designer may opt for simpler, more efficient protocols, which would not be possible
in the asynchronous setting. And many systems do have some timing assumptions, and can
tolerate seriously degraded behavior in the absence of these assumptions (e.g., the time-
out mechanism in many communication protocols). And even in the asynchronous setting,
where performance arguments are largely ad hoc, a good methodology for reasoning about
time would be useful.
Modelling timed distributed systems presents several difficulties. In state transition
systems, for example, modelling time requires a real valued state variable that varies con-
tinuously, or some similar mechanism. This greatly increases the number of states, and
requires states to change continuously rather than in discrete steps, as in conventional sys-
tems. It is possible, however, to restrict attention to an interesting subset of systems that
are modelled sufficiently well by discrete state transition systems.
We would also like our model to capture certain characteristics of time, such as its
monotonicity, and exclude from consideration executions that do not correspond to real
possibilities. Thus, our model ought to ignore executions in which time reaches a limit or
goes backward.
Furthermore, protocols using time often rely on implicit relationships among their timing
assumptions to guarantee not only performance, but also correctness, making them difficult
to decompose into modular pieces. Even small changes to these assumptions can cause
drastic changes in the behavior of a system. Because of this, reasoning about even rather
simple systems can be surprisingly difficult, and usually involves checking a lot of details.
However, liveness properties play a smaller role in timed systems than they do in untimed
systems. Claims that certain events eventually occur are often replaced with stronger claims
that they occur within a given amount of time, that is, timing or performance claims. But
since time increases without bound, timing properties are merely safety properties. This
suggests that assertional reasoning may be especially useful in this setting.
2.2.3 Models for Communication
Since interprocess communication represents the dominant cost in distributed algorithms,
the mechanism for communication is typically an important aspect of any distributed model.
While there are many different models for communication, most can be viewed as either
shared memory or message passing models.
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As implied by the name, processes in a shared memory model communicate via memory
registers that can be read and written by multiple processes. This was one of the earliest
models used [Dij65]. Because the processes are executing concurrently, it is important to
define what happens when two or more processes attempt to write into a register simulta-
neously. The simplest, and strongest, interpretation is to assume that reading and writing
the shared registers happens atomically, which means that every read and write operation
can conceptually be ordered, even though they may happen at the same time. In some
shared memory models, each shared variable can be written only by one process, though it
can be read by others, and there are many other variations of this model.
A message passing model more closely matches the intuition of a network of computers,
where a process sends a message by placing it in a message channel, and another process
receives it by removing it from the channel. These models vary in the topology of the
network they model (i.e., which other processes a process may send messages to), reliability
of the channel (e.g., whether the channel may lose messages, or deliver them out of order)
and message delivery delay (i.e., the time between when a message is sent and when it is
received).
2.2.4 Other Issues: What we do not model
This thesis is primarily concerned with analyzing the timing behavior of distributed systems,
and particularly with developing a methodology to approach proving timing properties using
simulations. So, while other issues such as composition and fault-tolerance are important
considerations in our choice of model, we shall not present them here, but rather merely
remark on them as they arise.
2.3 Simulations
Simulations form the basis for a powerful class of assertional techniques in which both the
system and its specification are modelled by abstract programs or state machines. A system
is shown to satisfy or implement its specification by establishing a correspondence, the
simulation, between the states of the two machines, such that any step of the system appears
identical to some steps of the specification that preserve the simulation. Simulation-based
methods have been widely used for verifying safety properties of asynchronous systems,
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and their value is well established. Lamport [Lam93a] and Lampson [Lam93b] have argued
that simulation-based and related techniques are the most practical methods available for
verifying concurrent systems.
2.3.1 Advantages of Simulation Proofs
Like invariants, simulations are usually established by induction on the length of an exe-
cution, and the induction step is proved for every possible action. This gives simulation
proofs a modular decomposition similar to invariance proofs.
If the state is expressed as a collection of state variables, the simulation is often the con-
junction of conditions on these variables, which can be checked almost independently. This
provides further structure and modularity to the proofs. It also typically makes them more
robust. Minor changes in the system or its requirements affect only a few of the conditions,
so little additional work needs to be done to accommodate them. This is especially useful
in the design of distributed systems.
A simulation proof typically indicates, for every possible step of the implementation,
the corresponding step, or sequence of steps, of the specification. Thus, this captures, in a
way, some of the intuition used in operational reasoning, expressing more abstractly how a
system executes. So while invariants capture the static aspects of the system, simulations
express a more dynamic view.
In addition, because there is no syntactical distinction between a system and its specifi-
cation, it is possible to introduce an intermediate system specification which can be viewed
either as a specification for the original system, or an implementation of the original speci-
fication. A good intermediate specification highlights the essential features of an execution,
and abstracts away the details used to implement these features. A sequence of interme-
diate specifications can be used to construct a layered or hierarchical proof, in which each
intermediate specification implements its successor, with the original system at the bottom
of this "hierarchy" and the original specification at the top.
An intermediate specification may also describe many systems, possibly by capturing
some common structure exploited by these systems to solve a problem. This not only is
useful for understanding the problem, but also allows the upper layers of the hierarchy to
be reused in several proofs.
One apparent disadvantage of simulation proofs is that they tend to be long compared
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with similar operational arguments. However, this is because they are very complete and
explicit, whereas operational proofs often omit the analysis of "trivial" details. Of course,
in any proof, suppression of detail is often necessary to make the structure of the proof
clear, especially when checking these details is straightforward and unilluminating. It is
still possible, indeed desirable, to omit these details in the discussion of the proof, though
they should still be checked, lest the proof be incomplete or wrong. That it is easy to
detect the omission of details that need to be checked is really an advantage, rather than a
handicap.
2.3.2 Proving Timing Properties with Simulations
As noted earlier, assertional techniques are especially promising in the timed setting, be-
cause liveness properties, which are difficult to prove, are replaced by timing properties,
which express safety rather than liveness. Several researchers have extended their models
and methods to handle time and timing conditions, and many argue that the techniques de-
veloped for the asynchronous setting carry over into their extended models, so that entirely
new techniques need not be invented.
However, most examples in literature have analyzed smaller systems, not using simula-
tions, and not proving timing properties-just correctness.
This thesis builds chiefly on the work by Lynch and Attiya [LA92], applying their
techniques to systems with more actions, and which exhibit a greater variety of behaviors.
We are interested in any general methods or heuristics to control the complexity of the
proofs, particularly for timing properties, taking advantage of the hierarchical structure
of simulation proofs. In particular, we discover that it is helpful to look for markers of
definite progress (e.g., loop termination), which we call milestones, and define intermediate
specifications with internal actions that represent reaching these milestones.
2.4 Automated Tools
Automated tools represent an important factor in determining the extent to which tech-
niques to reason formally about distributed systems can be applied. These tools can be
used to verify the formal proofs, and detect logical gaps or errors in symbol manipulation
that are likely to arise in lengthy proofs. They can also be developed to fill in "trivial"
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steps, or carry out "similar reasoning" repeatedly in several cases, and thus greatly reduce
the boring, repetitive, and tedious work often required for a truly complete proof. This
is especially useful for simulation-based proofs, because of their length and the amount of
tedious detail that needs to be checked.
2.4.1 Choosing a Tool
There is a wide range of possible useful automated tools, ranging from model-checkers
[CG87], which exhaustively search all possible states to verify properties without any human
guidance, to programs that simply check the validity of each step in a detailed proof, from
specialized provers optimized for a particular domain of applications, to general purpose
theorem provers, from provers that halt and request guidance at difficult places in the proof,
to those that search silently for solutions.
There are clearly trade-offs in the various choices. Model-checking and decision pro-
cedures, for example, work well when the state space is small. However, since theorem
proving in general is undecidable, and even when it can be decided, is often computa-
tionally intractable, these approaches that attempt to find proofs without guidance may
run indefinitely; even deciding when to terminate the search is difficult. Thus, for general
theorem proving, some human guidance is necessary. On the other hand, reducing the
need for detailed human guidance is one of the major motivations for pursuing automated
assistance. A restricted language may allow for increased automation at the expense of
expressive power, and thus preclude its use in many contexts. Highly specialized tools may
better meet the needs of the users for which it was was designed, but are less likely to find
wide applicability.
In addition, automatic provers should be able to reproduce for a human user the rea-
soning used to derive theorems, ideally in a form that lends insight about the proof. The
language understood by the prover must also be reasonably comprehensible to people, so
that there is some assurance that what the prover verifies is in fact what was intended.
Moreover, because initial attempts often have mistakes, it is important to provide mean-
ingful feedback when a proof cannot be derived, or a claim being verified is in fact not true.
When the entire proof is provided, it may be sufficient to simply point out the particular
step that fails, but as the program derives more of the proof for itself, it becomes less clear
what is useful to a human reader in order to correct the proof.
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In this thesis, we use the Larch tools [GH93] to formalize and verify proofs that corre-
spond closely with proofs that we do without automated tools. The system is formalized in
the Larch Shared Language, and checked using LP, the Larch Prover [GG91], both enhanced
to handle full first-order logic.
2.4.2 The Implications of Time
Since time is a continuous quantity, adding time to the formal model presents additional
challenges for automated tools. Tools designed specifically for finite state machines, for
example, must cope with the uncountable possibilities introduced by time. In any system,
the ability to reason about continuous quantities also needs to be added, preferably in a
way that will easily deduce the elementary properties of real numbers. Time bounds also
increase the uncertainty in the system, and inequalities are more difficult to handle than
equations, especially for tools, such as LP, which rely on rewriting terms into canonical
forms based on equations.
2.4.3 Using Automated Tools
Unfortunately, only very modest problems have been analyzed completely using automated
tools, and there is a need to evaluate whether the tools can cope with the increased com-
plexity of larger systems, especially when timing information is introduced. One of the
major goals of this thesis is to understand how proofs can be designed, and what sort of
tools should be developed, in order to improve automated assistance for proving timing
properties.
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Chapter 3
Models and Methods
In this chapter, we introduce the theoretical models and methods used in this thesis. To
simplify the discussion, we omit some structure in the model typically introduced to address
some important issues for distributed systems that are not considered in this thesis.
3.1 The I/O Automaton Model
All the work in this thesis is done in the context of I/O automata, introduced by Lynch and
Tuttle [LT87] to describe asynchronous systems. This model is a simple state transition
system, where actions of the system label the transitions between states. The actions may be
either external or internal. An execution (or run) of the system is a sequence of transitions
from one state to another, and a behavior of the system is a sequence of external actions
labelling transitions in an execution.
One of the primary motivations for using this model is the notion of composition, which
allows us to build an automaton from smaller automata in a way that corresponds to our
intuition, i.e., the resulting automaton behaves as we expect. This leads to the notion of an
action signature, which describes the interface of an automaton, i.e., how it can be composed
with other automata. The action signature distinguishes input, output, and internal actions,
where an automaton must always be able to accept any input action (though it may simply
ignore it). Composition allows us to model complex distributed systems by building them
up out of smaller systems. This provides modularity in our descriptions and our proofs.
In this thesis, however, we are concerned primarily with the issues introduced by timing,
rather than by composition, and to simplify the discussion, we do not distinguish between
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input and output actions, considering them both simply as external actions.
Formally, an I/O automaton A consists of:1
* a set states(A) of states;
* a nonempty subset start(A) of start states;
* a set acts(A) of actions, partitioned into external and internal actions;
* a set steps(A) of steps, which is a subset of states(A) x acts(A) x states(A).
We write s E A s' or just s 7 -s' as shorthand for (s, 7r, s') E steps(A).
There are no restrictions on steps(A). This allows us to easily model nondeterminism
and the fact that not all actions may be possible from any state.2 We say that an action 7r
is enabled in a state s if there is a state s' such that s s> s'.
An execution fragment is a finite or infinite alternating sequence Sorlsl0 1 r2 s2 ... , where
sj is a state, 7rj is an action, sjl-1 )sj for each j, and the sequence ends with a state if
it is finite. An execution is an execution fragment with so E start(A). A state of an I/O
automaton is reachable if it appears in some execution of the automaton. The trace of an
execution is the sequence of external actions that occur in the execution.
Intuitively, an execution represents the entire computation done by the system, up
to a certain point, if it is finite. Assertions about the system only need to be true of
reachable states, since only reachable states can occur in an execution. Traces correspond
to the visible behavior of the automaton, and executions that have the same trace (even on
different systems) cannot be distinguished externally. System requirements can only restrict
the traces, not the executions themselves, as these may depend on how we choose to model
the system.
3.2 MMT Automata
In order to reason about time in concurrent systems, Merritt, Modugno, and Tuttle extended
the I/O automaton model by defining timed executions and allowing an automaton to
1Readers familiar with I/O automata will notice that the fairness partition is not included in this defini-
tion. This is because fairness is not considered in this thesis. This notion is revived as tasks in the section
on adding timing information, but with a rather different interpretation.
2If we distinguished between input and output actions, we would require that the automaton be input-
enabled, that is, for every state s and every input action 7r, there exists a state s' such that (s, r, s') E
states(A).
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specify some restrictions on these timed executions [MMT91]; we use a special case of their
definition [LA92, LV91], which we call MMT automata. An MMT automaton partitions
the actions into tasks,3 and defines upper and lower bounds on the time it may take to
perform each task. A task is considered to be performed by any action in that task. Timed
executions are simply executions of I/O automata, with each action paired with the time
at which it occurs, where time is allowed to be any nonnegative number, and executions
are assumed to start at time 0. These times must satisfy the bounds for the tasks, as well
as some other conditions that we consider natural for time, i.e., they should not decrease
along an execution, nor should infinitely many events happen in a finite interval.
Formally, an MMT automaton M consists of:
* an I/O automaton A;
* a finite partition tasks(M) of acts(A);
* two functions, lowerM: tasks(M) [0, oo) and
upperM: tasks(M) -, (0, oo]
that satisfy lowerM(C) < upperM(C) for all C tasks(M).
We often omit the subscripts when the automaton is clear from context. The states, actions,
and steps of M are the same as those of A, i.e., states(M) = states(A), etc. We say that a
task C is enabled in a state s if any action in C is enabled in s, i.e., if 7r is enabled in s for
some 7r E C.
A timed execution of an MMT automaton is a sequence so(7rl, tl)sl(r 2, t2)s2 ... where
solrsl7r2s2 ... is an execution of the underlying I/O automaton, ti < ti+l, and ti satisfies
the given lower and upper bound requirements. Since execution starts at time 0, we define
to = 0. Formally, if a task C is enabled in sj, we say that it is newly enabled by sj-_l s
if 7ri is not enabled in sj_ 1 (or j = 0), or 7rj E C. In this case, the following conditions
must hold:
Upper bound: If there exists k > j with tk > tj + upper(C), then there exists k' > j with
tk' < tj + upper(C) such that either 7rk, E C or C is not enabled in Sk.
Lower bound: There does not exist any k > j with tk < tj + lower(C) and rk E C.
3In the more general theory of I/O automata, these were introduced to address fairness, which does not
concern us here. In this context, it is easier to have tasks only in the timed setting.
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Intuitively, the upper bound condition says that, whenever a task C is scheduled to be
done (i.e., it is enabled), if the time passes beyond its upper bound, then in the interim,
either the task is done (i.e., some action 7r E C occurs), or it was disabled. The lower bound
condition says that the task cannot be done before the specified lower bound from the time
it was newly enabled. Both of these conditions express safety properties. Like executions
for I/O automata, timed executions correspond to the computation done by the system, up
to a certain point.
A timed execution is admissible if it is infinite and the times associated with the actions
increase without bound,4 or if it is finite and every task C enabled in the final state has no
upper bound, i.e., upper(C) = oo. Each timed execution of an MMT automaton M gives
rise to a timed trace, which is just the subsequence of external actions paired with their
associated times. The admissible timed traces of an MMT automaton are the timed traces
that arise from the admissible timed executions.
An admissible timed execution corresponds to an execution in which time increases
without bound; if it is finite, the only tasks which may be enabled in the final state are
those which are not required to occur in a bounded amount of time. Thus, admissibility
expresses a liveness property. Admissible timed traces describe the visible behavior of the
system.
3.3 Timed Automata
The MMT automaton models timing constraints by imposing extra conditions on the ex-
ecutions of I/O automata. The main motivation for this is to provide a clean notion of
composition. However, this makes it difficult to use some of the methods developed for
proving properties of I/O automata; in particular, it is not obvious how to use simulations
to prove timing properties for MMT automata.
Lynch and Attiya [LA92] describe how to incorporate the timing information of an MMT
automaton M into the state, yielding an equivalent I/O automaton T of a special form. We
call automata derived in this way timed automata. This transformation is useful because
all the techniques developed for I/O automata can be immediately applied to the timed
4Infinite timed executions which only allow a finite amount of time to pass are called Zeno executions,
after Zeno's paradox, in which to reach his goal, Achilles must take an infinite number of steps, each half
the length of the remaining distance, approaching closer but never reaching it each time.
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automaton corresponding to an MMT automaton.
The idea is to augment the state with a variable now to represent current time, as well
as variables first(C) and last(C) for each task C to represent the earliest and latest times
when the task must be done. All these variables represent time in absolute, not incremental,
terms. A special time-passage action is added to allow time to increase, but not beyond
any of the deadlines set by the upper bounds. To guarantee the lower bounds, a constraint
is added to each action of the MMT automaton.
Formally, each state of T consists of the following components:
basic E states(M), initially a start state of M
now E [0, oc), initially 0, representing the current time
for each task C of M:
first(C) [0, oc), initially lowerM(C) if C is enabled in basic, 0 otherwise.
last(C) E (0, oo], initially upperM(C) if C is enabled in basic, oo otherwise.
The actions of T are the actions of M and a special time-passage action v. The time-
passage action is internal, and the other actions are classified as internal or external accord-
ing to their classification in M.
If w E acts(M), then s T s' exactly if all the following conditions hold:
* s.basic- rM s'.basic.
* S'.now = S.now.
* For each C tasks(M):
- If 7r E C then s.first(C) < s.now.
s.first(C)
s.now + lowerM(C)
0
s.last(C)
s.now + upperM(C)
oo
if C is enabled in both s.basic and s'.basic
and 7r ~ C
if C is newly enabled by s.basic- M s'.basic
if C is not enabled in s'. basic
if C is enabled in both s.basic and s'.basic
and 7r C
if C is newly enabled by s.basic r > M s'.basic
if C is not enabled in s'. basic
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- s.first(C) =
- s'.last(C) =
Notice that the three cases for s'.first(C) and s'.last(C) above are mutually exclusive, and
cover all the possibilities.
On the other hand, S-T s' exactly if all the following conditions hold:
* s'.basic = s.basic.
* s.now < s'.now.
* For each C C tasks(M):
- s'.now < s.last(C).
- s'.first(C) s.first(C)
- s'.last(C) = s.last(C).
For notational convenience, we often refer to the tasks of M as tasks of T; we say a
task is enabled in s E states(T) if it is enabled in s.basic, and that it is newly enabled by
s r >IT s' (for 7r $ v) if it is newly enabled by s.basic >M s'.basic. The following lemma
gives us necessary and sufficient conditions for an action 7r to be enabled in a state s of T.
Lemma 3.1 If T is a timed automaton and s E states(T) then
* 7r v is enabled in s if and only if r is enabled in s.basic and s.now > s.first(C),
where C is the task of 7r.5
* v is enabled in s if and only if s.now < s.last(C) for all tasks C.
Proof: This follows directly from the definition of the transformation from MMT au-
tomata to timed automata. ·
A timed execution of a timed automaton is a sequence so(7rl,t1)s(r 2, t2)s 2 ... where
so7rsl17r2 s2 ... is an execution and ti = si.now for all i. The admissible timed executions
are those in which the times associated with the actions increase without bound,6 and the
admissible timed traces are the traces of admissible timed executions. Lynch and Attiya
prove the following theorem:
Theorem 3.2 An MMT automaton and its corresponding timed automaton have the same
admissible timed traces.
5If its lower bound has not been reached, a task of a timed automaton may be enabled even though none
of its actions are. This is equivalent, but notationally more convenient, to the presentation in [LA92], which
checks whether tasks of the underlying MMT automaton are enabled.
6This forces there to be an infinite number of time-passage actions in an admissible timed execution.
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State
reported E {true, false}, initially false
countdown E N, initially k
Actions
External report Internal decrement
Pre: countdown = 0 A -reported Pre: countdown > 0
Eff: reported +- true Eff: countdown countdown - 1
Tasks
{report}: [cl,c2] {decrement}: [cl, c2]
Figure 3-1: Automaton Counter: A Simple Counter
We refer to the MMT automaton and its corresponding timed automaton interchange-
ably. Also, we often omit the basic part of the selector, writing s.field as a shorthand for
s.basic.field, where field is a component of the MMT automaton's state.
Notice also that lower bounds of 0 and upper bounds of oo impose no restrictions on the
automaton, making the corresponding first and last variables superfluous. In these cases,
we simply omit these variables from the automaton. 7
3.4 Notational Conventions and an Example
The model is described abstractly, rather than in terms of a particular language or semantics,
to allow flexibility and generality. However, we usually describe the state as a collection
of state variables, which are modified by the actions. We typically write the actions in
precondition-effect form, making it easy to determine whether an action is enabled, and if
it is, how the new state differs from the old. For the timing information, we simply list the
tasks, and the time bounds associated with each. When there is only one action in a task,
we often abuse notation by using the name of the action to denote the task as well.
A simple example, given in Figure 3-1, describes an automaton Counter which counts
down from k, and issues a report when it reaches 0. It has two state variables, reported and
countdown, and two actions, an internal decrement action and an external report action,
each in a separate task. It has lower and upper bounds of cl and c2 on the time it can take
to make a step, either to decrement its counter if it is not yet 0, or to report if it is already
0.
7Formally, we need to prove that this does not change the behavior of the automaton, which follows from
Lemma 3.3 proved later in this chapter.
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3.5 Invariants
An invariant of an automaton is any property that is true in all reachable states. We
usually establish an invariant I by proving that all start states satisfy it, and that all
steps preserve it, i.e., start(s) I(s) and I(s) A (sa s') #= I(s'). Often to establish the
induction step, we use properties already proven to be invariant, i.e., start(s) # I'(s) and
I(s) A I'(s) A (sas') I'(s'), allowing us to break the proof into more manageable pieces.
Timed automata satisfy the following invariants:
Lemma 3.3 In all reachable states of a timed automaton T, and for every task C:
1. now < last(C).
2. first(C) < now + lower(C).
3. If C is enabled then last(C) < now + upper(C).
4. If C is not enabled then first(C) = 0 and last(C) = oo.
5. If upper(C) = oo then last(C) = oo.
Proof: We only give the proof of the first; the rest are similar. We proceed, as indicated
above, by induction.
Base Case: In the start state, now = 0 and last(C) = upper(C) > 0 if task C is
enabled, and last(C) = oo if not. So now < last(C) for any task C.
Induction Step: Assuming s.now < s.last(C) and s ws', we show that s'.now <
s'.last(C). We consider separately when r is the time-passage action, and when it is
not.
Case 1 (7r = v): By construction, s'.now < s.last(C) = s'.last(C).
Case 2 (r $ v): By construction, s'.now = s.now, and we have the following
cases:
Case a (C is enabled in both s.basic and s'.basic and 7r V C):
s'.last(C) = s.last(C) > s.now = s'.now.
Case b (C is newly enabled by s.basic s'.basic):
s'.last(C) = s.now + upper(C) = s'.now + upper(C) > s'.now.
Case c (C is not enabled in s'.basic): s'.last(C) = oo > s'.now.
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We can also prove a simple invariant about Counter, which says that reported = false
unless countdown = 0.
Invariant 3.4 For Counter: If reported = true then countdown = 0.
Proof: (By induction)
Base Case: In the start state, reported = false, so this holds vacuously.
Induction Step: Assume that the invariant holds in s and that sss'.
Case 1 (r = report): s'.countdown = s.countdown = 0, so the invariant holds in s'.
Case 2 (r = decrement): s'.reported = s.reported = false, so the invariant holds
vacuously in s'.
Case 3 ( = v): s'.basic = s.basic so this invariant holds inductively.
3.6 Simulations
We often express the requirements of a system with a timed automaton that exhibits the
allowed behaviors. In this case, a system meets its specification if every behavior exhibited
by the system can also be exhibited by the specification. Formally, we say that a timed
automaton A implements another timed automaton B if every admissible timed trace of A
is an admissible timed trace of B. Thus we cannot distinguish A from B simply by observing
its behavior. Note that this relationship is not symmetric; B may allow behaviors that A
will not exhibit. Two automata are equivalent if each implements the other.
Simulations provide a powerful method to prove that one automaton implements an-
other. There are many variations of simulations [LVara, LVarb], but in this thesis, we only
need one of the simplest, the timed forward simulation.8
Formally, if A and B are timed automata then a timed forward simulation from A to B
is a relation f between states(A) and states(B) such that:
Time: If f(s, u) then u.now = s.now.
Start: If s E start(A) then there exists some u E start(B) such that f(s, u).
8This is called a weak timed forward simulation in [LV91, LVarb, Lyn93].
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Step: If f(s, u) for reachable states s and u of A and B, and s )A s', then there exists
some u' such that f(s', u') and there is some execution fragment of B from u to u'
with the same timed external behavior as (r, s'.now).
Notice that the last condition applies only to reachable states of A and B, so we may use
any invariants proved for A or B in our proof of the simulation.
We denote {u : f(s, u)} by f[s]; we usually write u E f[s] for f(s, u), and we say that u is
simulated by s. The key fact about timed forward simulations is expressed in the following
theorem:
Theorem 3.5 If there is a timed forward simulation from A to B then A implements B.
Proof: Every admissible timed trace is the trace of some admissible timed execution.
Suppose that a = s8071rs172s82... is an admissible timed execution of A. We show that if
there is a simulation f from A to B then there is an admissible timed execution a' of B
that has the same trace as a.
Let ai = S07rlS21 2 ... 7risi for i = 0, 1, .... By the start condition, there is a start state
u0 of B such that f(so, uo). We shall construct executions a of B such that a has the
same timed trace as a. Define a = uo0. Since So-- A S1, by the step condition, there is
some state ul such that f(sl, ul) and there is some execution fragment a' of B from u to
ul with the same timed external behavior as (rl,sl.now). Since uo is a start state, ac is
an execution of B, and it has the same timed trace as a = so7rlsl.
Given an execution a'il starting with uo and ending in some state ui_ E f[si-1] with
the same timed trace as ai-l, we recursively define ui and a i as follows: Since s_ 1 and
ui-1 are reachable, by the step condition, there is an execution fragment of B starting with
u_1 and ending in some state ui E f(si, ui) with the same external timed behavior as
(7ri,si.now). We use this execution fragment to extend a'l to an execution a that ends
in u. Thus a has the same timed trace as ai = acri-lriSi
If a is finite, that is a = an for some n, then we are done since a has the same timed
trace as a. Otherwise, a' = limi,,oo a' is an execution of B with the same timed trace as
a. Thus A implements B.
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State
reported E {true, false}, initially false
Actions
External report
Pre: -reported
Eff: reported - true
Tasks
{report}: [al, a2]
Figure 3-2: Automaton Report
f is a relation between the states of Counter and of Report, where u E f[s] if and only if:
u* .now = s.now
* u.reported = s.reported
ufirt(report) .first(decrement) + s.countdown. cl if s.countdown > 0
s.first(report) if -s. reported A s.countdown = 0
* u.last(report) s. last(decrement) + s.countdown * C2 if s.countdown > 
s.last(report) if -s.reported A s.countdown = 0
Figure 3-3: A Simulation from Counter to Report
3.7 A Simulation Proof
We conclude this chapter with a very simple simulation proof that illustrates many of the
common ideas used with this technique, including some general observations and heuristics,
and "natural" interpretations. We prove that the counter automaton from Section 3.4
implements a simpler automaton Report, shown in Figure 3-2, that has only a single report
action, which must occur within a specified time interval. We show that Counter implements
Report if al (k + 1)cl and a2 > (k + 1)c2. This proof is a slightly revised version of proofs
in [LA92, S6y94, LSGL94].
We begin by defining a relation f between states of the implementation automaton, in
this case Counter, and states of the specification automaton, in this case Report. This is
shown in Figure 3-3. With appropriate assumptions about the timing bounds, we prove
that this relation is a simulation from Counter to Report.
Simulations are often defined like this one, as a list of conditions, one for each state
variable of the specification, including one that guarantees the timing condition in the
simulation definition. The conditions for the untimed state variables are usually functions
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of the untimed state variables of the implementation, while the conditions on the time
bounds are usually inequalities that guarantee that the specification allows enough time for
the implementation to take the steps necessary to simulate the task. We assume here that
k > 0, so report is not enabled in the start state of Counter.
Proof that f is a simulation from Counter to Report if [(k+1)cl, (k+1)c2] C [al, a2]:
Time: By definition of f.
Start: In the start states uo and so of Report and Counter,
UO. nOW 0 = S. nOW
uo. reported = false = so. reported
uo.first(report) = al < (k + 1) ci = so.first(decrement) + so.countdown- cl
uo.last(report) = a2 > (k + 1) c2 = so.last(decrement) + so.countdown c2
so u0 E f[so].
Step: Suppose s and u E f[s] are reachable states and that s '.
Case 1 (r = report): This simulates u report U'.
Since report is enabled in s, we have s.reported = false and s.countdown = 0.
Thus, u.reported = false and u.first(report) < s.first(report) since u f[s], so
report is enabled in u, and this is a step of Report.
Thus u'.now = u.now = s.now = s'.now and u'.reported = s'.reported = true,
so u' E f[s'].
Case 2 (r = decrement): There is no corresponding step in Report. Since decrement
is internal, we show u E f[s'].
Because decrement is enabled in s, we have s.reported = false and s.countdown >
0. Thus u.now = s.now = s'.now, u.reported = s.reported = s'.reported = false,
and
u.first(report) < s.first(decrement) + s.countdown cl since u e f[s],
< s.now + s.countdown · c since decrement occured,
= s'.first(decrement) + (s.countdown - 1) cl by construction,
= s'.first(decrement) + s'.countdown cl by the effect of decrement,
u.last(report) > s.last(decrement) + s.countdown c2 since u E f[s],
> s.now + s.countdown. C2 by Lemma 3.3,
= s'.last(decrement) + (s.countdown - 1) c2 by construction,
= s'.last(decrement) + s'.countdown C2 by the effect of decrement.
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Case 3 (r = v): This simulates u u', where u'.now = s.now.
We know u' E f[s'] since u E f[s], so we only need to verify that s'.now <
u.last(report). If s.reported = u.reported = true then u.last(report) = oc. Other-
wise,
u.last(report) > f s.last(report) if s.countdown = 
s.last(decrement) + s.countdown c2 if s.countdown > 0 J
U
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Chapter 4
LeLann-Chang-Roberts Election
Algorithm
We now consider a simple asynchronous algorithm by LeLann, Chang and Roberts [LeL77,
CR79], which solves the election problem for a ring network in the message passing model.
Although the algorithm is asynchronous, we assume bounds on the communication delay
and the local step times in order to prove an upper bound on the time to election. This
does not rule out any possible behaviors, and it is commonly done in the timing analysis of
asynchronous distributed systems.
4.1 The Election Specification
In the election problem, several essentially similar processes in a network elect a single
process from amongst themselves to be the leader. This is important when dissimilar tasks
need to be performed by the processes, and so the tasks must be distributed among the
processes. Once a process has been elected, it can assign the tasks to the other processes.
We index the processes for notational convenience, but the processes do not have access
to these indices. This problem is specified by the automaton Election in Figure 4-1. Notice
that all the leader, actions constitute a single task, so this is not a distributed description of
the system. Exactly one leader action occurs within time treport, after which the automaton
takes no further (visible) actions.
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State
reported E {true,false), initially false
Actions
External leaderi
Pre: -reported
Eff: reported - true
Tasks
leader = {leaderi}: [0, treport]
Figure 4-1: Automaton Election: A Simple Specification for Leader Election
Figure 4-2: A Four Process Unidirectional Communication Ring
4.2 Some Preliminary Definitions
We only consider this problem for the simple case of an asynchronous ring network with
unidirectional communication. The processes are arranged in a circle, and each process
sends messages only to the process immediately clockwise from it, and receives messages
only from the process immediately counterclockwise. We index the processes in an n-process
ring by Zn (the integers modulo n) increasing clockwise around the ring (see Figure 4-2).
The channels are indexed by the processes they link, delivering messages clockwise around
the ring.
Although the processes do not know their indices, each process Pi has a unique identifier
UIDi E I, where I is totally ordered. Thus, if i j (mod n) then either UIDi < UIDj or
UID < UIDi. We assume each process knows only its own identifier, and nothing about
the identifiers of other processes, except that they are different from its own. In particular,
the identifiers do not necessarily increase or decrease around the ring. We also assume that
po has the maximum identifier, i.e., UIDo = max{UIDj : j E Zn). This last assumption
does not change the problem since the processes do not know their own indices, which are
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State
For each i E Z,,
statusi E {unknown, chosen, reported}, initially unknown
pending i E Queues(I), initially a queue with only UIDi
channeli,+l Queues(I), initially empty
Actions
External leaderi Internal sendi(m): m E I
Pre: statusi = chosen Pre: m is at the front of pendingi
Eff: statusi = reported Eff: m is removed from the front of pending,
m is added to the back of channel,,i+l
Internal receivei(m): m E I
Pre: m is at the front of channelil,
Eff: m is removed from the front of channeli-l,
if m > UID, then m is added to the back of pending i
if m = UIDi then statusi - chosen
Tasks
{leader,}: [0,1] sendi = {sendi(m): m E I}: [0,1]
receive, = {receive,(m): m E I}: [0, d]
Figure 4-3: Automaton LCR: LeLann-Chang-Roberts Algorithm
used for notational convenience only.
We also assume the channels are reliable and FIFO, that is, on any channel. We model
these channels by queues, adding messages sent to the back of the queue, and removing
messages received from the front.
For any set M, we denote the set of queues containing elements of M by Queues(M).
We write queues as sequences from front to back. In the queue ml, m 2, m3, for example,
ml is at the front, and will be removed next, while m3 is at the back, and was added
last. Given two queues ql and q2, their concatenation ql o q2 is the queue beginning with
the elements from ql followed by the elements of q2. Notice that if an element is removed
from the front of q2 and added to the back of ql, their concatenation ql o q2 is unchanged,
and that if it is merely removed from q2, their new concatenation is a subsequence of their
original concatenation. We will sometimes treat a queue as the set of its elements, using
appropriate notation.
4.3 LeLann-Chang-Roberts Algorithm
The automaton LCR in Figure 4-3 expresses a simple protocol proposed by LeLann [LeL77],
and improved by Chang and Roberts [CR79], to elect the process with the maximum iden-
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State
For each i E Z,
statusi E {unknown, chosen, reported}, initially unknown
pending i E Queues(I), initially a queue with only UIDi
Actions
External leaderi Internal deliveril,i(m): m E I
Pre: statusi = chosen Pre: m is at the front of pendingi_,
Eff: statusi = reported Eff: m is removed from the front of pendingi_1
if m > UIDi then m is added to the back of pending i
if m = UIDi then statusi +- chosen
Tasks
{leader/}: [0, I] deliveri,i = {deliveri_1,i(m): m E I}: [0, I + d]
Figure 4-4: Automaton NoChannel: LeLann-Chang-Roberts Algorithm Without Channels
tifier. Every process sends out its identifier, and waits for it to return around the ring.
However, an identifier is discarded by any process with a higher identifier, and a message
must be received by every process before returning to its originator. So only the maximum
identifier will not be discarded; it will return to its originator, which will then declare itself
the leader.
It is easy to see that this algorithm elects a single leader, but it is less clear how long
this protocol could take. If the processes sent messages synchronously, it would take n
rounds of communication. However, if some processes and channels are slower than others,
the messages may "pile-up" at these bottlenecks. Thus a single process may have up to n
messages pending, and the last message to be received would be delayed until all the earlier
messages are sent. This does not, however, slow down the entire system; in particular, we
show that LCR implements Election if treport > n(l + d) + 1.
We can simplify our analysis of this algorithm by noticing that from an abstract point of
view, there is little distinction between messages about to be sent, i.e., messages in pending,
and messages already sent but not yet received, i.e., messages in the outgoing channel. This
suggests a useful intermediate specification, which we develop in the next section
4.4 Eliminating Channels
We define a new automaton NoChannel, shown in Figure 4-4, which does not distinguish
between messages about to be sent, and messages already sent but not yet received. The two
queues of messages are simply concatenated, and the send and corresponding receive actions
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are replaced by a deliver action, with bounds to allow enough time to do both actions.
4.4.1 Observations and Invariants
We begin with some informal observations about the system. Recall that we are assuming
UIDo is the maximum identifier, i.e., UIDo > UID3 for all j $ 0. Thus, po will discard every
identifier it receives, and no other process will discard UIDo. Because the queues are FIFO,
the identifiers are not re-ordered in the queues; each will be received by po according to the
position of its process in the ring, unless it is discarded by some other process. In particular,
when UIDo is received by po, all other identifiers must already have been discarded. Also,
no process other than po will change its status, i.e., all other processes will always have
status = unknown.
To formally state and prove this intuition as invariants of NoChannel, let messages 
pendingn_1 opending,_2o .. opendingo, the queue of identifiers that have not been discarded,
beginning with the next one to be delivered to po. We begin by showing that the identifiers
in messages may be discarded, but not re-ordered or duplicated, i.e., messages is always a
subsequence of messages in the start state. This is a special case of the following invariant:
Invariant 4.1 For NoChannel:
For all k, pending k opendingk_ 1 o .. .opending o is a subsequence of UIDk, UIDki,..., UIDo.
Proof: (By induction)
Base Case: In the start state, pending k = UIDk for all k, so pending k o · · o pending o =
UII)k,... ,UIDo0 .
Induction Step: Assume this holds for s and s s'.
Case 1 (r = leaderi or 7r = v): s'.pending k = s.pending k for all k so this holds
inductively.
Case 2 (r = deliveri,i+l(UIDj)): The pending queues change only in that UID is
removed from the front of pending i and possibly added to the back of pendingi+l,
so s'.pendingk o ... s'.pending o is a subsequence of s.pending k o ... o s.pendingo,
which by the inductive hypothesis, is a subsequence of UIDk,..., UID for all k.
U
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We have the following useful corollary:
Invariant 4.2 For NoChannel:
If UIDk is at the front of pendingk_1 then k = 0 and messages = UIDo.
Proof: This follows immediately from the previous invariant, since UIDk pendingk_1 o
·.. o pending o C UIDk_1,... ,UID, unless k = 0, and thus k - 1 = n - 1. But then
messages = pending,_l o ... o pending o is a subsequence of UID_i,... , UIDo, with UIDo
in front, so messages = UIDo. ·
The next invariant asserts that only po will ever change its status, that is, every other
process will always have status = unknown.
Invariant 4.3 For NoChannel: statusk = unknown for all k 0.
Proof: (By induction)
Base Case: In the start state, statusk = unknown for all k.
Induction Step: Assume this holds in s, and that s s'.
Case 1 (r = deliveri_l,i(UIDi)): Since UIDi is at the front of s.pendingi_l, by
Invariant 4.2, i = 0. So s'.statusk = s.statusk = unknown for all k / i = 0, by
the inductive hypothesis.
Case 2 (r = deliveri_l,i(UIDj) for j $ i or r = leader/ or 7r = v):
s'.statusk = s.statusk for all k, so this holds inductively.
Finally, we prove that po will know it is the leader only after it has discarded its own
identifier, which will be the last one to be discarded.
Invariant 4.4 For NoChannel: statuso = unknown UIDo E messages X: messages $ 0.
Proof: (By induction)
Base Case: In the start state, statusi = unknown for all i and UIDo E messages.
Induction Step: Assume that this holds in s, and that ss'.
Case 1 (s.statuso #4 unknown): By the inductive hypothesis, s.messages = 0, and
so s'.statuso y4 unknown and s'.messages = 0.
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f is a relation between states of LCR and of NoChannel, where u E f[s] if and only if:
* u.now = s.now
* u.statusi = s.statusi for all i E Zn
* u.pending i = s.channeli,i+1 o s.pending i for all i E Zn
* u.1std eiivej ji· ,( f s.last(receivei+a) if s.channeli,i+l is not empty
u.last(deliver ) s.last(sendi) + d otherwise
* u.last(leaderi) > s.last(leaderi) for all i E Zn
Figure 4-5: A Simulation from LCR to NoChannel
Case 2 (s.statuso = unknown): By Invariant 4.3, s.statusi = unknown for all i, so
X 5 leader/.
Case a (r = deliver_l,(UIDo)): Since UIDo is at the front of s.pending,_ , by
Invariant 4.2, s.messages = UIDo. So s'.statuso = chosen and s'.messages =
0.
Case b (r = deliveri_l,i(UIDo) for i 0): Since the identifiers are unique and
UIDo is the maximum, UIDo > UIDi. So UIDo 0 s'.pending i C s'.messages
and s.statuso = s.statuso = unknown.
Case c (r = delivern_l,o(UIDj) for j 0): By the inductive hypothesis, UIDo E
s.messages, so UIDo E s'.messages and since the identifiers are unique,
UTIDo $ UIDj, so s'.statuso = s.statuso = unknown.
Case d (r = deliveri_l,i(UIDj) for i,j 0): By the inductive hypothesis,
UIDo E s.messages, both of which are unchanged by this action.
Case e (r = v): s'.basic = s.basic so this holds inductively.
4.4.2 LCR Implements NoChannel
We now show that LCR implements NoChannel by proving that the relation f defined in
Figure 4-5 is a simulation from LCR to NoChannel. Notice that the timing condition for
the deliveri,i+l task only requires the upper bound to allow enough time for the next send
action and its corresponding receivei+l, if there are no messages already sent but not yet
received, i.e., if channeli,i+l is empty. The following proof is straightforward, and does not
even require the invariants proved above.
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Proof that f is a simulation from LCR to NoChannel:
Time: By definition of f.
Start: If so and u0o are start states of LCR and NoChannel then uo.now = 0 = so.now and
for all i E Z:
uo.statusi = unknown = so.statusi
so.channeli,i+i is empty
uo.pending i and so.pendingi both contain only UIDi
uo.last(deiveri,i+ ) = I + d = so.last(sendi) + d
uo.last(leaderi) = oo
So uo E f[so].
Step: Suppose that s and u E f[s] are reachable states and that s s'.
leader/Case 1 (r = leader/): This step is simulates u - u', which has the same external
behavior.
a. To see that leaderi is enabled in u, notice
u.statusi = s.statusi since u E f[s]
= chosen since leaderi is enabled in s
b. We have u' E f[s'], since u E f[s] and all variables are unchanged except
u'.statusi = reported = s'.statusi and
u'.last(leaderi) = oo = s'.last(leaderi)
Case 2 (r = sendi(UIDj)): There is no corresponding action in NoChannel. This
has the same external behavior since sendi(UIDj) is internal.
We have u E f[s'] since u E f[s] and s' = s except for s'.pendingi, s'.channeli,i+l,
s'.last(sendi), and possibly s'.last(receivei+l), and:
a. Since UIDj is removed from the front of pending i and added to the back of
channeli,i+l, we have s'. channeli,i+l os'.pendingi = s. channeli,i+ os.pendingi.
b. If s.channeli,i+l is empty, i.e., receivei+l is not enabled in s, then
u.last(deliver,+i) > s.last(sendi) + d since u E f[s],
> s.now + d by Lemma 3.3,
= s'.last(receivei+l) since receivei+l is newly enabled.
c. If s.channeli,i+l is not empty, then s'.last(receivei+l) = s.last(receivei+l).
deliver/_ i(UIDj)Case 3 ( = receivei(UID3)): This simulates u u, which has the
same external behavior because both are internal.
a. Since UIDj is at the front of s.channeli_l,i, then UIDj is at the front of
u.pendingi_l = s.channeli_l,i o s.pending-_l, so deliveri_,i(UIDj) is enabled
in u.
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b. We need to check that u' E f[s']. Notice that s' = s except for channeli_l,i,
last(receivei), and possibly either pending i and last(sendi) or statusi and
last(leaderi), and u' = u except for pendingi_l and last(deliveri_l,i), and
possibly either pending i and last(deliveri,i+l) or statusi and last(leaderi).
UIDj is removed from the front of both s.channeli_l,i and u.pendingi_l, so
u'.pendingi_ = s'.channeli_l,i o s'.pendingi_1. If this is not empty, then
u'.last(deliveri_,i) = u.now + I + d, which, by Lemma 3.3, is greater than
s'.last(receivei) if s'.channeli_1,i is empty, and greater than s'.last(sendi_l)+
d otherwise.
If UIDj < UIDi, this is all that needs to be checked. If UIDj = UIDi then
u'.statusi = s'.statusi = chosen, and u'.last(leaderi) = st.last(leaderi) =
s'.now + 1. If UIDj > UIDi then UIDj is added to the back of pending i (in
both s and u), so u'.pendingi = s'.channel,i+l o s'.pendingi. If u.pendingi
is empty, then u'.last(deliveri,i+l) = s'.now + I + d = s'.last(sendi) + d.
Otherwise, u'.last(deliver,i+l) = u.last(deliveri,i+l) which is greater than
s'.last(receivei+l) = s.last(receivei+l) if s'.channeli,i+l = s.channeli,i+ is
not empty, and greater than s'.last(sendi) + d = s.last(sendi) + d if it is.
Case 4 (r = v): This simulates u u' such that u'.now = s'.now, which has the
same external behavior.
a. We know u E)u' because for all i, s'.now < s.last(leaderi) < u.last(leaderi)
and
s'.now I s.last(receivei+l) if channelii+ ulatdever
s.last(sendi) + d if channel = 0 J .last(de
b. Since u E f[s] and all variables except now are unchanged, u' E f[s'].
4.5 A Template for Synchronous n-round Algorithms
The invariants in the previous section prove that NoChannel will never elect any leader
other than po, but they do not establish that po will actually be elected. For the rest of
this chapter, we establish not only that it will be elected, but also an upper bound on the
time to election. We do this by viewing the automaton as though it were a synchronous
n-round algorithm. We capture this by defining a simulation between NoChannel and a
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State
reported E {true, false}, initially false
round E N, initially 0
Actions
External leaderi Internal increment
Pre: round = n A -reported Pre: round < n
Eff: reported - true Eff: round - round + 1
Tasks
leader = {leaderi}: [0, 1] {increment}: [0, p]
Figure 4-6: Automaton Rounds: A Template for n-Round Algorithms
simple automaton Rounds, shown in Figure 4-6, which keeps track of the rounds already
completed.
The increment action signifies the end of an abstract round. At the end of the nth
round, the leader task becomes enabled. Notice that, as in Election, all the leader actions
are in a single task. Rounds and Election are essentially the same as Counter and Report
in Chapter 3, except that the automaton now counts up to n, rather than down to 0.
Also, the single report action is replaced by a set of leader actions, and the bounds on the
two tasks of Rounds are different. However, the proof that Rounds implements Election
when treport > np + I is identical in form to the proof that Counter implements Report in
Section 3.7, so we do not reproduce it here.
4.6 NoChannel Implements Rounds
In this section, we show how to simulate the rounds of a synchronous execution. Intutively,
one round of communication, which may take up to I + d time to complete, corresponds
to a deliver action for every pair of connected processes with a message pending. Because
of the asynchrony, one "round" may start before the previous one, even several previous
ones, ends. We are only interested in the number of rounds that have completed, which we
determine by the "distance" the "slowest" messages have travelled.
4.6.1 Preliminary Definitions and Lemmas
To capture this intuition formally, we introduce the notion of the reach of a process, which
corresponds to the distance its identifier has travelled. This can be determined by the
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pending queue it appears in, unless it has already been discarded, in which case the reach
is defined to be n. The "slowest" identifiers are then those of processes with the minimum
reach, and the processes which contain these identifiers in their pending queues are the
bottlenecks. Formally, for any reachable state of NoChannel, we define:
i - j E {O,1,..., n- 1} if UIDj E pendingi
n if UIDj ~ messages
This is well-defined because, by Invariant 4.1, UIDj E pending i for at most one i Z.
* minreach = min{reach(j): j e Zn) is the minimum reach of any process.
* Slowest = {j e Zn: reach(j) = minreach} is the set of indices of processes with the
"slowest" identifiers.
* Bottlenecks = {i E Z: UIDj E pending i for some j E Slowest} is the set of indices
of processes holding the "slowest" identifiers.
Lemma 4.5 The following are true:
* In any state of NoChannel, reach(j) = n if and only if UIDj messages and
minreach = n if and only if messages = 0 if and only if Bottlenecks = 0.
deliver/,+l (UID1 )* If s ii+ (j)I s' then s'.reach(j) > s.reach(j) and s'.minreach > s.minreach.
Proof: This follows directly from the definitions of reach and Bottlenecks. ·
4.6.2 The Simulation
We now show that NoChannel implements Rounds by proving that the relation g defined
in Figure 4-7 is a simulation from NoChannel to Rounds. Recall that P0 has the maximum
identifier. so that it will eventually report that it is the leader. Following the intuition
above, the round is determined by the minimum reach of any process. The upper bound on
the increment action must allow enough time for all of the slowest identifiers to be delivered.
By definition, these identifiers are in the pending queues of the bottleneck processes.
1Note reach: Z - Z for each state of NoChannel.
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g is a relation between states of NoChannel and of Rounds, where u E g[s] if and only if:
* u.now = s.now
* u.reported = s.statuso = reported
* u.round = s.minreach
* u.last(leader) > s.last(leadero) if s.statuso = chosen.
* u.last(increment) > s.last(deliveri,i+i) if i E s.Bottlenecks
Figure 4-7: A Simulation from NoChannel to Rounds
Proof that g is a simulation from NoChannel to Rounds if p > I + d:
Time: By definition of g.
Start: In the start states u0o and so of Rounds and NoChannel,
uo.now = 0 = so.lnow
uo.reported = false and so.statuso = unknown $ reported
uo.round = 0 = so.minreach since reach(j) = 0 for all j
uo.last(increment) = p l + d = so.last(deliveri,i+ ) for all i
so u0 E g[so].
Step: Assume s and u E g[s] are reachable states and that s'.
Case 1 (r = leader/): Since s.statusi = chosen, by Invariant 4.3, i = 0. This step
leaderUsimulates u leader u' for some u', which has the same external behavior.
a. To see that leadero is enabled in u, note
s.messages = 0 by Invariant 4.4
s.minreach = n by Lemma 4.5
u.round = n since u E g[s]
-u.reported since u E g[s] and s.statuso = chosen
b. We have u' E g[s'] since u E g[s] and all variables are unchanged except
s'.status = reported and u'.reported = true, and u'.last(leader) = oo =
s'.last(leaderi).
Case 2 (r = deliveri,i+l(UIDj)): Since this is internal, it must simulate internal
actions, i.e., increment.
Case a (j = i + 1): This step simulates u increment u for some u'.
By Invariant 4.2, j = 0 and s.messages = UIDo, since UIDj is at the front of
s.pendingj_1. Thus, s.minreach = n- 1 and s'.messages = 0, s'.statuso =
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chosen, s'.minreach = n, and s'.last(leadero) = s.now + 1. So increment is
enabled in u.
To see that u' E g[s'], we check u'.round = n and u'.reported = false since
u e g[s], and u'.last(leader) = u.now + I = s.now + I since leader is newly
enabled.
Case b (s.Slowest = j) and i + 1 j): This simulates the execution fragment
increment incrementund = mnec
· u-u-- * - ~u,  where u'.round = s.minreach.
Such an execution fragment exists because u.reported = false, and this is not
changed by increment actions, and u.round = s.minreach < s'.minreach < n
by Lemma 4.5. Moreover, s'.reach(j) > s.reach(j) by Lemma 4.5, and for
all j' j, s'.reach(j') = s.reach(j') > s.reach(j), so we have s'.minreach >
s.minreach, and there is at least one increment in the execution fragment.
Since s.messages 5# 0, by Invariant 4.4, UIDo E s.messages. But UIDo is not
discarded by any action except delivern_l,(UIDo), so UIDo E s'.messages,
and s'.minreach < n.
We have u' E g[s'] because u' = u except u'.round = s'.mrninreach and
u'.last(increment) = u.now + p > s'.now + (I + d) > s'.last(deliveri,,i+l)
for any i' such that s'.pendingi, y 0.
Case c (j E s.Slowest but s.Slowest ({j}): There is no corresponding action
in Rounds. We have s'.reach(j') = s.reach(j') = s.minreach for some j' 
j, so s'.minreach = s.minreach. Thus, s'.Slowest = s.Slowest - (j), and
s'.Bottlenecks = s.Bottlenecks - i), so u E g[s'].
Case d (j s.Slowest): Again, there is no corresponding action in Rounds.
Since s'.reach(j') = s.reach(j') for all j' 54 j, we have s'.Slowest = s.Slowest.
So s'.Bottlenecks = s.Bottlenecks and u E g[s'].
Case 3 (r = v): This simulates u u' where u'.now = s'.now, which has the same
external behavior.
If leader is enabled in u then s.statuso # reported and s.minreach = n since u E
g[s]. By Lemma 4.5, s.messages = 0, so by Invariant 4.4, s.statuso $ unknown,
so s.statuso = chosen. Thus u.last(leader) > s.last(leadero) > s'.now.
If increment is enabled in u then s.minreach < n, so i E s.Bottlenecks for some i
by Lemma 4.5, and u.last(increment) > s.last(deliveri,i+l) > s'.now.
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And u' E g[s'] since u E g[s] and all variables except now are unchanged.
4.7 Discussion
We conclude this chapter with a few remarks about the approach used in this proof. First,
we note that the formal details of the proof were much easier to handle because of the hier-
archical structure. For example, by introducing NoChannel, the difficulty in the proof was
isolated mostly to the consideration of the deliver actions in the simulation from NoChannel
to Rounds. Without this intermediate abstraction, much of that proof would need to be
repeated for both the send and the receive actions of LCR. In addition, because there is no
conceptual distinction between messages about to be sent, and messages sent but not yet
received, this also simplified the statements of the invariants.
Second, each of the intermediate automata introduced in this example illustrate an
important idea that may be useful in many other simulation proofs. The reduction of the
buffered FIFO channels to a single queue representing both the pending buffer and the
channel should be applicable to any automaton that has this mechanism. As mentioned,
this allows us to reason about a simpler automaton, and makes the proofs clearer.
The Rounds automaton illustrated the idea of milestones, which we will see again in the
next example. In this case, we view an asynchronous algorithm as running synchronously
by specifying the "round" corresponding to each state. To do this, it is useful to track
the progress of every message. The current round then corresponds to the "distance" the
"slowest" message has travelled. Although the rounds here all have the same time bounds,
this is not necessary. The important point is that it must be possible to partition the states
so that the automaton never returns to one class of states once it has left it, before reaching
the desired goal.
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Chapter 5
Fischer's Mutual Exclusion
Algorithm
We now consider the mutual exclusion problem, in which several processes compete for a
critical resource. The mutual exclusion requirement demands that at most one process has
the resource at any time. Burns and Lynch [BL93] proved that in the asynchronous shared
memory model, the mutual exclusion problem for n processes requires at least n atomic
read/write shared variables. In this chapter, we examine Fischer's timing-based mutual
exclusion algorithm [Fis85, Lam87], using only a single shared variable. In addition to
mutual exclusion, we prove an upper bound on the time any process must wait to acquire
the resource while it remains unused. Our primary interest in this algorithm is as a test
case for the methods we have developed for proving timing properties.
5.1 The Mutual Exclusion Problem Specification
In the mutual exclusion problem, several processes, called users, are competing for a critical
resource, which cannot be used simultaneously by two processes. When a process is using
the resource, we say that it is critical, or that it is in its critical region. When it does not
need the resource, it is in its remainder region. To manage the resource, the users may
have to take additional steps to acquire or release the resource, during which we say a user
is in its trying or exit regions respectively. We assume that once a user has the resource, it
will not be interrupted, i.e., it may continue to use the resource until it releases it.
The timed automaton Mutex in Figure 5-1 is the specification for a system that not
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State
regioni E {remainder, trying, critical, exit} for i E I, initially remainder
Actions
External tryi External exiti
Pre: regioni = remainder Pre: regioni = critical
Eff: regioni - trying Eff: regioni - exit
External criti External remi
Pre: regioni = trying Pre: regioni = exit
for all j, regionj 4 critical Eff: regioni - remainder
Eff: regioni - critical
Tasks
{tryi}: [O,oo] {exiti): [, oo]
crit = {criti : i E I}: [0, tcrit] {remi}: [0, trem]
Figure 5-1: Automaton Mutex: A Simple Specification for Mutual Exclusion
only guarantees mutual exclusion, but also upper bounds on the time that any user must
spend in its trying region before some user is in its critical region, and the time any user
must spend in its exit region. This automaton keeps track of the regions of each of the
users (with indices in I), and ensures that at most one user is in its critical region at any
time. Notice that all crit actions belong to the same task. Intuitively, this means that if
some users are trying to acquire the resource when it is free, then one will succeed within
the specified upper bound. This specification is not truly distributed, that is, it does not
describe a truly distributed system, because the users can access each other's state.
5.2 Fischer's Mutual Exclusion Algorithm
Fischer proposed a simple timing-based algorithm using only a single n + 1-valued atomic
variable x that can be read and written by all the users. This register can contain any of
the users' names, or a special free value. For simplicity, we will use a user's index as its
name, and 0 as the free value. Intuitively, if a user is critical, the register contains its name,
and if every user is in its remainder region, the register is free, i.e., it contains 0. Figure 5-2
contains A familiar pseudocode-style listing of the program executed by each user is given
in Figure 5-2, and the corresponding timed automaton Fischer is shown in Figure 5-3. User
i is in its trying region if pci E {testing, set, checking, leave-trying}), and in its exit region if
pci C {reset, leave-exit).
Each user trying to obtain the resource first tests the register until it is free, and when
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Shared variable: x E I U {O}, initially O.
(pci)
remainder *** Remainder Region ***
tryi
testing wait until x = 0
set x -i
pause
checking if x $ i then goto test
leave-trying criti
critical *** Critical Region ***
exiti
reset x - 0
leave-exit remi (goto remainder)
Figure 5-2: Pseudocode for User i
State
pc E {remainder, testing, set, checking, leave-trying, critical, reset, leave-exit}
x E I U {0}, initially 0
Actions
for i E I, initially remainder
External tryi
Pre: pci = remainder
Eff: pci + testing
Internal testi
Pre: pci = testing
Eff: if x = O then pci set
Internal seti
Pre: pci = set
Eff: x -- i
pci - checking
Internal checki
Pre: pc/ = checking
Eff: if x = i
then pci - leave-trying
else pci - testing
Tasks
Assume a < b < c
{tryi}: [0, oo]
{testi}: [O,a]
{seti}: [O,a]
{checki}: [b, c]
External criti
Pre: pci = leave-trying
Eff: pci , critical
External exiti
Pre: pci = critical
Eff: pci - reset
Internal reseti
Pre: pci = reset
Eff: x - 0O
pci - leave-exit
External remi
Pre: pci = leave-exit
Eff: pci - remainder
{criti}: [O, a]
{exiti}: [O0,oo]
{ reseti}: [0, a]
{rem/}: [, a]
Figure 5-3: Automaton Fischer: Fischer's Algorithm
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it is, sets it to its own name. Since several users may be competing for the resource, the
user pauses long enough to give every user a chance to set the register. Then, when the
register value has stabilized, it checks if the register still contains its name. If it does, the
user takes the resource. Otherwise, it returns to testing until the register is free again. The
last user to set the register gets the resource, and upon exiting, resets the register to 0.
To maintain mutual exclusion, every user must allow enough time for the register to
stabilize before checking it. Otherwise, two users could both test the register and find it
free. The faster one could then set and check the register, and enter its critical region
before the slower one even manages to set the register. The slow user would then overwrite
the register, and find its name still there when it checks. Thus, it would also enter its
critical region, violating mutual exclusion. This is avoided by a simple timing restriction
that requires each user to allow enough time before checking the register for any other user
to set it. Formally, upper(seti) < lower(checkj) for all i,j E I.
Notice that every action is a task by itself, and no user can access the state of any other
user, corresponding to the intuition that each user acts independently of the other users.
Also, each action reads or writes the shared register at most once, and external actions do
not access it at all. This corresponds to the intuition that in one step an atomic read/write
register can only be either read or written by a single process. We define time bounds for all
the tasks other than tryi and exiti in order to prove the time bounds for the specification.1
We wish to prove that Fischer implements Mutex if tcrit > 5a + 2c and trem > 2a.
5.3 Fischer's Algorithm Satisfies Mutual Exclusion
In this section, we demonstrate that Fischer's algorithm satisfies mutual exclusion. This
is done entirely by proving some invariants about Fischer. But first we note the following
useful fact:
Lemma 5.1 For Fischer: If s -os' and s'.x 0 then 7r = set,.x or s.x = s'.x.
Proof: (By inspection)
Only the set and reset actions modify x, but the reset actions set x to 0, and s'.x 0.
Next we establish the following easy invariant:
'We can show tight, slightly better bounds; see Section 5.8.
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Invariant 5.2 For Fischer: If x 4 0 then pcx E {checking, leave-trying, critical, reset).
Proof: (By induction)
Base Case: In the initial state, x = 0, so this holds vacuously.
Induction Step: Assume that s satisfies the invariant, and that s s'.
Assume: s'.x = i 0.
Prove: s'.pci E {checking, leave-trying, critical, reset)
Case 1 (r = set/): s'.pci = checking
Case 2 (r $ seti): By Lemma 5.1, s.x = i.
By the inductive hypothesis, s.pci E {checking, leave-trying, critical, reset}.
But 7r reset/, so s'.pci E {checking, leave-trying, critical, reset} also.
Recall that for this algorithm to work, every user must delay checking the register until
all other users have a chance to set it. We only need to show this for the user whose index
is currently in the register, since only it can successfully complete the check action and
proceed to its critical region. The following invariant captures this crucial intuition.
Invariant 5.3 (Sufficient Confirmation Delay) For Fischer:
If x y$ 0 and pc = checking then first(checkx) > last(setj) for all j such that pcj = set.
Proof: (By induction)
Base Case: This holds vacuously in the initial state.
Induction Step: Assume that it holds in some reachable state s, and that sss'.
Assume: s'.x = i 0 and s'.pci = checking.
Prove: s'.first(checki) > s'.last(setj) for all j such that s'.pcj = set.
Case 1 (7r = seti): By the timing restriction and Lemma 3.3, if s'.pcj = set (i.e.,
setj is enabled in s'.basic) then s'.first(checki) = s'.now + lower(checki) >
s'.now + upper(setj) > s'.last(setj).
Case 2 (r seti): By Lemma 5.1, s.x = i, so r 54 testj for any j.
If s'.pcj = set then s.pcj = set also, so setj is not newly enabled by s -s'.
Also, s.pc i = checking, so by the inductive hypothesis, s'.first(checki) =
s.first(checki) > s.last(setj) = s'.last(setj).
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We can now prove the invariant that demonstrates mutual exclusion. It says that if any user
is in the critical region, or immediately before or after it, then its index is in the variable x
and no other user is about to overwrite it. Notice that there is no timing information in the
statement of this invariant, though timing information is used in its proof. This invariant
is slightly stronger than mutual exclusion, and clearly implies it:
Invariant 5.4 (Strong Mutual Exclusion) For Fischer:
If pci E {leave-trying, critical, reset}, then x = i and pcj ~ {set, leave-trying, critical, reset}
for all j i.
Proof: (By induction)
Base Case: This holds vacuously in the initial state.
Induction Step: Assume that this holds in some reachable state s, and that sa s'. If
7r = v, then s'.basic = s.basic, and this holds inductively. So assume that 7r v.
Case 1 (s.pci E {leave-trying, critical, reset} for some i): s.x = i and for all j i,
we have s.pcj {set, leave-trying, critical, reset}.
Case a (r E {criti, exiti}): s'.pcj = s.pcj {set, leave-trying, critical, reset} for
all j f i and s'.x = s.x = i, so the invariant holds.
Case b (r = reseti): s'.pcj , {set, leave-trying, critical, reset} for all j (includ-
ing i), so the invariant holds vacuously.
Case c (r E {tryj,testj,checkj,remj} for some j i): s'.x = s.x = i, and
for all j' {i,j), s'.pcj, = s.pcj, {set, leave-trying, critical, reset}, and
s'.pcj {set, leave-trying, critical, reset} since s.x ({i,j), so the invariant
holds in s'.
From the possible values of the pc variables in s, no other actions are enabled.
Case 2 (s.pcj {leave-trying, critical, reset} for all j):
Case a ( = checks. ): Since s.first(checkS.x) < s.now < s.last(setj) for all j,
by Invariant 5.3, s.pcj set for all j. So this holds because s'.x = s.x, and
s'.pcj ({set, leave-trying, critical, reset} for all j s.x.
Case b (r check,.): s'.pcj {leave-trying, critical, reset} for all j, so this
holds vacuously.
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State
regioni E {remainder, trying, critical, exit} for i E I, initially remainder
status, an element of {start, seized, stable}, initially start
Actions
External tryi External criti
Pre: regioni = remainder Pre: regioni = trying
Eff: regioni - trying status = stable
Eff: regioni - critical
Internal seize status - start
Pre: for some i, region i = trying
status = start External exiti
for all j, regionj $ critical Pre: regioni = critical
Eff: status- seized Eff: regioni - exit
Internal stabilize External remi
Pre: status = seized Pre: regioni = exit
Eff: status - stable Eff: regioni remainder
Tasks
{tryi}: [0, o] crit = {criti: i E I}: [0, a + c]
{seize}: [0, 3a + c] {exiti}: [0, oo]
{stabilize}: [0, a] {remi}: [0, 2a]
Figure 5-4: Automaton Milestone: An Intermediate Milestone Automaton
5.4 Milestones: An Intermediate Abstraction
Although Invariant 5.4 guarantees mutual exclusion, it does not bound the time a user may
be in its trying region before some user (not necessarily the same one) enters its critical
region. Intuitively, it can not be too long, since once any user sets the register, only users
that have already tested the register and found it free will overwrite it. Each such user will
set the register only once until the register becomes free again, and the last user that sets
it will enter its critical region after waiting an appropriate amount of time, and its name
will remain in the register until it resets it as it exits.
While we could construct a simulation directly from Fischer to Mutex, we find it useful
to introduce an intermediate level of abstraction which captures this intuition. We define
an automaton Milestone, shown in Figure 5-4, with actions that correspond to milestones
toward the goal of some user entering its critical region. We then construct two intuitive
simulations, one from Fischer to Milestone, and one from Milestone to Mutex, which to-
gether establish that every admissible timed trace of Fischer is an admissible timed trace
of Mutex.
We say that the register is seized when a user sets it from 0 to its name. This is the first
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milestone; the register will not be free again until after some user enters its critical region,
and resets the register as it exits. Thus, all the users that will set the register must have
already tested it. The second milestone occurs when the last user sets the register. At this
point we say the register is stable; no user will set it again until it has been reset by this
user when it exits its critical region. If only one user wants the resource, then when it sets
the register, it is both seized and stabilized. Notice that seize and stabilize are not actions
of individual users, but of the entire system.
Informally, we might reason that a user entering its trying region will seize the register,
if it is free, within time 2a, i.e., enough time to do both test and set the register. Then
every user that has already tested the register must set it within time a, after which the
register will be stable. Finally, the last user to set the register will check it, and then enter
its critical region within time a + c. However, this does not take into account the possibility
that a user could already be in its trying region when the critical user exits. In this case,
the register may not be free for additional time a, after which any user waiting to test the
register will do so within time 2a as above, for total of time 3a. But if the only users trying
are still waiting to check the register, then it may take an additional time c before any
discover their names have been overwritten, and are ready to test the register again. Thus,
the upper bound for the seize action is 3a + c.2
We first prove the following easy invariant, which simply states formally that the register
is only seized or stable if some process is making progress towards its critical region, that
is, that it is in its trying region, and no other process is critical.
Invariant 5.5 For Milestone:
If status start then regioni = trying for some i and regionj 5- critical for all j.
Proof: (By induction)
Base Case: This holds vacuously in the initial state.
Induction Step: Assume that this holds in some reachable state s, and that so-) s'.
Case 1 (s.status = start): r #4 stabilize or criti for any i.
Case a (r = seize): s'.regioni = s.regioni = trying for some i, and s'.regionj =
s.regionj critical for all j.
2 This is not tight, and will be improved in Section 5.8.
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g is a relation between the states of Milestone and of Mutex, where u E g[s] if and only if:
* .nOW = s.now
* u.region, = s.regioni
s.last(seize) + 2a + c if s.regioni = trying for some i, and
s.status = start, and
* u.last(crit) > s.regionj critical for all j,
_ s.last(stabilize) + a + c if s.status = seized,
s.last(crit) if s.region, = trying for some i, and
s.status = stable.
* u.last(remi) > s.last(remi) if s.regioni = exit
Figure 5-5: A Simulation from Milestone to Mutex
Case b (r E tryj,exitj,remj) for some j): s'.status = s.status = start, so this
holds vacuously.
Case 2 (s.status start): s.regioni = trying for some i and s.regionj $ critical for
all j, so 7r (seize, tryi, exiti, remi}.
Case a (r E tryj,exitj,remj) for some j i): s'.regioni = s.regioni = trying,
s'.regionj critical, and for all j' $ j, s'.regionj, = s.regionj critical. (r
cannot be exitj, but we deal with it here rather than make a separate case.)
Case b (r = critj for some j): s'.status = start, so this holds vacuously.
Case c (r = stabilize): s'.regionj = s.regionj for all j so this holds inductively.
5.5 Milestone Implements Mutex
Intuitively, the seize and stabilize actions are steps the system must take before any user can
enter its critical region. We capture this with a relation g in Figure 5-5. The now, region,
and rem conditions are all straightforward. Notice that qualification on the conditions
involving seize, stabilize, and crit are their respective enabling conditions. Thus, for example,
u.last(crit) > s.last(seize) + 2a + c requires the crit deadline in Mutex to allow enough time
for the seize action in Milestone plus an additional 2a + c time to take the remaining steps
necessary to enter the critical region.
Proof that g is a simulation from Milestone to Mutex if t,,it > 5a+2c and t,em > 2a:
Time: By the definition of g.
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Start: If uo and so are start states of Mutex and Milestone, then uo.now = so.now = 0
and for all i, uo.regioni = so.regioni = trying and uo.last(crit) = uo.last(remi) = oo,
so uo E g[so].
Step: Suppose s and u E g[s] are reachable states, and s s':
Case 1 ( = tryi): This step simulates u i .
tryi is enabled in u, since u.regioni = s.region i = remainder.
Case a (u.regionj = s.region = trying for some j):
Since s' = s and u' = u except that u'.regioni = trying = s'.regioni, we have
ut E g[s'].
Case b (u.regionj = s.regionj $ trying for all j):
By Invariant 5.5, s.status = start.
Case i (u'.regionj = u.regionj = s.regionj = critical for some j):
u'.last(crit) = oo and all other conditions continue to hold.
Case ii (u.regionj = s.regionj $ critical for all j):
crit is newly enabled in u' and seize is newly enabled in s', so u'.last(crit) =
u.now + tcrit > (s.now + 3a + c) + 2a + c = s'.last(seize) + 2a + c.
Case 2 (r = seize): There is no corresponding step for Mutex.
s' = s except that s'.status = seized, s'.last(seize) = oc, and s'.last(stabilize) =
s.now + a. Since u.last(crit) s.last(seize) + 2a + c > s.now + 2a + c =
s'.last(stabilize) + a + c, we have u E g[s'].
Case 3 (r = stabilize): Again, there is no corresponding step for Mutex.
By Invariant 5.5, s.region i = trying for some i. Thus, s' = s except that
s'.status = stable, s'.last(stabilize) = oo, and s'.last(crit) = s.now + a + c. Since
u.last(crit) > s.last(stabilize) + a + c > s.now + a + c = s'.last(crit), we have
u E g[s'].
critiCase 4 (r = criti): This simulates u -- u 
a. criti is enabled in u since u.regioni = s.regioni = trying, and u.regionj =
s.regionj $ critical for all j by Invariant 5.5.
b. We have u' = u except u'.regioni = critical = s'.regioni and u'.last(crit) =
oo, so u' E g[s'].
e xits i '.Case 5 (r = exit-): This simulates u u 
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a. exiti is enabled in u since u.regioni = s.regioni = critical.
b. u'.regioni = exit = s'.regioni and since remi is newly enabled in s' and u',
u'.last(remi) = u.now + trem > s.now + 2a = s'.last(remi).
s'.status = s.status = start by Invariant 5.5, so if crit is (newly) enabled in u',
then seize is enabled in s' and u'.last(crit) = u.now+tcrit > (s.now+3a+c)+
2a + c > s'.last(seize) + 2a + c by Lemma 3.3. Otherwise, u'.last(crit) = oo.
So u' E g[s'].
Case 6 (r = remi): This simulates u rem-i u'.
remi is enabled in u since u.region = s.region i = exit. Since u' = u except
u'.regioni = remainder = s'.regioni, and u'.last(remi) = oc, we have u' g[s'].
Case 7 (r = v): This simulates u u', where u'.now = s'.now.
We know s'.now < s.last(C) for any task C of Milestone, and we show that
s'.now u.last(C) for any task C of Mutex. If C is not enabled in u.basic,
or C e {tryi,exiti) for some i, then u.last(C) = oo. Otherwise, we have the
following cases:
Case a (C = crit): s.regioni = u.regioni = trying for some i, and s.regionj =
u.regionj critical for all j.
Case i (s.status = start): u.last(crit) > s.last(seize) + 2a + c > s'.now.
Case ii (s.status = seized): u.last(crit) > s.last(stabilize) + a + c > s'.now.
Case iii (s.status = stable): u.last(crit) > s.last(crit) > s'.now.
Case b (C = remi for some i): s.region = u.region = exit, so u.last(remi) 
s.last(remi) > s'.now.
Thus, if u' = u except that u'.now = s'.now, then u u' and ' E g[s'].
5.6 Fischer implements Milestone
Recall the intuition we used to define the milestone automaton: The first time the register
is set before some user gets the resource corresponds to a seize action, and the last time
corresponds to a stabilize action. We denote by w(i), an upper bound on the time before
user i will set the register if it remains free. So if some users are trying to get the resource,
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f is a relation between states of Fischer and of Milestone, where u E f[s] if and only if:
· u.now = s.now
* u.regioni = s.regioni
trying
critical
exit
remainder
if s.pci E {testing, set, checking, leave-trying},
if s.pci = critical,
if s.pci E {reset, leave-exit},
if s.pci = remainder.
start if s.x = 0 or
for some i, s.pc i E {critical, reset},
seized if s.x 0, and
* u.status = ( for all i, s.pci {critical, reset}, and
for some i, s.pci = set,
stable if s.x : 0 and
for all i, s.pci {set, critical, reset}.
* u.last(seize) > s.last(reseti) + 2a + c if s.pci = reset.
* u.last(seize) > s.w(i) for some i if s.x = 0,
s.last(testi) + a if s.pci = testing,
where s.w(i) = J s.last(seti) if s.pci = set,
s.last(checki) + 2a if s.pci = checking,
.co otherwise.
* u.last(stabilize) > s.last(seti) if s.pci = set.
u.lastcri s.last(checkx) + a if s.pc = checking,
- s.last(criti) if s.pci = leave-trying.
us.last(reseti) + au.last(rem) s.last(remi) if s.pci = reset,if s.pci = leave-exit.
Figure 5-6: A Simulation from Fischer to Milestone
and the register is free, the upper bound for seize in a simulated state must allow enough
time for some user to set the register. If some user is exiting, but has not yet reset the
register, then the simulated state must allow enough time for the user to reset the register,
and then for some other user to seize it. Once the register has been seized, we only need
to allow enough time for each user that is still going to set the register to do so, and once
the register is stable, we only need to wait for the user that wrote last to check the register
and then enter its critical region. When a user is exiting, we need to allow enough time for
it to reset the register and then leave its exit region. For convenience, we often refer to the
region of a user in a state of Fischer. We capture this intuition with the simulation f in
Figure 5-6.
Proof that f is a simulation from Fischer to Milestone:
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Time: By definition of f.
Start: In the start states uo and so of of Milestone and Fischer, uo.now = so.now = 0,
uo.regioni = so.pci = remainder for all i, uo.status = start and so.x = 0, and
uo.last(C) = oo for tasks C of Milestone, so Uo E f[so].
Step: Suppose that s and u f[s] are reachable states of Fischer and Milestone respec-
tively, and that s >s':
Case 1 (7r = tryi): This step simulates u >Y u'.
tryi is enabled in u since u.region i = s.region i = remainder, and s' = s except
that s'.pci = testing (and so s'.regioni = trying), and s'.last(testi) = s.now + a.
We show that u' E f[s']:
Case a (seize is newly enabled): u' = u except u'.regioni = trying and
u'.last(seize) = u'.now + 3a + c
= s'.now + a + 2a + c
s.last(resetj) + 2a + c if s'.pcj = reset.
s'.last(testi) + a
Case b (seize is not newly enabled): u' = u except that u'.regioni = s.region i =
trying, and since s.w(i) = oo > s'.last(testi) + a = s'.w(i),
u'.last(seize) = u.last(seize)
s'.last(resetj) + 2a + c if s'.pcj = reset.
s'.w(j) for some j if s'.x = O.
Case 2 (r = testi): There is no corresponding step in Milestone.
We show that u ¢ f[s']:
Case a (s.x $ 0): s' = s except that s'.last(testi) = s.now + a. So f[s'] = f[s]
since s'.x = s.x 54 0.
Case b (s.x = 0): s' = s except that s'.pci = set, s'.w(i) = s'.last(seti) =
s.now + a < s.last(testi) + a = s.w(i), and s'.last(testi) = oo. Since
u.status = start, stabilize is not enabled in u.basic, and the condition for
last(seize) is satisfied since for some j, u.last(seize) > s.w(j) > s'.w(j).
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Case 3 (r = seti): s.pc i = set, s'.pci = checking, and s'.x = i 4 0, so by strong mu-
tual exclusion, s'.pcj {critical, reset} for all j. We have the following cases:
Case a (s.x = 0): seize is enabled in u since u.status = start, u.regioni =
s.regioni = trying, and u.regionj = s.regionj critical for all j; suppose
seize /U eize) , so u'.status = seized.
Case i (s.pcj set for all j $ i): This step simulates u seize) stabilize) U
u" = u except that u".status = stable, u".last(crit) = s.now + a + c, and
u".last(seize) = oo. Since s.now + a + c is greater than any of the time
bounds in the condition for last(crit), and s'.pcj 54 set for all j, we have
u" E f[s'].
Case ii (s.pcj = set for some j i): This step simulates u se) u'.
u E f[s'] since s'.pcj = set and u' = u except that u'.status = seized,
u'.last(seize) = oo, and u'.last(stabilize) = s.now + a > s'.last(setj,) for
all j' such that s'.pcj, = set.
stabilizeCase b (s.x $ 0 and for all j $ i, s.pcj $ set): This step simulates u stabilize) 
stabilize is enabled in u since u.status = seized. u' = u except that u'.status =
stable, u'.last(stabilize) = oo, and u'.last(crit) = s.now + a + c. Since
s.now + a + c is greater than any of the time bounds in the condition for
last(crit), and s'.pcj $A set for all j, we have u' E f[s'].
Case c (s.x y$ 0 and s.pcj = set for some j i): There is no corresponding
step in Milestone.
u E f[s'] since u.status = seized, and s'.pcj = set.
Case 4 (r = checki): There is no corresponding step in Milestone.
We show that u E f[s'] in three easy cases:
Case a (s.x = i): s' = s except that s'.pci = leave-trying, s'.last(checki) = oo,
and s'.last(criti) = s.now + a < s.last(checki) + a < u.last(crit).
Case b (s.x = 0): s' = s except that s'.pci = testing, s'.last(checki) = oo, and
s'.last(testi) = s.now + a, so s'.w(i) = s.now + 2a < s.last(checki) + 2a =
s.w(i). Thus, for some j, u.last(seize) > s.w(j) > s'.w(j).
Case c (s.x {0, i}): There is nothing even to check. (In this case, f[s] C f[s'].)
crit, u'.Case 5 ( = critb): This simulates u ? u
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s.pci = leave-trying, so by strong mutual exclusion, s.x = i and for all j, s.pcj 
{set, critical, reset}. Thus, u.status = stable and u.regioni = trying, so crit is
enabled in u.
We have s' = s except that s'.pci = critical and s'.last(crit) = oo, and u' = u
except that u'.regioni = critical, u'.status = start, and u'.last(crit) = oc, so
ua E f[s'] since seize, stabilize, and crit are all disabled in u'.basic.
exit/ 
'Case 6 (r = exiti): This simulates ui 
u.regioni = s.regioni = critical, so exit, is enabled in u, u.status = start, and
seize is not enabled in u.basic. We have s' = s except that s'.pci = reset and
s'.last(reseti) = s.now + a.
u' C f[s'] since u' = u except that u'.regioni = exit, u'.last(remi) = u.now +
2a = s.now + a + a = s'.last(reseti) + a, and if seize is enabled in u'.basic,
u'.last(seize) = u.now + 3a + c = s.now + a + 2a + c = s'.last(reseti) + 2a + c.
Case 7 (r = reseti): There is no corresponding step in Milestone.
s.pci = reset, so u.status = start, and s' = s except that s'.pci = leave-exit,
S'.x = 0, s'.last(reseti) = o, and s'.last(remi) = s.now + a < s.last(reseti) + a 
u.last(remi). If seize is enabled in u.basic then s.regionj = trying for some
j i and by strong mutual exclusion, s.pcj $ leave-trying, so s'.pcj = s.pcj C
{testing, set, checking}, and u.last(seize) > s.last(reseti) + 2a + c > s.now + 2a +
c > s'.w(j). Otherwise, u.last(seize) = oo. So u E f[s'].
Case 8 (r = remi): This simulates u r .
remi is enabled in u since u.region i = s.region exit. If u then a' E
f[s'] since u' = u and s' = s except that u'.region i = remainder = s'.pc i and
u'.last(remi)= o = s'.last(remi).
Case 9 (r = v): This simulates u > ' where u'.now s'.now.
We know s'.now < s.last(C) for any task C of Fischer. We show that s'.now <
u.last(C) for any task C of Milestone,
If C is not enabled in u.basic, or C c {tryi,exiti) for some i, then u.last(C) = oo.
Otherwise, we have the following cases:
Case a (C = seize): u.status = start and u.regionj $ critical for all j, so
s.x = 0 or s.pci = reset for some i.
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Case i (s.pci = reset): u.last(seize) > s.last(reseti) + 2a + c > sr.now. 
Case ii (s.x = 0): For some i, 
s. last( test , )  + a if s.pc, = t es t ing  
s . last(set ,)  if s.pc, = set  
u. last(seize)  > s . w ( i )  = 2 s l .now 
s.1ast(checki) + 2a if s.pcj  = checking 
00 otherwise 
Case b (C = stabilize): u.stntus = seized, so s.pci = set for some i ,  and 
Case c (C = crit): ~ ~ . s t n t u s  = stable, so s.x + 0 and by Invariant 5.2, s.pc,., E 
{checking, leave-trying, critical, reset). But s.pci $ {critical, reset) for all i 
and 
s.last(check,.,) + a if s.pc,,, = checking 
u. last(cri t)  2 I > sl .now s.last(crit,.,) if s.pc,,, = leave-trying 
Case d (C = remi for some i): u.regioni = exit, so s.pci E {reset, leave-trying) 
and 
s. last(reset;)  + n if s.pc, = reset 
u . las t ( rem;)  > I 2 s l .now s. last(rem j )  if s.pc, = leave-exit 
5.7 Discussion 
Tlre intermediate automaton in this example can also be viewed as introducing three 
"rountls" to entering the critical region. These rounds, corresponding to  seizing the register, 
stabilizing tlre register, and entering tlre critical region, have different time bounds, but the 
key point is that once seized, the register will remain seized until it has been stabilized, and 
then it will remain stable until some process enters the critical region. These milestones 
allow us to track the progress of the system, and by bounding the time for each milestone, 
we can bound tlre total time to enter tlre critical region. 
IClore generally, there need not be only one set of milestones, all of which need t o  be 
passetl. Rat her, there could be several alternative paths, each with its own set of milestones. 
This is similar to the decrementing junction method of Floyd [Flo67], with milestones corre- 
sponding to decrementing the function. Using the milestones as actions of an intermediate 
automaton allows us to construct hierarchical proofs that are rigorous, modular, and intiu- 
tive. 
5.8 Achieving Optimal Time Bounds 
The upper bound proved for the seize action of Milestone is not tight, and thus neither is 
the bound on tcrit. In this section, we give a simulation that establishes an upper bound of 
max(2a+ c - b, 3a) for the seize action. This yields an upper bound of max(4a + 2c - b,  5a + c )  
for the time for some user to  enter its critical region. This bound is tight because it is possible 
t o  construct executions of Fischer that reach each of these upper limits. To our knowledge, 
this bound was not known before. 
To establish this tight bound on the seize task, only a few conditions of the simulation 
need to  be modified. The proof that this is still a simulation follows the structure of the 
original proof, and only a few cases are affected, because our methodology produces a very 
modular proof.3 Thus proving the improved bound was very simple, and did not involve 
any intricate reasoning, but was straightforward to derive from the original proof. 
5.8.1 The Slack in the  Time Bounds 
We can see how the slack in the time bound arises by examining the informal reasoning 
given in Section 5.4, or the proof of the simulation from Fischer to AIilestone. Recall that 
the bound for seize was not 2n because a user might already be in the trying region. After 
the critical user exits, the trying user may still not be able to  successfully test the register, 
either because it is very slow and has not yet even checked the register after setting it 
earlier, or because the register has not yet been reset. The upper bound for seize of 3r1+ c 
allowed enough additional time both for a trying user to  finish checking, and for the esiting 
user to  reset the register. 
In the formal proof, the simulation requires that enough time be left after an exiting 
user resets the register to allow a user still waiting to check the register enough time t o  do 
so, as though it had just set- the register. 
This is not tight for two reasons. First, these effects are not additive, since the users malie 
progress concurrently. Thus, the bound should allow enough time for either possibility, hut 
not for both, i.e., max(2a + c ,  2n + a). Second, a user wa,iting to  check the register mlist 1la.ve 
set the register before the exiting user, which was the last to  set the register. Meanwhile, 
3 ~ l l e  simulation from the intermediate automaton with the improved b o ~ ~ r l d s  to the mutual exclusion 
specification automaton also needs to  refect the new bounds, but this change is trivial. 
the exiting user checked the register, waiting at least time b before doing so, and entered
and exited the critical region. Thus, the user waiting to check has already been waiting for
at least time b, and thus will wait an additional time of at most c - b. Combining these
yields the upper bound of max(2a + c - b, 3a), instead of 3a + c, for the seize action.
This bound is tight, because there are executions that achieve it. For example, suppose
two processes trying to acquire the critical resource set the register at the same time (i.e.,
there is no time-passage action between the two set actions), and the process which sets the
register last waits exactly b time before checking it and proceeding to its critical section.
If this process then immediately exits and resets the register, the other process may still
take up to c - b time before it checks the register and finds its name overwritten, and an
additional a time to test whether the register is free.4 Then it may take a time to set the
register, for a total of 2a + c - b to seize the register after the critical resource became
available. The 3a bound is easily achieved by an exiting process taking a time to reset the
register after exiting, and then a trying process taking the full 2a time to test and then set
the register after it has been reset.
5.8.2 A Proof Sketch of the Improved Bound
To establish the tight upper bound, we need to decouple of the two sources of delay in the
simulation, and also prove an invariant that limits the time a user may take to check the
register after some other user exits the critical region.
The new simulation, in Figure 5-7, is identical to the one in Figure 5-6, except in the
conditions involving the seize actions. When some user is about to reset the register, the
upper bound for seize is only required to allow enough time to test and set the register after
it is reset. For the other condition, only the qualifier is different, extended to include any
case that seize might be enabled in u.
With this change alone, we can prove an upper bound of 2a + c for the seize action.
However, we can prove the tight upper bound of max(2a + c - b, 3a) with the following
invariant, which says that a user still waiting to check the register while some other user is
in its critical region, must have already waited at least time b. Note that if pcj = checking
then last(checkj) - c represents the time that user j set the register before reaching its
4 This suggests that if the register is free when a process checks it, it might immediately try to set it, rather
than testing it again. This will in fact reduce the upper bound to seize the register to max(a + c - b, 3a).
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f' is a relation between states of Fischer and of Milestone', where u E f'[s] if and only if:
* u.now = s.now
critical if s.pci = critical,
· u.regioni = s.regioni = [ ei t
exit if s.pc i E {reset, leave-exit},
remainder if s.pci = remainder.
start if s.z = 0 or
for some i, s.pci E {critical, reset},
seized if s.x  0, and
* u.status = for all i, s.pci 4 {critical, reset}, and
for some i, s.pc i = set,
stable if s.x $ 0 and
for all i, s.pci 4 {set, critical, reset}.
* u.last(seize) > s.last(reseti) + 2a if s.pci = reset.
* u.last(seize) > s.w(i) for some i if s.z = 0 or for some j, s.pcj = reset.
* u.last(stabilize) > s.last(seti) if s.pci = set.
ulast(crit) f s.last(check,) + a if s.pc = checking,
s.last(criti) if s.pci = leave-trying.
s.last(reseti) + a if s.pci = reset,
s.last(remi) if s.pci = leave-exit.
Figure 5-7: A Simulation for Proving a Tight Bound for the seize Action
current state.
Invariant 5.6 For Fischer:
If pci = critical and pcj = checking then now > last(checkj) - c + b.
Proof sketch: Rather than prove this formally here, 5 we sketch a proof following the
intuition described at the beginning of this section. If pci = critical then by strong mutual
exclusion, x = i, so user i was the last to set the register. This must have been at least time
b earlier, since check, has a lower bound of b, and if pcj = checking, user j must have set
the register before then. That is, if t is the time user j set the register then t < now - b,
and last(checkj) = t + c, yielding last(checkj) < now - b + c as required. ·
We can now prove that Fischer implements Milestone', where Milestone' is exactly the
same as Milestone, except for an upper bound of 2a + max(c - b, a) for the seize task. The
5We cannot prove this directly by induction. We first need to prove that if pc = checking = pcj
for some j x, then last(checkj) - c first(checks) - b. Then we strengthen the original invariant: If
pci E {leave-trying, critical} then now > last(checkj) - c + b.
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only substantial differences from the previous proof are in the consideration of the exit and
reset actions, but the case when x 0 and pcj = reset for some j also need to be handled
for the test and check actions. Other very minor changes are also needed, but these follow
in an obvious way from the changes to these conditions and to the upper bound of seize.
Proof sketch that f' is a simulation from Fischer to Milestone': We only consider
the four cases mentioned above, where this proof differs significantly from the proof in
Section 5.6. The changes for the test, check, and exit actions arise from the requirement
that u.last(seize) > s.w(i) when s.pcj = reset for some j, even if s.x 0. This simplifies
the analysis for the reset action. The case for the exit action is identical to the original proof
except for the last line, where Invariant 5.6 is used to establish s'.w(j) = s'.last(checkj) +
2a < s.now + 2a + c - b when s'.pcj = checking.
1. If r = testi and s.x 0 and s.pcj = reset for some j then
u.last(seize) > s.last(resetj) + 2a > s.now + 2a = stw(i).
2. If 7r = checki and s.x {0, i} and s.pcj = reset for some j then f'[s] C f'[s'] as before,
since for all j', s'.w(j') < s.w(j').
3. If r = exiti then u.region i = s.region i = critical, so exiti is enabled in u, u.status =
start, and seize is not enabled in u.basic. We have s' = s except that s'.pci = reset
and s'.last(reseti) = s.now + a. If u >exti u', then u' f'[s'] since u' = u except that
u'.regioni = exit, u'.last(remi) = u.now + 2a = s.now + a + a = s'.last(reseti)+ a, and
if seize is enabled in u'.basic,
u'.last(seize) = u.now + 2a + max(c - b, a)
_s'.last(reseti) + 2a
s'.w(j) for any j such that s'.pcj E {testing, set, checking}
4. If 7r = reseti then s.pci = reset, so u.status = start, and s' = s except that s'.pci =
leave-exit, s'.x = 0, s'.last(reseti) = o, and s'.last(remi) = s.now+a < s.last(reseti)+
a < u.last(remi). For some j, u.last(seize) > s.w(j) = s'.w(j), So u E f'[s'].
N
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Chapter 6
Automated Proof Assistance
In this chapter, we explore how automated tools can be used to assist in simulation proofs in
the style of the previous chapters. This builds mainly on work done by S6ylemez [S6y94] and
S0gaard-Andersen, Garland, Guttag, Lynch, and Pogosyants [SGG+93]. In particular, we
formally verify the proof in Chapter 5 using LP. As the proof is very lengthy and repetitive,
we consider only the salient features of the proof and the automation process; the full proof
can be found in the appendix.
6.1 The Larch Tools
Larch is a family of tools intended to support formal specification and verification in pro-
gramming. Since we are verifying abstract systems, rather than particular programs, we
use only two tools from this family, the Larch Shared Language (LSL) and the Larch Prover
(LP). In LSL, we write machine-readable definitions of our model and the abstract systems
we are modelling, including the requirements they are expected to satisfy. We then use LP
to reason about these systems and to prove that the required properties are guaranteed by
the system.
6.1.1 The Larch Shared Language
The basic unit of specification in LSL is a trait, which introduces types, called sorts, and
functions, called operators, that act on the sorts. Properties of these sorts and operators
are expressed by assertions in the trait, using first-order logic. Typically, a trait defines a
single concept or data type. Complex traits are often built using simpler traits, introducing
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a hierarchy of traits, which matches our mathematical understanding of the concepts. The
Larch tools include a library of LSL traits formalizing many common concepts in discrete
mathematics.
Two important characteristics of LSL are that sorts are disjoint, and that operators
always represent total functions, though the value of the function may not be constrained
over the whole domain. Also, the domain and range of operators are always sorts, specified
when the operators are introduced. Thus, any trait can be checked for syntactic correctness
in much the same way type-checking is done in many programming languages. This catches
many of the simple mistakes made when writing these traits. We use an LSL checker to do
this, as well as to generate input for LP, which will be discussed further in the next section.
Assertions are typically either logical expressions that are always true, or equations
expressing the equivalence of two expressions of the same sort. It is also possible to make
two other types of assertions about sorts. A sort is generated by a set of operators if every
element of that sort can be derived by a finite application of the operators. This justifies
structural induction, which cannot be expressed otherwise by a finite set of assertions in
first-order logic. We may further specify that the sort is generated freely if every element
generated by the operators is distinct. A sort is partitioned by a set of operators if distinct
elements can always be distinguished by at least one of the operators.
A trait may define a data structure by declaring a new sort and asserting appropriate
axioms. The sorts and traits may be parameterized, supporting a form of polymorphism.
The LSL checker also understands shorthands for a few common data structures in computer
science, such as records (called tuples) and enumerations, and it automatically generates
the appropriate axioms.
A trait may also list useful consequences of its axioms in a special section called the
implies clause. The intent is that these can be derived from the axioms. However, it is
useful to list them explicitly since they often express desired properties of a trait. The LSL
checker generates proof obligations for these implications.
6.1.2 The Larch Prover
The LSL checker generates input files for LP from the LSL traits, including a file of proof
obligations. This translation is straightforward because LP understands equations, as well
as "generated by" and "partitioned by" assertions. Logical assertions are interpreted as
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equations where the expression equals true.
Unlike the LSL checker, LP is an interactive tool; it processes each command before
reading the next one. In addition to assertions, which declare new facts to LP, there are
commands to introduce proof obligations, to provide guidance to LP when doing a proof,
to query LP about its state, and to control the way in which LP works automatically.
LP is a general purpose proof assistant, which attempts to rewrite terms into canonical
forms, so that logically equivalent expressions become syntactically identical. This is called
normalization. LP converts the equations given into rewrite rules. To prevent these rules
from being applied endlessly, LP defines a partial order, called the registry, on the operators,
and rewrites higher operators to lower ones. Finding an appropriate partial order for the
operators and rewriting the assertions comprise the bulk of the automatic work that LP
does.
In contrast to LSL, LP views all facts equally-there is no hierarchy of traits. Instead,
each assertion is given the name of the trait it was derived from, appended with a number
to distinguish it from the other assertions of that trait. The statements to be proven are
typically given a different name, to distinguish them from the other assertions. Whenever
LP derives a new fact from an old one, it appends another number to its name.
Proof obligations in LP are called conjectures. LP considers a conjecture proved if it
can normalize it to true. Rather than searching for a proof, LP normalizes the conjecture
and all the facts it knows, and then relies on guidance from the user. It may be enough to
point out particular facts or instances of general facts that can be used to further rewrite
the conjecture. Often, however, it is necessary to direct LP to consider several cases, or
to proceed by induction, or when trying to prove an implication, to assume the hypothesis
and attempt to prove the conclusion. These are called proof methods.
It is also possible to direct LP to automatically try these proof methods before prompting
the user for guidance. The trade-off here is that if the wrong methods are chosen, the
proof may evolve in some totally inappropriate fashion before LP discovers that it cannot
continue; the proof must then be backed out to some earlier stage, where the appropriate
proof methods can be applied. It may also be much more difficult, at that point, to even
understand what has gone wrong. This is much like compiling programs in languages that
lack sufficient redundancy for the compiler to discover the error before it is significantly
past the point the error occured.
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Some proof methods, such as case analysis, introduce additional assumptions for parts of
the proof, which need not even be consistent with the other assertions. These assumptions
are often particularly relevant to the proof, and LP names each with a suffix of XxxxHyp,
where the Xxxx indicates the proof method that introduced it.
LP can be run in "batch mode" by recording all the commands in a script file, which
is then executed. Each command is processed in turn, exactly as if it had been entered
interactively by a user. (An error, however, stops the execution of a script.) The current
state of LP can also be saved in freeze files, which can later be thawed, so that some common
work can be reused in several proofs. When executing a script, LP can also do box checking,
in which every time a proof method is invoked to prove the current conjecture, LP checks
that the file has certain marks that indicate that this was in fact intended, and every time
the current conjecture is established, LP checks the file for other marks that indicate that
this too was expected.
6.2 Machine-Readable Definitions
6.2.1 General Traits for Timed Automata
We begin by developing a library of traits that define the general notions used in timed
simulation proofs. This is analogous to the the development of the model in Chapter 3.
These traits can be reused in proofs similar to the ones in this thesis.
We begin with the definition of an I/O automaton A in Figure 6-1. The enabled and
effect predicates are intended to support the use of precondition-effect form for specifying
the transition relation of the automaton. Because sorts are determined by syntax alone,
execution fragments are defined as those "step sequences" that satisfy the execFrag pred-
icate. The start states and execution fragments are defined using predicates (start and
execFrag) rather than sets, since predicates are easier to handle in LP. States, actions,
and step sequences are parameterized by the automaton. However, traces represent exter-
nal behavior, and thus must be comparable between automata. Since sorts are disjoint, the
common operator is necessary to map the external actions to a common sort CommonActions.
We also define invariants in Figure 6-2. Notice that the operator inv is introduced
in the Automaton trait, but it is not used in that trait. This is because invariants vary
among automata. However, each automaton can define its own invariant, and then use the
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Automaton (A): trait
introduces
start : States[A] -+ Bool
enabled : States[A], Actions[A] - Bool
effect : States[A], Actions[A], States[A] - Bool
isStep : States[A], Actions[A], States[A] -* Bool
isExternal : Actions[A] - Bool
isInternal : Actions[A] 
- Bool
: States[A] -* StepSee
: StepSeq[A], Actions[A], States[A] - StepSee
first, last : StepSeq[A] - Statesl
execFrag : StepSeq[A] - Bool
task : Actions[A] - Tasks[I
enabled : States[A], Tasks[A] -+ Bool
inv : States[A] -+ Bool
common : Actions[A] - CommonJ
empty : - Traces
: Traces, CommonActions - Traces
trace : Actions[A] -* Traces
trace : StepSeq[A] - Traces
asserts
sort Traces generated by empty, ^
V a: Actions[A], s, s': States[A], ss: StepSeq[A], c: Tas]
isInternal(a) ¢~ - isExternal(a);
isStep(s, a, s') ¢e enabled(s, a) A effect(s, a, s');
enabled(s, c) ¢~ 3 a (enabled(s, a) A task(a) = c);
q[A]
[A]
[A]
A]
Actions
ks[A]
first({s}) = s; first(ss{a,s}) = first(ss);
last({s}) = s; last(ss{a,s}) = s;
execFrag({s}); execFrag(ss{a,s'}) ¢* execFrag(ss) A isStep(last(ss), a, s');
trace({s}) = empty;
trace(ss{a,s}) = (if isExternal(a) then trace(ss) ^ common(a) else trace(ss));
trace(a) = (if isExternal(a) then empty ^ common(a) else empty);
Figure 6-1: Larch Trait Defining Untimed I/O Automata
Invariants (A, inv): trait
assumes Automaton(A)
asserts
V s, s': States[A], a: Actions[A]
start(s) inv(s);
inv(s) A isStep(s, a, s') = inv(s');
Figure 6-2: Larch Trait Defining Invariants
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Time (T): trait
includes TotalOrder(T), Natural(- for e), AC(+, T)
introduces
0, infinity : - T
+ __ : T, T - T
__ * __ : N, T - T
asserts
V t, tl, t2: T, n: N
0 < t; t < infinity;
+ t = t;
tl + t2 $ infinity t infinity A t2 infinity;
* t = 0;
succ(n) * t = (n * t) + t;
t < (t + t);
t infinity = ((t + t) < (t + t2) tl < t2);
t infinity = (t + t = t + t2 ¢ t = t2);
implies
V t, t, t2: T, b: Bool
infinity + t = infinity;
t < infinity ' t infinity;
t infinity = ((t + t) < (t + t2) 4t tl < t2);
(if b then t else t2) = t ¢* (if b then tl = t else t2 = t);
(if b then tl else t2) < t ¢t (if b then tl < t else t2 < t);
(if b then tl else t2) > t 44 (if b then tl > t else t2 > t);
(if b then ti else t2) < t '4 (if b then tl < t else t2 < t);
(if b then t else t2) > t ¢4 (if b then tl > t else t2 > t);
Figure 6-3: Larch Trait for Time
Invariants trait to express that it is in fact an invariant.
We then axiomatize time and boundmaps using three traits. We model time as non-
negative reals extended with infinity. The Time trait in Figure 6-3 captures the properties
desired.1 The Bounds trait in Figure 6-4 is a tuple of lower and upper bounds, with some
convenient operators. The BoundMap trait in Figure 6-5 specifies the mapping that assigns
time bounds to each task of an automaton. Recall that an MMT automaton is merely an
I/O automaton together with an appropriate boundmap.
The TimedAutomaton trait in Figure 6-6 defines the timed automaton TA corresponding
to a I/O automaton A and a boundmap b. This straightforwardly expresses the transfor-
mation from MMT automata to timed automata described in Chapter 3.
Finally, the TimedForward trait in Figure 6-7 captures the definition of a timed forward
simulation from one automaton to another. For this to be meaningful, the automata are
required to have a now component in their state. This trait is also parameterized by in-
'We are doing concurrent research to use decision procedures to handle time more easily [Pog95]; this
was presented in [LSGL94].
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Bounds: trait
includes Time(Time)
Bounds tuple of first: Time, last: Time
introduces
__ + __ : Bounds, Time -+ Bounds
unbounded : -+ Bounds
asserts
V b: Bounds, t: Time
b + t = [b.first + t, b.last + t];
unbounded = [0, infinity];
Figure 6-4: Larch Trait for Expressing Lower and Upper Bounds
BoundMap(A,b): trait
includes Bounds
introduces
b : Tasks[A] -+ Bounds
asserts
V c: Tasks[A]
b(c).first < infinity;
b(c).first < b(c).last;
Figure 6-5: Larch Trait Defining a Boundmap for an Automaton
variants for each automaton, since the step condition only needs to be proved for reachable
states.
6.2.2 The Automata and Simulations
We can now specialize these general traits to define the particular automata and simulations
we used to verify Fischer's algorithm. Each automaton is defined by two traits, the first
specifying the untimed components, and the second, adding the timed aspects. We begin
by listing in Figure 6-8 the common actions that appear in the traces. An action is indexed
by the process that performs it.
The AutomatonMutex trait in Figure 6-9 specifies the untimed behavior required for any
mutual exclusion algorithm. An action is specified by its type and the index of its process,
and the transition relation is specified by enabled and effect predicates for each action.
The unchanged predicate is used to specify that any action changes only the state of its
process. Notice that the crit actions are in a single task, and all the other actions are in
classes by themselves. The TimedMutex trait in Figure 6-10 gives the time bounds on each
of the tasks.
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TimedAutomaton (A, b, TA): trait
assumes Automaton(A), BoundMap(A,b)
includes Automaton(TA), Bounds, FiniteMap(Bounds[A], Tasks[A], Bounds, __[__] for apply)
States[TA] tuple of basic: States[A], now: Time, bounds: Bounds[A]
introduces
nu : Time -+ Actions[TA]
addTime : Actions[A] - Actions[TA]
asserts
sort Actions[TA] generated freely by nu, addTime
V s, s': States[TA], c: Tasks[A], a: Actions[A], t: Time
defined(s.bounds, c);
isInternal(nu(t));
isInternal(addTime(a)) ¢* isInternal(a);
common(addTime(a)) = common(a);
start(s) ¢* start(s.basic) A s.now = 0
A V c ( (ienabled(s.basic, c) = s.bounds[c] = unbounded)
A (enabled(s.basic, c) = s.bounds[c] = b(c)));
enabled(s, nu(t)) ¢* s.now < t A t < infinity A V c (t < (s.bounds[c]).last);
effect(s, nu(t), s') 4= s'.now = t A s'.basic = s.basic A s'.bounds = s.bounds;
enabled(s, addTime(a)) *= enabled(s.basic, a) A (s.bounds[task(a)]).first < s.nov;
effect(s, addTime(a), s') *
s'.now = s.now
A effect(s.basic, a, s'.basic)
A c (s'.bounds[c] =
(if -enabled(s'.basic, c) then unbounded
else if enabled(s.basic, c) A task(a) c then s.bounds[c]
else b(c) + s.now)
);
inv(s) ¢
V c ( s.now < (s.bounds[c]).last
A (-'enabled(s.basic, c) = s.bounds[c] = unbounded)
A (enabled(s.basic, c) = (s.bounds[c]).last < (s.now + b(c).last))
A (s.bounds[c]).first < (s.now + b(c).first)
A (b(c).last = infinity = (s.bounds[c]).last = infinity))
A s.now < infinity
A inv(s.basic);
implies
Invariants(TA, inv)
V s, s': States[TA], a:Actions[TA], c:Tasks[A]
isStep(s, a, s') A inv(s)
=. (enabled(s.basic, c) = (s.bounds[c]).last < (s'.bounds[c]).last);
Figure 6-6: Larch Trait for Generating Timed Automata from MMT Automata
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TimedForward (Al, A2, f, I1, 12): trait
assumes Automaton(A1), Automaton(A2), NowExists(A1), NowExists(A2),
Invariants(Al, I1), Invariants(A2, I2)
introduces
f : States[All, States[A2] - Bool
I1: States[Al] -+ Bool
12 States[A2] - Bool
asserts
V s, s': States[All, u: States[A2], a: Actions[All, alpha: StepSeq[A2]
f(s, u) = u.now = s.now;
start(s) 3 u (start(u) A f(s, u));
f(s, u) A inv(s) A inv(u) A Il(s) A I2(u) A isStep(s, a, s')
= 3 alpha (execFrag(alpha) A first(alpha) = u A f(s', last(alpha))
A trace(alpha) = trace(a))
Figure 6-7: Larch Trait Defining Timed Forward Simulations
CommonActions: trait
CommonActionTypes enumeration of try, crit, exit, rem
introduces
__[__] : CommonActionTypes, UID -* CommonActions
asserts sort CommonActions generated freely by __[__]
Figure 6-8: Larch Trait Listing the Common Actions
Likewise, the AutomatonFischer and TimedFischer traits in Figures 6-11 and 6-12
specify the untimed and timed aspects of Fischer's mutual exclusion algorithm. That each
of the actions is in a class by itself can be derived from the assertion that Tasks F] is
generated freely by task. The TimedFischer trait also defines the sufficient confirmation
delay and strong mutual exclusion invariants used in the proof of the simulation.
The automaton expressing the milestones in the algorithm is defined in Figures 6-13
and 6-14. Notice that seize and stabilize generate actions without any process index,
since they are actions of the whole system. The implies clause lists some trivial but useful
lemmas that LP does not automatically recognize as true.
Finally, the timed forward simulation from the milestone automaton to the mutual
exclusion specification is defined in Figure 6-15 and the one from Fischer's algorithm to
the milestone automaton in Figure 6-16. Except for the STEP operator in each, both are
straightforward translations of the simulations in Chapter 5. The STEP operator allows LP
to exploit the fact that the effect relation defines a total function.
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AutomatonMutex (M): trait
includes Automaton(M), Arrayl(Region, UID, Regions), CommonActions
Region enumeration of rem, try, crit, exit
States[M] tuple of region: Regions
ActionTypes[M] enumeration of try, crit, exit, rem
introduces
__[__] : ActionTypes[M], UID - Actions[M]
unchanged : States[M], States[M], UID -* Bool
asserts
sort Actions[M] generated freely by __[__]
sort Tasks[M] generated by task
V i: UID
common(try[i]) = try[i];
common(crit[i]) = crit[i];
isExternal(try[i]);
isExternal(crit[i]);
V a, a': Actions[M], i, i':UID
task(a) = task(a') ¢t a = a'
V s, s': States[M], i, j:
start(s)
unchanged(s, s', i)
enabled(s, try[i])
effect(s, try[i], s')
enabled(s, crit[i])
effect(s, crit[i], s')
enabled(s, exit[i])
effect(s, exit[i], s')
enabled(s, rem[i])
effect(s, rem[i], s')
common(exit[i]) = exit[i];
common(rem[i]) = rem[i];
isExternal(exit[i]);
isExternal(rem[i]);
V (3 i (a = crit[i]) A 3 i' (a' = crit[i']));
UID
t¢ V i (s.region[i] = rem);
¢t V j (j i s'.region[j] = s.region[j]);
=t s.region[i] = rem;
*j s'.region[i] = try A unchanged(s, s', i);
*j s.region[i] = try A V j (s.region[j] cr:
¢t s'.region[i] = crit A unchanged(s, s', i);
* s.region[i] = crit;
*j s'.region[i] = exit A unchanged(s, s', i);
¢t s.region[i] = exit;
¢ s'.region[i] = rem A unchanged(s, s', i);
it);
inv(s) ¢* V j (i j = s.region[i] crit V s.region[j] crit);
implies
Invariants(M, inv)
V s, s': States[M], at: ActionTypes[M], i: UID
isStep(s, at[i], s') = unchanged(s, s', i);
Figure 6-9: Larch Trait Specifying the Untimed Mutual Exclusion Problem
6.3 Machine-Checkable Proofs
In this section, we examine parts of the proof that were checked mechanically. The entire
proof, presented in the appendix, is too long to examine in detail, and much of it involves
handling rather low-level details. However, as we shall see, most of the reasoning follows
the same structure as the hand proof.
We will look at two proof scripts. The first is the proof of the sufficient confirmation
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TimedMutex(TM): trait
includes AutomatonMutex(M), TimedAutomaton(M, bdmap, TM)
introduces
a, b, c : - Time
asserts
V i: UID
bdmap(task(try[i])) = unbounded; bdmap(task(exit [i])) = unbounded;
bdmap(task(crit[i])) = [0, (4*a)+(2*c)]; bdmap(task(rem[i])) = [0, 2*a];
implies
V s, s', '': States[TM], a: Actions[TM]
effect(s, a, s') A effect(s, a, s"'') = s' = s";
Figure 6-10: Larch Trait Specifying Time Bounds for Mutual Exclusion
delay invariant; the second is a fragment of the proof of the simulation from Fischer's
algorithm to the milestone automaton. Finally, we discuss how the proof was modified to
establish the improved bounds in Section 5.8.
6.3.1 The Sufficient Confirmation Delay Proof
We shall examine in detail the entire script, shown in Figure 6-17, for the proof of In-
variant 5.3, which established that processes "waited long enough" after setting the register
before checking it. Recall that a script is just a file with commands that are executed by
LP in order. This script, as well as the one in the next section, is presented without the box
checking marks that are found in the full proof scripts in the appendix. The indentation
indicates the structure of the proof, and where this is inadequate, comments have been
added.
The first command tells LP to restore the work saved in a freeze file, which resulted from
processing the axioms produced by the LSL checker from the TimedFischer trait. 2 The set
immunity command sets a parameter which prevents instantiations from being normalized
away by their parents. The set name command indicates the name for the axioms to be
derived.
The next command specifies which proof methods LP will attempt automatically. If
the conjecture is an implication, the first method directs LP to assume the hypothesis and
attempt to prove the conclusion. Otherwise, LP will normalize the conjecture. 3
2A few transitivity rules were also added to help LP in reasoning about inequalities.
3Unless directed otherwise, LP will always normalize the facts it has assumed; however, it will only
normalize the conjecture if this is among its automatic proof methods, or it is explicitly instructed to do so.
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AutomatonFischer (F): trait
includes Automaton(F), Arrayl(PC, UID, PCs), CommonActions, SetShorthand(PC)
PC enumeration of rem, test, set, check, lvtry, crit, reset, lvexit
Reg tuple of free: Bool, owner: UID , owner only relevant if -free
States[F] tuple of pc: PCs, x: Reg
ActionTypes[F] enumeration of try, test, set, check, crit, exit, reset, rem
introduces
__[__] : ActionTypes[F], UID - Actions[F]
unchanged : States[F], States[F], UID - Bool
asserts
sort Actions[F] generated freely by __[__]
sort Tasks[F] generated freely by task
V i: UID
common(try[i]) = try[i]
common(crit[i]) = criti
isExternal(try[i]);
isInternal(test[i]);
isInternal(set[i]);
isInternal(check[i]);
V s, s': States[F], i, j
start(s)
unchanged(s, s', i)
enabled(s, try[i])
effect(s, try[i], s')
enabled(s, test[i])
effect(s, test[i], s')
enabled(s, set[i])
effect(s, set[i], s')
enabled(s, check[i])
effect(s, check[i], s')
enabled(s, crit[i])
effect(s, crit[i], s')
enabled(s, exit[i])
effect(s, exit[i], s')
enabled(s, reset[i])
effect(s, reset[i], s')
enabled(s, rem[i])
effect(s, rem[i], s')
inv(s) 4= -s.x.free =
implies
Invariants(F, inv)
[i];
common(exit[i]) = exit[i];
common(rem[i]) = rem[i];
isExternal(crit [i]);
isExternal(exit[i]);
isInternal(reset[i]);
isExternal(rem[i]);
: UID
*j V i (s.pc[i] = rem) A s.x.free;
* V j (i j s'.pc[j] = s.pc[j]);
* s.pc[i] = rem;
¢4 s'.pc[i] = test A s'.x = s.x A unchanged(s, s', i);
¢4 s.pc[i] = test;
¢4 s'.pc[i] = (if s.x.free then set else s.pc[i])
A s'.x = s.x A unchanged(s, s', i);
¢4 s.pc[i] = set;
<4 s'.pc[i] = check A unchanged(s, s', i)
A -'s'.x.free A s'.x.owner = i;
*j s.pc[i] = check;
¢4 s'.pc[i] = (if -s.x.free A s.x.owner = i then lvtry
else test)
A s'.x = s.x A unchanged(s, s', i);
¢4 s.pc[i] = lvtry;
¢4 s'.pc[i] = crit A s'.x = s.x A unchanged(s, s', i);
¢ s.pc[i] = crit;
:= s'.pc[i] = reset A s'.x = s.x A unchanged(s, s', i);
¢* s.pc[i] = reset;
¢~ s'.pc[i] = lvexit A s'.x.free A unchanged(s, s', i);
*j s.pc[i] = lvexit;
e s'.pc[i] = rem A s'.x = s.x A unchanged(s, s', i);
(s.pc[s.x.owner] E { check, lvtry, crit, reset });
V s, s':States[F], at: ActionTypes[F], i, j: UID, b: Bool, p, pl, p2: PC
effect(s, at[i], s') unchanged(s, s', i);
s'.pc[j] = s.pc[j] = (enabled(s', at[j]) ¢* enabled(s, at[j]));
(if b then pl else p2) = p ¢* (if b then pl = p else p2 = p);
isStep(s, at[i], s') A -'s'.x.free =' at[i] = set[s'.x.owner] V s.x = s'.x;
isStep(s, at[i], s') A -s'.x.free A s'.pc[j] = set =4 s.pc[j] = set;
isStep(s, at[i], s') A s'.pc[j] = check =- s.pc[j] = check V at[i] = set[j];
Figure 6-11: Larch Trait Specifying Untimed Aspects of Fischer's Algorithm
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TimedFischer(TF): trait
includes AutomatonFischer(F), TimedAutomaton(F, bdmap, TF), SetShorthand(PC)
introduces
a, b, c : Time
SCD, StrongMutex, Mutex, Inv : States[TF] -+ Bool
asserts
V i: UID
a < b;
bdmap(task(try[i])) = unbounded; bdmap(task(crit[i])) = [0, a];
bdmap(task(test[i])) = [0, a]; bdmap(task(exit[i])) = unbounded;
bdmap(task(set[i])) = [0, a]; bdmap(task(reset[i])) = [0, a];
bdmap(task(check[i])) = [b, c]; bdmap(task(rem[i])) = [0, a];
V s: States[TF], i, j: UID
SCD(s) * -s.basic.x.free A s.basic.pc[s.basic.x.owner] = check
= j (s.basic.pc[j] = set
= (s.bounds[task(check[s.basic.x.owner])]).first
> (s.bounds[task(set[j])]) .last);
StrongMutex(s) ¢~ V i (s.basic.pc[i] E { lvtry, crit, reset }
= -s.basic.x.free A s.basic.x.owner = i
A V j (s.basic.pc[j] set));
Inv(s) ¢4 SCD(s) A StrongMutex(s);
Mutex(s) ¢* V i (s.basic.pc[i] E { lvtry, crit, reset }
= V j (j i = s.basic.pc[j] { lvtry, crit, reset }));
implies
Invariants(TF, Inv)
V s, s', s": States[TF], a: Actions[TF], at, at': ActionTypes[F], i, j: UID, t: Time
inv(s) A isStep(s, addTime(at[i]), s')
=> V j (j i = s'boundstask(at' =s.bounds[task(at'[j])]);
a < c; a infinity;
Figure 6-12: Larch Trait Specifying Timed Aspects of Fischer's Algorithm
The invariant is proven with three conjectures. The first establishes the base case for the
invariant, and the second proves that the invariant is preserved by the time passage action.
They are proved automatically by LP. The qed asks LP to verify that the conjecture has
been proven.
The last conjecture proves the invariant is preserved by all the other actions. Because
this is an implication, LP first assumes its hypothesis, and attempts to prove SCD(s' ). This
is also an implication with hypothesis s'.x 0 A s'.pc, = checking (expressed in Larch
by -s' .basic.x.free A s'.basic.pc[s' .basic.x.owner] = check). LP also assumes
this hypothesis, as in the proof in Chapter 5.
LP then strips the universal quantifier off the conclusion of the implication defining
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AutomatonIntermediate (I): trait
includes Automaton(I), Arrayl(Region, UID, Regions), CommonActions
States[I] tuple of region: Regions, status: Status
Status enumeration of start, seized, stable
Region enumeration of rem, try, crit, exit
ActionTypes[I] enumeration of try, crit, exit, rem
introduces
: ActionTypes[I], UID - Actions[I]
seize, stabilize : - Actions[I]
unchanged : States[I], States[I], UID -+ Bool
asserts
sort Actions[I] generated freely by __[__], seize, stabilize
sort Tasks[I] generated by task
V i: UID
common(try[i]) = try[i]; common(exit[i]) = exit[i];
common(crit[i]) = crit[i]; common(rem[i]) = rem[i];
isExternal(try[i]); isExternal(crit [i]);
isInternal(seize); isExternal(exit[i]);
isInternal(stabilize); isExternal(rem[i]);
V a, a': Actions[I], i, i':UID
task(a) = task(a') ¢* a = a' V (3 i (a = crit[i]) A 3 i' (a' = crit[i']));
V s, s': States[I], i, j: UID
start(s) ¢4 V i (s.region[i] = rem) A s.status = start;
unchanged(s, s', i) 1e V j (j i s'.region[j] = s.region[jl);
enabled(s, try[i]) 1= s.region[i] = rem;
effect(s, try[i], s') 14 s'.region[i] = try
A s'.status = s.status A unchanged(s, s', i);
enabled(s, seize) ¢ 4 3 i (s.region[i] = try) A V j (s.region[j] crit)
A s.status = start;
effect(s, seize, s') 1= V j (s'.region[j] = s.region[j]) A s'.status = seized;
enabled(s, stabilize) ¢4 s.status = seized;
effect(s, stabilize, s') ¢4 V j (s'.region[j] = s.region[j]) A s'.status = stable;
enabled(s, crit[i]) 4= s.region[i] = try A s.status = stable;
effect(s, crit[i], s') ¢~ s'.region[i] = crit
A s'.status = start A unchanged(s, s', i);
enabled(s, exit[i]) 1= s.region[i] = crit;
effect(s, exit[i], s') ¢4 s'.region[i] = exit
A s'.status = s.status A unchanged(s, s', i);
enabled(s, rem[i]) e s.region[i] = exit;
effect(s, rem[i], s') ¢4 s'.region[i] = rem
A s'.status = s.status A unchanged(s, s', i);
inv(s) {= s.status $ start = (3 i (s.region[i] = try) A V j (s.region[j] crit));
implies
Invariants(I, inv)
V s, s': States[I], at: ActionTypes[I], i: UID
enabled(s, task(crit[i])) ¢E 3 i enabled(s, crit[i]);
isStep(s, at[i], s') = unchanged(s, s', i);
V stat:Status
stat = start V stat = seized V stat = stable;
Figure 6-13: Larch Trait Expressing Milestones for Fischer's Algorithm
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TimedIntermediate(TI): trait
includes AutomatonIntermediate(I), TimedAutomaton(I, bdmap, TI)
introduces
a, b, c : - Time
asserts
V i: UID
bdmap(task(try[i])) = unbounded; bdmap(task(crit[i])) = [0, a+c];
bdmap(task(seize)) = [0, (2*a)+c]; bdmap(task(exit [i])) = unbounded;
bdmap(task(stabilize)) = [0, a]; bdmap(task(rem[i])) = [0, 2*a];
implies
V s, s': States[TI], a: Actions[I], at: ActionTypes[I], t: Time, i, j: UID
inv(s) A isStep(s, addTime(a), s')
= s'.bounds[task(rem[j])] = s.bounds[task(rem[j])]
V a = exit[j] V a = rem[j];
inv(s) A isStep(s, addTime(at[i]), s') A at crit
= s'.bounds[task(stabilize)] = s.bounds[task(stabilize)]
A s'.bounds[task(crit[j])] = s.bounds[task(crit[j])];
V s, s', s'': States[TI], a: Actions[TI]
effect(s, a, s') A effect(s, a, s") = s' = s'"
Figure 6-14: Larch Trait Expressing Time Bounds for the Milestones
I2M: trait
includes
TimedIntermediate(TI), TimedMutex(TM)
introduces
g : States[TI], States[TM] -+ Bool
STEP : States[TM], Actions[TM] - States[TM]
asserts
V u, u': States[TM], a: Actions[TM]
STEP(u, a) = u' e= effect(u, a, u');
% The simulation relation.
V s:States[TI], u:States[TM], i:UID
g(s, u) *
u.now = s.now
A i ( u.basic.region[i] = s.basic.region[i]
A (enabled(s.basic, task(seize))(u.bounds[task(crit[i])]).last
> ((s.bounds[task(seize)]).last + (2*a) + c) )
A (enabled(s.basic, task(stabilize))
= (u.bounds [task(crit[i])]).last
> ((s.bounds[task(stabilize)]).last + a + c) )
A (enabled(s.basic, task(crit[i]))
=} (u.bounds [task(crit [i])]).last > (s.bounds [task(crit [i] )]).last )
A (enabled(s.basic, task(rem[i]))
= (u.bounds[task(rem[i])] ).last > (s.bounds[task(rem[i])]).last )
implies TimedForardTI TM g ;v, 
implies TimedForward(TI, TM, g, inv, inv)
Figure 6-15: Larch Trait for the Simulation from the Milestones to the Specification
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F2I: trait
includes TimedIntermediate(TI), TimedFischer(TF)
introduces
f : States[TF], States[TI] - Bool
STEP : States[TI], Actions[TI] I States[TI]
w : States[TF], UID - Time
asserts
V u, u': States[TI], a: Actions[TI]
STEP(u, a) = u' ¢* effect(u, a, u');
V s:States[TF], i:UID
s.basic.pc[i] = test = w(s,i) = (s.bounds[task(test[i])]).last + a;
s.basic.pc[i] = set = w(s,i) = (s.bounds[task(set[i])]).last;
s.basic.pc[i] = check = w(s,i) = (s.bounds[task(check[i])]).last + a + a;
- (s.basic.pc[i] E { test, set, check }) #= v(s,i) = infinity;
% The simulation relation.
V s: States[TF], u: States[TI], i: UID
f(s, u) ~*
u.now = s.now
A i ( (u.basic.region[i] = rem ¢* s.basic.pc[i] = rem)
A (u.basic.region[i] = try 
s.basic.pc[i] E { test, set, check, lvtry })
A (u.basic.region[i] = crit ¢• s.basic.pc[i] = crit)
A (u.basic.region[i] = exit it
s.basic.pc[i] E { reset, lvexit } )
A (u.basic.status = start t
s.basic.x.free V 3 i (s.basic.pc[i] E { crit, reset }))
A (u.basic.status = seized *=
-s.basic. x.free
A i (s.basic.pc[i] ~ { crit, reset })
A 3 i (s.basic.pc[i] = set))
A (u.basic.status = stable it
(-s.basic.x.free A V i (s.basic.pc[i] ~ { crit, reset, set })))
A (enabled(s.basic, task(reset[i]))
4 (u.bounds[task(seize)]).last
> ((s.bounds[task(reset[i])]).last + a + a))
A 3 i: UID ((u.bounds[task(seize)]).last > w(s, i))
A (enabled(s.basic, task(set[i]))
=4 (u.bounds[task(stabilize)]).last > (s.bounds[task(set[i])]).last)
A (enabled(s.basic, task(check[i]))
A -s.basic.x.free A s.basic.x.owner = i
4 (u.bounds[task(crit[i])]).last > ((s.bounds[task(check[i])]).last + a))
A (enabled(s.basic, task(crit[i]))
=4 (u.bounds[task(crit [i])]).last > (s.bounds [task(crit [i] )]).last)
A (enabled(s.basic, task(reset[i]))
=4 (u.bounds[task(rem[i])]) .last > ((s.bounds[task(reset[il)]).last + a))
A (enabled(s.basic, task(rem[i]))
=- (u.bounds[task(rem[i] )]) .last > (s.bounds[task(rem[i])]).last));
implies TimedForward(TF, TI, f, StrongMutex, inv)
Figure 6-16: Larch Trait for the Simulation from Fischer's Algorithm to the Milestones
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thaw TimedFischer
set immunity ancestor
set name SCD
set proof-methods =, normalization
prove start(s:States[TF]) SCD(s)
qed
prove SCD(s) A isStep(s, nu(t), s') #= SCD(s')
qed
prove SCD(s) A inv(s':States[TF]) A isStep(s, addTime(at[i]), s') = SCD(s')
resume by case atc[ic] = set[s'c.basic.x.owner]
/, CASE 1: atc[ic] = set[s'c.basic.x.owner]
prove (s'c.now + a) < (s'c.now + b)
instantiate t by s'c.now, tl by a, t2 by b in Time
instantiate c by task(set[jc]) in *impliesHyp
% CASE 2: - (atc[ic] = set[s'c.basic.x.owner])
instantiate s by sc.basic, s' by s'c.basic, at by atc, i by ic in AutomatonFischer
instantiate j by jc in AutomatonFischer
instantiate j by sc.basic.x. owner in AutomatonFischer
prove atc[ic] check[sc.basic.x.owner] by contradiction
prove atc[ic] set[jc] by contradiction
instantiate j:UID by jc in *hyp
qed
Figure 6-17: Larch Proof of Invariant 5.3: Sufficient Confirmation Delay
SCD,4 and assumes the s'.pcj = set hypothesis of the resulting implication. This is also
done, though not explicitly, in each of the cases of the hand proof.
LP generates fresh constants and substitutes them for the variables in the hypotheses
it assumes.5 These are the sc, s'c, atc, ic, and jc that appear in the proof.
When the conjecture is no longer an implication, LP normalizes it, and awaits further
guidance, supplied by the remainder of this script. First, we instruct LP to consider two
cases as in the hand proof. Note that ic represents the index of the process that took a
step, which need not be s'c.basic.x.owner (i.e., s'.x).
If the action is sets,.x, then we prove s'.now + a < s'.now + b. Unfortunately, LP is
not very good at even simple arithmetic, and a bit of further guidance is necessary for it
to recognize this. 6 The instantiate command calls LP's attention to instances of general
facts that are useful for establishing the current conjecture. The second instantiation, for
4All unbound variables are implicitly universally quantified in LP.
5 This is justified by the universal generalization rule of logic.
6 LP is being enhanced with decision procedures that will greatly improve its ability to deal with
arithmetic.
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7. CASE 3: set[ul]
resume by =:
instantiate j:UID by s'c.basic.x.owner in *impliesHyp % StrongMutex
prove s'c.basic.pc[i] 0 { crit, reset }
resume by case i = s'c.basic.x.owner
instantiate j:UID by ic in *impliesHyp
resume by case sc.basic.x.free
Figure 6-18: Larch Proof that seti Preserves the Simulation: Part 1
example, causes LP to recognize that the conjecture follows from Lemma 3.3. This is enough
for LP to derive the rest of the proof for that case.
If the action is not set,,.z, then Lemma 5.1, along with the other two lemmas, is in-
stantiated with the relevant constants that LP generated. Then, though this was not done
explicitly in the hand proof, it is proven (by contradiction) that checks,. and setj are not
newly enabled. The final instantiation uses the inductive assumption to finish the proof.
6.3.2 Preserving the Simulation under the seti Action
We now present the script for the proof that the simulation is preserved by the seti action.
This script, shown in Figures 6-18, 6-19, and 6-20, does not stand alone, but rather is
extracted from the larger proof that the simulation is preserved by any action of Fischer.
However, as in the hand proof, this is the most complex and interesting part of the proof.
Again, the script follows the structure of the hand proof closely.
Because this is only a fragment of a script, we begin by setting the context in which it
occurs. The conjecture being proved is
f(s,u) A isStep(s, a, s') A inv(s) A inv(u) A StrongMutex(s)
3 alpha (execFrag(alpha) A first(alpha) = u A f(s', last(alpha))
A trace(alpha) = trace(a))
and this script verifies the case when a = addTime(set [ull ). Unlike in the previous script,
the only proof method that LP applies by default is normalization. Thus, the conjecture is
still an implication.
The resume by => command causes LP to assume the hypothesis of the conjecture, and
attempt to prove the conclusion, as was done automatically in the previous proof script.
Following the proof in Chapter 5, we prove Vj, s.pcj {critical, reset}, and then consider
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% CASE (a): sc.basic.x.free
prove 3 i:UID (uc.basic.region[i] = try)
resume by specializing i:UID to s'c.basic.x.owner
resume by case V j:UID (s'c.basic.pc[j] set)
% CASE i. V j:UID (s'c.basic.pc[j] set)
assert (ac = seize); u'c = STEP(uc, addTime(ac))
assert a'c = stabilize; uc = STEP(u'c, addTime(a'c))
resume by specializing
alpha to (({uc}) { addTime(ac), u'c }) { addTime(a'c), u''c }
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(ac) in *impliesHyp / c-op(.first)
resume by case i = s'c.basic.x.owner
% CASE: - (i = s'c.basic.x.owner); First case was automatic.
instantiate j:UID by ic in *Hyp
resume by -
instantiate i:UID by ic in *impliesHyp
% CASE ii. -V j:UID (s'c.basic.pc[j] set)
assert (ac = seize); u'c = STEP(uc, addTime(ac))
resume by specializing alpha to ({uc}) { addTime(ac), u'c }
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(ac) in *impliesHyp / c-op(.first)
prove 3 i:UID (s'c.basic.pc[i] = set)
declare op ic: -UID
fix j:UID as ic in *caseHyp
resume by specializing i:UID to ic
resume by case i = s'c.basic.x.owner
% CASE: - (i = s'c.basic.x.owner); First case was automatic.
instantiate j:UID by ic in *impliesHyp
resume by A
resume by •
instantiate i:UID by ic in *impliesHyp
resume by =
instantiate c:Tasks[F] by task(set[ic]) in *impliesHyp
Figure 6-19: Larch Proof that set/ Preserves the Simulation: Part 2
three cases. These cases correspond exactly to the cases in the hand proof, and they are
numbered accordingly. Figure 6-19 contains the first case, proven in two subcases, and
Figure 6-20 contains the later two cases.
Each case introduces constants to name the simulated actions and the resulting states.
These form the simulated execution fragment, which LP attempts to verify meets the
step condition. After specializing the conjecture, we first direct LP to consider that the
lower bounds for the actions are met, with the instantiate ... in *impliesHyp /
c-op(.first) command. This step was not in the hand proof because of our conven-
tion of omitting first components for trivial lower bounds. However, the LP traits derive
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resume by case V j:UID (s'c.basic.pc[j] set)
% CASE (b): -sc.basic.x.free A j:UID (s'c.basic.pc[j] set)
assert (ac = stabilize); u'c = STEP(uc, addTime(ac))
resume by specializing alpha to (uc)) ({ addTime(ac), u'c }
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(ac) in *impliesHyp / c-op(.first)
prove 3 i:UID (sc.basic.pc[i] = set)
resume by specializing i:UID to s'c.basic.x.owner
resume by case i = s'c.basic.x.owner
% CASE: ic = s'c.basic.x.owner
prove -V i:UID - (sc.basic.pc[i] = set) by contradiction
% CASE: -(ic = s'c.basic.x.owner)
instantiate j:UID by ic in *Hyp
resume by =
instantiate i:UID by ic in *impliesHyp
% CASE (c): -sc.basic.x.free A -V j:UID (s'c.basic.pc[j] set)
resume by specializing alpha to {uc}
prove uc.bounds[task(seize)].last = infinity
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(seize) in *hyp
prove -V i:UID - (sc.basic.pc[i] = set) by contradiction
prove 3 i:UID (sc.basic.pc[i] = set)
resume by specializing i:UID to s'c.basic.x.owner
prove 3 i:UID (s'c.basic.pc[i] = set)
declare op ic:-+UID
fix j:UID as ic in *caseHyp
resume by specializing i:UID to ic
resume by case i = sc.basic.x.owner
% CASE: ic = s'c.basic.x.owner
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(crit[ic]) in *impliesHyp
% CASE: -(ic = s'c.basic.x.owner)
instantiate j:UID by ic in *impliesHyp
instantiate i:UID by ic in *impliesHyp
resume by A
resume by •
resume by =
Figure 6-20: Larch Proof that seti Preserves the Simulation: Part 3
the timed automaton systematically, so these conditions still need to be checked.
Within each case, we also prove some simple lemmas, usually with existential quanti-
fiers. These are all straightforward, but the quantifier prevents LP from recognizing them
automatically, and so they must be proved explicitly.
Finally, each case contains an additional case split not found in the hand proof. Actually,
this split is necessary, but the case when i = s'.x is so straightforward that we don't mention
it explicitly. Notice that LP needs little or no guidance for that case; however, it does need to
be directed to make the case split. The guidance provided to LP in the other case (i s'.x)
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merely directs LP to prove each condition of the simulation separately by assuming the
hypothesis and establishing the conclusion.
6.3.3 The Improved Bounds
The proof presented in Section 5.8 was not carefully and systematically checked. Instead,
it is informal, and appeals strongly to the similarity to the proof with the weaker bounds,
claiming that any changes, other than those explicitly noted, are straightforward. Without
automated verification, we must either be content with such informality, or else check every
tedious step of the proof again.
One of the important advantages of using automated tools is that the computer can
re-do these checks for us. If the changes really are straightforward, then the scripts should
require little modification. This is also part of the motivation for choosing a tool that follows
our conventional reasoning: if the structure of the hand proof does not change, neither will
the structure of the automated proof.
The proof presented in the appendix is, in fact, not the original proof, but one which
establishes a time bound of 2a + c for the seize task.7 Other than the obvious changes in
the traits reflecting the improved time bounds, the only changes required corresponded to
those described in Section 5.8.
6.4 Discussion
The simplest but most significant observation to make is that we succeeded in verifying this
proof using the Larch tools. This indicates that automating such proofs is not intractable,
but in fact realistic. The proof follows the hand proof closely, which makes it easy to
understand. It is also quite general, because it uses parameters, rather than specific values,
for the time bounds, and is valid for any number of processes.
Though it is difficult to accurately quantify the development time, the main simulation
proof, from Fischer to Milestone, took about a week to formalize and verify using LP. Since
this proof was intended largely as a test case on which to tune LP better to accomodate
simulation proofs, especially those involving time, many changes were made for readability
7The tight time bound was also verified using LP, but this required subtraction to be axiomatized, as
well as the additional invariant to be proved.
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and to reduce the running time. These changes, made over a period of about a year, reflect
a better understanding of how LP verified the proof, as well as improvements made to LP
suggested by the difficulties encountered in doing this proof.
Minor changes made in the hand proof seem to be easy to transfer to the automated
proof. To establish the improved time bound for the seize task, for example, required only
changes in the LSL traits reflecting the new bound, and a few minor changes to the proof
scripts, which corresponded to the changes in the hand proof.
Another important consideration is the amount of computation LP needs to verify the
proof. The current version of the proof takes about an hour of CPU time running on a DEC
3000 AXP Model 500 at 150MHz to process all the traits, and run all the proof scripts, a
little under half of which is spent on the proof of the simulation from Fischer to Milestone.
This is significantly reduced from our earlier proofs, mostly by assisting LP in ordering
operators in the registry, and by choosing formalizations that LP handles more effectively.
We believe there is still leeway to improve this further. For example, in a smaller test
case, we achieved a 30% speed-up by using decision procedures for arithmetic and boolean
algebra.
The main danger for Larch proofs is that the traits may define an inconsistent theory.
We encountered this problem with our initial Bounds trait, which introduced a subtle in-
consistency. Because we never directed LP to use this inconsistency, we only discovered it
when we tried to tune the traits so that LP would do more of the proof without guidance.
This problem was easily fixed, requiring only simple modifications to the traits.
Because determining consistency is undecidable, some theorem provers impose greater
restrictions on axiomatizations which guarantee consistency.8 However, such restrictions
make it more difficult and awkward to express some concepts, and thus make proofs more
complicated and less intuitive. This is especially problematic for proof development, since
the high level structure may be obscured. A possible compromise approach is to allow
greater flexibility at first, and then use a checker that accepts a restricted language once
the structure of the proof has emerged. Our experience indicates that adapting a proof to
use a new formalism is not difficult, if the fundamental concepts remain the same. This
seems to stem, again, from the similarity of the automated proofs to our standard hand
proofs.
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8 Assuming number theory is consistent.
We have found that adhering to the reasoning we employ in our hand proofs generally
results in proof scripts that are clearer, more succinct, and easier to modify if necessary.
This is especially true at the high level; once the structure of the proof is defined, it is
convenient to set LP to do more work automatically, so that it can fill in the details with
little guidance.
One difficulty with this approach, however, is that some "obvious" facts used are proved
"by inspection," usually involving a simple check over many cases. In fact, in hand proofs,
we often simply use such facts without explicitly mentioning them. LP, however, needs
some guidance to derive the appropriate statement. This is often best handled by stating
the required facts as lemmas, which can be verified by LP with little difficulty.
Also, as mentioned earlier, simple arithmetic and boolean algebra require more guidance
in LP than corresponds to the hand proof, and this problem is exacerbated by first-order
quantifiers. A new version of LP which uses specialized decision procedures to do arith-
metic and boolean algebra is being tested, and we expect that this will improve both the
readability and the speed of the proofs. Although first-order logic is undecidable, we are
also considering ways to handle quantifiers better.
One of the most significant trade-offs in Larch is between usability and efficiency. Since
LP is intended for developing proofs, not merely verifying them, it is designed to interact
with the user. Thus, for example, LP attempts to retain the form of assertions as much as
possible, so that the user can recognize where the various facts arose from. This means,
however, that two semantically identical facts may retain syntactically different forms, and
thus not be recognized as equivalent by LP.
Also, Larch does restrict its language to first-order logic, and forbids subtyping by
requiring all sorts to be disjoint. This limits the expressive power of Larch, but simplifies
its semantics, and allows greater syntactic checks on the input.
We are still trying to learn how to approach these proofs better, so that it will usually be
easy to automate proofs of this sort. Some of this work, such as enhancing LP with decision
procedures, is already done and simply needs to be exploited in the Fischer proof. Other
work still needs to be done. We are also thinking about ways to improve the interaction
between LP and the user, to assist in proof development, as well as ways to isolate the user
from details conceptually unrelated to the proof, such as the ordering of the operators in
the registry. That this proof has been entirely verified using Larch is very encouraging, but
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we can still see many ways in which we can improve.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a methodology based on simulations and invariants for analyzing real-
time distributed systems and establishing bounds on the time to accomplish certain tasks.
We have demonstrated it on some small but nontrivial examples, which previously had no
rigorous timing analysis. In particular, the tight upper bound on the time to reach the
critical region in Fischer's mutual exclusion algorithm was not, to our knowledge, known
before. We have also verified the proof of Fischer's algorithm using the Larch tools.
This methodology involves specifying both the system and its requirements as automata,
and establishing a relationship between them that proves that the system satisfies its re-
quirements. Because both are specified as automata, it is possible to introduce intermediate
specifications, which express some intuition about how the system unfolds. We have also
proposed an approach to defining these intermediate automata, using milestones, to assist
in proving timing properties.
This methodology leads to well-structured hierarchical proofs that are rigorous, sys-
tematic, and amenable to automatic verification. Also, invariants and simulations serve
as "documentation", expressing key insights about a system's behavior, including its tim-
ing. Invariants capture the unchanging aspect of the system, while simulations characterize
changes in the system, as reflected in the requirements. In this sense, simulations replace
operational arguments with an assertional framework.
It also appears that this methodology will scale reasonably to realistic systems. This
is because, although the length of the proofs increases as the systems grow, they do not
become too complicated. Rather than large, intricate proofs, they typically consist of many
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small checks that can usually be done independently. Furthermore, many of the checks are
trivial, and can be done automatically.
For an estimate of the complexity of simulation proofs, we can characterize the size and
complexity of a system by the number of state variables and actions I of an automaton for
that system. Proving an invariant typically requires separate consideration of each action.
Thus, the proof for an invariant is roughly proportional to the size of the system.
A simulation, on the other hand, involves two automata, one for the implementation, and
one for the specification. Again, separate consideration is usually required for each action of
the implementation, to verify that the simulation can be preserved by that action. However,
the simulation also grows more complex with the systems. In the examples we have done,
the number of conditions defining the simulation is proportional to the number of state
variables in the specification automaton, including the timing variables, or alternatively,
the number of variables in the untimed state plus the number of actions. Each of these
conditions must be preserved by every action in the implementation, so the proof of a
simulation grows as the product of the sizes of the two systems.
Moreover, most of the cases in these proofs are trivial, and thus these proofs are amenable
to automatic verification. We have defined a library of abstractions for the Larch tools,
which we have used to verify Fischer's algorithm in a way that corresponds closely with the
human reasoning we employ to convince ourselves. This provides added confidence that the
proof is indeed correct, and that every case has been properly checked.
Using automated verification tools also promises to be helpful when modifying systems.
When we modify a system or its specification only slightly, we expect that LP will be able
to check most of the original proof automatically, allowing us to concentrate our attention
on what has truly changed, without worrying that some important detail has been over-
looked. This was, in fact, our experience when we proved the improved bounds for Fischer's
algorithm.
More work is still necessary in applying these techniques to larger systems, to test
both the methodology and the automated tools. A natural starting point is to verify other
mutual exclusion algorithms. In particular, a detailed proof of the simulation given by Lynch
1 Parameterized actions and variables technically correspond to many actions and variables, but can
usually be treated uniformly, and thus can be considered a single action or variable for this analysis. For
example, the mutual exclusion automata in Chapter 5 have a set of state variables and actions for each
process, but the proof does not depend on the number of processes.
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[Lyn93] for Dijkstra's mutual exclusion algorithm [Dij65] should be an informative test of the
enhancements made to the Larch tools. The hybrid algorithm of Lynch and Shavit [LS92]
is another possibly instructive example to examine, as are Lamport's "bakery" algorithm
[Lam74], and algorithms proposed by Peterson and Fischer [PF77].
A much more ambitious study would be to attempt to analyze a more complex and subtle
practical algorithm such as the distributed minimum spanning tree algorithm of Gallager,
Humblet, and Spira [GHS83]. Welch, Lamport, and Lynch gave a rigorous and detailed,
and very lengthy, analysis of this algorithm [WLL88], but it did not include a performance
analysis. A timing analysis of this algorithm, accompanied by a simple, concise proof, would
be relevant for practical systems, and also serve as an interesting case study of the methods
developed here.
Operating systems, especially distributed operating systems, provide another rich do-
main for problems and protocols, such as synchronization [KR93] and scheduling [Jef92,
Zho92] with hard real-time constraints, that might be analyzed using this methodology.
For these, and other problems, it is important to characterize not only correctness but also
timeliness.
Perhaps the most useful application of these techniques lies in the analysis of communi-
cation protocols [CAZ92, MSST93], which generally have only informal claims of efficiency
and even correctness. For many of these, especially the distributed group communication
protocols, the correctness guarantees are not always clear, and only recently have there
been attempts at stating these more formally [HT93, FKL95, FvR95, MBRS94]. Unfortu-
nately, these usually lack performance guarantees, which are essential for communication
systems. S0gaard-Andersen, Lynch, and Lampson have recently done a lengthy case study
applying simulation methods to communication protocols [SLL93a, SLL93b], but this does
not include an analysis of the timing. Instead, the performance is typically determined
empirically (e.g., [vRHB94]).
Performance guarantees, however, are often difficult to characterize, especially "soft"
time bounds, that is, bounds that hold in "typical" cases. The MMT automaton model used
in this thesis is adequate only for expressing "hard" time bounds which usually characterize
real implementations. Lynch and Vaandrager have defined a more general timed automaton
model [LVarb] to specify systems which have a more complex relationship between timing
and state. However, little work has been done to develop a methodology for these more
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general automata, and in particular, this has not yet been used to model any systems with
soft time bounds. Furthermore, it is unclear how much additional complexity in the proofs
will result with this increased dependency between timing and state.
Another important class of systems that cannot be handled within the framework of
this thesis are randomized algorithms. Segala [Seg95] has developed a general probabilistic
automaton model, which Pogosyants and Segala [PS95] have specialized to a probabilistic
variant of MMT automata, and have proved some results using this model. Pogosyants is
also working on automating these proofs using the Larch tools. However, more work is still
necessary to understand the general structure behind such proofs, and to develop guidelines
to approach and automate such proofs.
We believe that this is a fruitful area of research, and that many interesting real-time
systems are now within the reach of formal methods. Furthermore, as automated tools
become more sophisticated, we expect practical machine verification of proofs of real-time
systems to be a reasonable goal.
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Appendix A
LP Proof Script Files
This appendix contains the proof scripts used to verify the Fischer algorithm described in
Chapter 5. The proof is divided into six scripts, corresponding to the implies clauses of the
automaton and simulation traits specific to the proof of Fischer's algorithm.'
At the beginning of several files are some commands that indicate how certain opera-
tors are to be ordered in the registry. This significantly reduces the time that LP spends
attempting find an order for the operators that does not cause it to loop infinitely during
normalization.
These proofs use LP's box-checking option, with marks generated by to indicate points
at which new proof obligations are introduced (the <> marks) and satisfied (matching []
marks).2 These marks are often enough to indicate the structure of the proof, and serve as
documentation, as well as checks that LP is proceeding as expected. Comments, preceded
by %, provide further documentation where necessary. Long commands may be split into
several lines, terminated by two periods (. .). These do not indicate any elision of the script,
which is provided here in full, exactly as it is processed by LP.
A.1 The Untimed Aspects of Fischer's Algorithm
set script untimedfischer
execute AutomatonFischer_Axioms
1There is some rearrangement of where the implications are proved. For example, there are actually two
scripts for establishing the implies clause of the TimedFischer trait, one for the sufficient confirmation delay
invariant, and the other establishing strong mutual exclusion.
2Proof obligations introduced explicitly with a prove command do not have redundant <> marks. They
are matched by [] conjecture.
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set box-checking on
set name UntimedFischer
set proof-methods #=,normalization
set immunity ancestor
declare vars p, p, p2: PC
prove p = (if b then pl else p2) ¢* (if b then p:PC = pl else p = p2) by case b
<> case bc
[] case bc
<> case - bc
[] case -bc
[] conjecture
qed
declare var at:ActionTypes[F]
prove effect(s, at[i], s') = unchanged(s, s', i) by induction on at:ActionTypes[F]
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> #= subgoal
[] => subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
prove s'.pc[j] = s.pc[j] = (enabled(s', at[j]) 4t enabled(s, at[j]))
<> = subgoal
resume by induction on at
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
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[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
prove
isStep(s, at[i], s') A -s'.x.free • at[i] = set[s'.x.owner] V s.x = s'.x
by induction on at:ActionTypes[F]
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> subgoal
[] • subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> =j subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal.
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] • subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> subgoal
[] • subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
set proof-methods normalization
prove isStep(s, at[i], s') A -s'.x.free A s'.pc[j] = set = s.pc[j] = set
resume by case i:UID = j
<> case ic = jc
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set proof-methods normalization, =.
resume by induction on at:ActionTypes[F]
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] • subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] case ic = jc
<> case - (ic = jc)
resume by #
<> #= subgoal
instantiate s by sc, s' by s'c, at by atc, i by ic, j by jc in UntimedFischer
[] #= subgoal
[] case - (ic = jc)
[] conjecture
qed
prove isStep(s, at[i], s') A s'.pc[j] = check = (s.pc[j] = check V at[i] = set[j])
resume by case i:UID = j
<> case ic = jc
set proof-methods normalization, =
resume by induction on at:ActionTypes[F]
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
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[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] E subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] case ic = jc
<> case - (ic = jc)
resume by =>
<> = subgoal
instantiate s by sc, s' by s'c, at by atc, i by ic, j by jc in UntimedFischer
[] = subgoal
[] case - (ic = jc)
[] conjecture
qed
', The invariant
prove start(s) = inv(s) by =
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
prove inv(s) A isStep(s, a, s') = inv(s') by induction on a:Actions[F]
<> basis subgoal
resume by case s'.x = s.x
<> case s'c.x = sc.x
resume by case u = sc.x.owner
<> case uc = sc.x.owner
set proof-methods 4=, normalization
resume by induction on al
<> basis subgoal
<> #' subgoal
<> 4 subgoal
[] subgoal
[] 4= subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> 4= subgoal
<> 4 subgoal
[] -- subgoal
[] 4' subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
<> = subgoal
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[] = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> =* subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> => subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> => subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] =} subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> #= subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] =} subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] case uc = sc.x.owner
<> case - (uc = sc.x.owner)
set proof-methods 4, normalization
resume
<> => subgoal
<> = subgoal
instantiate s by sc, s' by s'c, at by aic, i by uc in untimedfischer
instantiate j by sc.x.owner in untimedfischer
[] = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] case - (uc = sc.x.owner)
[] case s'c.x = sc.x
<> case - (s'c.x = sc.x)
set proof-methods #=, normalization
resume
<> = subgoal
<> = subgoal
instantiate s by sc, s' by s'c, at by alc, i by uc in untimedfischer
[] = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] case - (s'c.x = sc.x)
[] basis subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
set log untimedfischer
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statistics
quit
A.2 The Milestone Automaton
set script intermediate
execute AutomatonIntermediateAxioms
set name Intermediate
set immunity ancestor
set box-checking on
declare variable stat:Status
prove stat = start V stat = seized V stat = stable by induction on stat
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
prove enabled(s, task(crit[i])) ¢* 3 i enabled(s, crit[i])
resume by case 3 i enabled(s, crit[i])
<> case 3 i:UID enabled(sc, crit[i])
declare operator ic: -+ UID
fix i as ic in *caseHyp
resume by specializing a:Actions[I] to crit[ic]
<> specialization subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] case 3 i:UID enabled(sc, crit[i])
<> case -3 i:UID enabled(sc, crit[i])
resume by case a = crit[i]
<> case ac = crit[ic]
[] case ac = crit[ic]
<> case - (ac = crit[ic])
resume by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
declare operator i'c: - UID
fix i as i'c in *contraHyp
[] contradiction subgoal
[] case - (ac = crit[ic])
[] case -3 i:UID enabled(sc, crit[i])
[] conjecture
qed
prove start(s) = inv(s) by =
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
prove inv(s) A isStep(s, a, s') #= inv(s') by case s.status = start
<> case sc.status = start
resume by induction on a:Actions[I]
<> basis subgoal
set proof-methods normalization, =
resume by induction on al
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<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
[] E subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> subgoal
[] subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> • subgoal
[] subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
resume by 
<> = subgoal
[] subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] case sc.status = start
<> case - (sc.status = start)
resume by case 3 i(sc.region[i] = try)
<> case 3 i (sc.region[il = try)
declare operator ic: - UID
fix i:UID as ic in *hyp
resume by induction on a:Actions[I]
<> basis subgoal
set proof-methods normalization, =
resume by induction on al
<> basis subgoal
<> subgoal
resume by specializing i:UID to ic
<> specialization subgoal
prove ic uc by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
instantiate j:UID by ic in *hyp
resume by case j = uc
<> case jc = uc
[] case jc = uc
<> case - (jc = uc)
instantiate j:UID by jc in *hyp
[] case - (jc = uc)
[] specialization subgoal
[] => subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> subgoal
[] E subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
<> subgoal
[] subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
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<> = subgoal
prove uc ic by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
resume by specializing i:UID to ic
<> specialization subgoal
instantiate j:UID by ic in *hyp
resume by case j = uc
<> case jc = uc
[] case jc = uc
<> case - (jc = uc)
instantiate j:UID by jc in *hyp
[] case - (jc = uc)
[] specialization subgoal
[] X subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
resume by =-
<> subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] case 3 i (sc.region[i] = try)
<> case -3 i (sc.region[i] = try)
[] case -3 i (sc.region[i] = try)
[] case - (sc.status = start)
[] conjecture
qed
set log intermediate
statistics
quit
A.3 Sufficient Confirmation Delay
set script SCD
thaw TimedFischer
set box-checking on
set immunity ancestor
set name theorem
set proof-methods =, normalization
%%%%%% Preliminaries
% Put information in registry to speed up ordering
register height
__[__]:Bounds[F],Tasks[F] --+Bounds
> (.first, .last, bdmap, 3:Actions[F],Bool-+Bool, .basic, +:Time,Time-+Time)
register height .bounds > (.basic, enabled:States[F] ,Actions[F]-+Bool)
%%%%%%.% The proof
prove start(s:States[TF]) = SCD(s)
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<> =~ subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
prove SCD(s) A inv(s':States[TF]) A isStep(s, addTime(at[i]), s') = SCD(s')
<> #. subgoal
<> #= subgoal
<> subgoal
resume by case atc[ic] = set[s'c.basic.x.owner]
<> case atc[ic] = set[s'c.basic.x.owner]
prove (s'c.now + a) < (s'c.now + b)
instantiate t by s'c.now, t by a, t2 by b in Time
[] conjecture
instantiate c by task(set[jc]) in *impliesHyp
[] case atc[ic] = set[s'c.basic.x.owner]
<> case - (atc[ic] = set[s'c.basic.x.owner])
instantiate s by sc.basic, s' by s'c.basic, at by atc, i by ic in AutomatonFischer
% Uses Lemma 5.1
instantiate j by jc in AutomatonFischer
instantiate j by sc.basic.x. owner in AutomatonFischer
, We now know set[jc] and check[sc.basic.x.owner] are enabled in sc and s'c.
prove atc[ic] check[sc.basic.x.owner] by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
prove atc[ic] set[jc] by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
instantiate j by jc in *hyp
[] case - (atc[ic] = set[s'c.basic.x.owner])
[] = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
prove SCD(s) A isStep(s, nu(t), s') = SCD(s')
<> = subgoal
[] • subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
set log SCD
statistics
quit
A.4 Strong Mutual Exclusion
set script mutex
thaw TimedFischer
set proof-methods =, normalization
set immunity ancestor
set box-checking on
set name theorem
%%%%%% Preliminaries
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% Put information in registry to speed up ordering
register height
__[__]:Bounds[F] ,Tasks[F] -Bounds
> (.first, .last, bdmap, 3:Actions[F],Bool-+Bool, .basic, +:Time,Time-+Time)
register height .bounds > (.basic, enabled:States[F],Actions[F]-+Bool)
%%%/%%%% The proof
prove start(s:States[TF]) = StrongMutex(s)
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
prove
StrongMutex(s) A SCD(s) A inv(s:States[TF]) A isStep(s, addTime(at[i]), s')
=- StrongMutex(s')
by induction on at:ActionTypes[F]
% CASE 1: at = try
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
<> = subgoal
resume by case icl = ic
<> case icl = ic
[] case icl = ic
<> case - (icl = ic)
critical-pairs *caseHyp with *impliesHyp
instantiate i by icl in *hyp
resume by case j = ic
<> case jc = ic
[] case jc = ic
<> case - (jc = ic)
critical-pairs *caseHyp with *impliesHyp
[] case - (jc = ic)
[] case - (icl = ic)
[] = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
% CASE 2: at = test
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
<> = subgoal
resume by case ic = icl
<> case ic = icl
resume by case sc.basic.x.free
<> case sc.basic.x.free
[] case sc.basic.x.free
<> case - sc.basic.x.free
[] case - sc.basic.x.free
[] case ic = icl
<> case - (ic = icl)
instantiate j by icl in *impliesHyp
instantiate i by icl in *impliesHyp
resume by case j = ic
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<> case jc = ic
[] case jc = ic
<> case (jc = ic)
instantiate j by jc in *impliesHyp
[] case - (jc = ic)
[] case - (ic = icl)
[] = subgoal
[] subgoal
[] basis subgoal
% CASE 3: a = set
<> basis subgoal
<> =- subgoal
<> #= subgoal
prove icl ic by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
instantiate j by icl in *hyp
instantiate i by icl in *hyp
[] = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
% CASE 4: a = check
<> basis subgoal
<> 4= subgoal
<> #= subgoal
instantiate j by ic in *hyp
resume by case sc.basic.x.owner = ic A -sc.basic.x.free
<> case sc.basic.x.owner = ic A -sc.basic.x.free
prove ic = icl by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
instantiate j by icl in *hyp
instantiate i by icl in *hyp
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
prove V j (s'c.basic.pc[j] set)
resume by case j = ic
<> case jc = ic
[] case jc = ic
<> case - (jc = ic)
instantiate j by jc in *impliesHyp
instantiate c by task(set[jc]) in *hyp
resume by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] case - (jc = ic)
[] conjecture
[] case sc.basic.x.owner = ic A -sc.basic.x.free
<> case -(sc.basic.x.owner = ic A -sc.basic.x.free)
prove icl ic by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
instantiate j by icl in *hyp
instantiate i by icl in *hyp
resume by case j = ic
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<> case jc = ic
[] case jc = ic
<> case - (jc = ic)
instantiate j by jc in *hyp
[] case - (jc = ic)
[] case - (sc.basic.x.owner = ic A -isc.basic.x.free)
[] = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
% CASE 5: a = crit
<> basis subgoal
<> = subgoal
<> subgoal
resume by case icl = ic
<> case icl = ic
instantiate i by ic in *hyp
resume by case j = ic
<> case jc = ic
[] case jc = ic
<> case - (jc = ic)
instantiate j by jc in *hyp
[] case -(jc = ic)
[] case icl = ic
<> case - (icl = ic)
instantiate j by icl in *hyp
instantiate i by icl in *hyp
resume by case j = ic
<> case jc = ic
[] case jc = ic
<> case - (jc = ic)
instantiate j by jc in *hyp
[] case -(jc = ic)
[] case - (icl = ic)
[] = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal.
% CASE 6: a = exit
<> basis subgoal
<> •= subgoal
<> 4= subgoal
resume by case ic = ic
<> case icl = ic
instantiate i by ic in *hyp
resume by case j = ic
<> case jc = ic
[] case jc = ic
<> case - (jc = ic)
instantiate j by jc in *hyp
[] case - (jc = ic)
[] case icl = ic
<> case - (icl = ic)
instantiate j by icl in *hyp
instantiate i by icl in *hyp
resume by case j = ic
<> case jc = ic
[] case jc = ic
<> case - (jc = ic)
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instantiate j by jc in *hyp
[] case - (jc = ic)
[] case - (icl ic)
[] •= subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
% CASE 7: a = reset
<> basis subgoal
<> •= subgoal
resume by case i = ic
<> case icl = ic
[] case icl = ic
<> case - (icl = ic)
instantiate i by ic in *hyp
instantiate j by icl in *hyp
instantiate i by icl in *hyp
[] case - (icl = ic)
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
% CASE 8: a = rem
<> basis subgoal
<> •= subgoal
<> •= subgoal
resume by case icl = ic
<> case icl = ic
[] case icl = ic
<> case - (icl = ic)
instantiate j by icl in *hyp
instantiate i by icl in *hyp
resume by case j = ic
<> case jc = ic
[] case jc = ic
<> case - (jc = ic)
instantiate j by jc in *hyp
[] case - (jc = ic)
[] case - (icl = ic)
[] z= subgoal
[] 4= subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
prove StrongMutex(s) A isStep(s, nu(t), s') = StrongMutex(s')
<> subgoal
[] subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
prove StrongMutex(s) Mutex(s)
<> = subgoal
<> subgoal
<> = subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *hyp
resume by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
instantiate i by jc in *hyp
[] contradiction subgoal
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[] = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
set log mutex
statistics
quit
A.5 The Simulation from the Milestones to the Specification
set script i2m
thaw I2M
set name theorem
set immunity ancestor
set box-checking on
%/.%%%% Preliminaries
% Put information in registry to speed up ordering
register height
___[__]:Bounds[I], Tasks[I] -+Bounds
> (.first, last, bdmap:Tasks[I]-+Bounds, 3:Actions[I] ,Bool-+Bool,
.basic:States[TI] -States[I], +:Time,Time-*Time)
register height
__ [__]:Bounds [M],Tasks[M] -+Bounds
> (.first, .last, bdmap:Tasks[M] -+Bounds, 3:Actions[M],Bool-+Bool,
.basic:States[TM] -States [M, +:Time,Time-*Time)
register height
.bounds:States[TI] -+Bounds[I]
> (.basic:States [TI] -+States[I], enabled:States[I] ,Actions[I] -- Bool)
register height
.bounds:States[TM] -Bounds [M
> (.basic:States[TM] I-States[M], enabled:States [M],Actions[M] -+Bool)
register height ____] :Regions,UID-+Region > V
% Introduce constants that will be used to replace variables
declare operators
uc: - States[TM] % Used by LP for u in hypotheses
sc, s'c: - States[TI] 7. Ditto for s and s'
u'c: - States[TM] % To abbreviate STEP(uc, ... )
ac, a'c: - Actions[M] %. To abbreviate actions
% Put information in registry to ensure intended orientation of equations
register top uc, u'c
register height u'c > uc
register height s'c > sc
% Some preliminary lemmas.
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prove effect(s, a, STEP(s, a))
rewrite conjecture with reversed I2M
[] conjecture
qed
prove enabled(s:States[M], task(crit[i])) ¢* 3 i:UID enabled(s:States[M], crit[i])
resume by case 3 i:UID enabled(s:States[M], crit[i])
<> case 3 i:UID enabled(sc, crit[i])
declare operator ic: -+ UID
fix i:UID as ic in *caseHyp
resume by specializing a:Actions[M] to crit[ic]
<> specialization subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] case 3 i:UID enabled(sc, crit[i])
<> case -3 i:UID enabled(sc, crit[i])
resume by case a:Actions[M] = crit[i]
<> case ac = crit[ic]
[] case ac = crit[ic]
<> case - (ac = crit[ic])
resume by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
declare operator i'c: -+ UID
fix i:UID as i'c in *contraHyp
[] contradiction subgoal
[] case - (ac = crit[ic])
[] case -3 i:UID enabled(sc, crit[i])
[] conjecture
qed
%%%% The proof of the simulation
prove start(s:States[TI]) = 3 u:States[TM] (g(s,u) A start(u:States[TM])) by =
<> = subgoal
declare operators nullbounds: -+ Bounds[M], startregs: - Regions
assert V i:UID (startregs[i] = rem)
assert V c:Tasks[M] (nullbounds[c] = unbounded)
resume by specializing u to [[startregs], 0, nullbounds]
<> specialization subgoal
resume by induction on c:Tasks[M]
<> basis subgoal
resume by induction on a7
<> basis subgoal
resume by induction on a5
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] 4 subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
prove g(s,u) •= s:States[TI].now = u.now by =
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<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
declare variable alpha:StepSeq[TM]
prove
g(s,u) A isStep(s:States[TI], a, s') A inv(s:States[TI]) A inv(u)
3 alpha (execFrag(alpha) A first(alpha) = u A g(s',last(alpha))
A trace(alpha) = trace(a:Actions[TI]) )
by induction a:Actions[TI]
<> basis subgoal
% CASE: a = nu(s'c.now)
resume by =
<> = subgoal
assert u'c = STEP(uc, nu(s'c.now))
resume by specializing alpha to ({uc}) { nu(s'c.now), uc }
<> specialization subgoal
resume by induction on c:Tasks[M]
<> basis subgoal
resume by induction on a7
<> basis subgoal
resume by induction on a5
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 1: c = task(try[ul])
instantiate c:Tasks[M] by task(try[ul]) in *impliesHyp
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 2: c = task(crit[ul])
resume by cases
enabled(sc.basic, seize),
enabled(sc.basic, stabilize),
enabled(sc.basic, task(crit[ul])),
-, enabled(uc.basic, task(crit [ul]))
<> case justification
resume by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
instantiate stat by sc.basic.status in AutomatonIntermediate
declare operator ic: -+ UID
fix i:UID as ic in *contraHyp
[] contradiction subgoal
[] case justification
<> case enabled(sc.basic, seize)
prove s'c.now < (sc.bounds[task(seize)].last + a + a + c)
instantiate z by sc.bounds[c.last+a+a+c in Transitivity
[] conjecture
[] case enabled(sc.basic, seize)
<> case enabled(sc.basic, stabilize)
prove s'c.no < (sc.bounds[task(stabilize)].last + a + c)
instantiate z by sc.bounds[c] .last+a+c in Transitivity
1] conjecture
1] case enabled(sc.basic, stabilize)
<> case enabled(sc.basic, task(crit[ulc]))
[] case enabled(sc.basic, task(crit[ulc]))
<> case - enabled(uc.basic, task(crit[ulc]))
instantiate c:Tasks[M] by task(crit[ulc]) in *impliesHyp
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[] case - enabled(uc.basic, task(crit[ulc]))
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 3: c = task(exit[ul])
instantiate c:Tasks[M] by task(exit[ull) in *impliesHyp
[] basis subgoal
C> basis subgoal
% CASE 4: c = task(rem[ul])
resume by case enabled(uc.basic, task(rem[ul]))
<> case enabled(uc.basic, task(rem[ulc]))
instantiate a:Actions[I] by rem[ulc], i by ulc in *impliesHyp
[] case enabled(uc.basic, task(rem[ulc]))
<> case - enabled(uc.basic, task(rem[ulc]))
instantiate c:Tasks[M] by task(rem[ulc]) in *impliesHyp
[] case -enabled(uc.basic, task(rem[ulc]))
[] basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
resume by induction on a3
<> basis subgoal
resume by induction on al
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 1: a = addTime(try[ul])
resume by 
<> 4= subgoal
assert (ac = try[ulc]); u'c = STEP(uc, addTime(ac))
resume by specializing alpha to ({uc}) { addTime(ac), u'c }
<> specialization subgoal
instantiate c by task(ac) in *impliesHyp / c-op(.first)
prove u'c.basic.region[i] = s'c.basic.region[i]
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp, theorem
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] conjecture
% The rest are checking the bounds in the post-states.
% We do this in two parts, starting with the bound for the rem action
prove
(s'c.basic.region[i] = exit
=4 s'c.bounds[task(rem[i])] .last < u'c.bounds[task(rem[i])].last)
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
resume by 
<> subgoal
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(rem[ic]) in *impliesHyp
instantiate c:Tasks[M] by task(rem[ic]) in theorem
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp
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instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp / c-op(rem:--ActionTypes[M])
[] = subgoal
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] conjecture
resume by case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[i]))
<> case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
instantiate c:Tasks[M] by task(crit[ic]) in theorem
resume by case V j:UID - (s'c.basic.region[j] = crit)
<> case V j:UID - (s'c.basic.region[j] = crit)
[] case V j:UID - (s'c.basic.region[j] = crit)
<> case -V j:UID - (s'c.basic.region[j] = crit)
[] case - j:UID - (s'c.basic.region[j] = crit)
[] case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
<> case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic])))
resume by case enabled(uc.basic, task(crit[ic]))
<> case enabled(uc.basic, task(crit[ic]))
resume by A
<> A subgoal
resume by =
<> = subgoal
resume by case enabled(sc.basic, seize)
<> case enabled(sc.basic, seize)
[] case enabled(sc.basic, seize)
<> case - enabled(sc.basic, seize)
instantiate c by task(seize) in *impliesHyp
instantiate c:Tasks[M] by task(crit[i]) in theorem
declare operator i'c: - UID
fix i:UID as i'c in *caseHyp
[] case - enabled(sc.basic, seize)
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by =
<> • subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by =.
<> = subgoal
prove enabled(sc.basic, task(crit[ic]))
resume by case 3 i (sc.basic.region[i] = try)
<> case 3 i:UID (sc.basic.region[i] = try)
declare operator i'c: -- UID
fix i:UID as i'c in *impliesHyp
[] case 3 i:UID (sc.basic.region[i] = try)
<> case -3 i:UID (sc.basic.region[i] = try)
[] case -3 i:UID (sc.basic.region[i] = try)
[] conjecture
[] •= subgoal
[] A subgoal
[] case enabled(uc.basic, task(crit[ic]))
<> case -enabled(uc.basic, task(crit[ic]))
% seize, stabilize, crit[i] are not enabled in sc
% (because crit[i] is not enabled in uc, and g(sc,uc) )
resume by case -3 i:UID (sc.basic.region[i] = try)
<> case -3 i:UID (sc.basic.region[i] = try)
resume by =.
<> = subgoal
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[] = subgoal
[] case -3 i:UID (sc.basic.region[i] = try)
<> case -(-3 i:UID (sc.basic.region[i] = try))
resume by A
<> A subgoal
resume by =,
<> •= subgoal
prove -enabled(sc.basic, seize) by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by ='
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by =-
<> = subgoal
declare operator i'c: -+ UID
fix i:UID as i'c in *caseHyp / c-op(sc)
instantiate i by i'c in *caseHyp
[] => subgoal
[] A subgoal
[] case - (-3 i:UID (sc.basic.region[i] = try))
[] case - enabled(uc.basic, task(crit[ic]))
[] case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic])))
[] specialization subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
, CASE 2: a = addTime(crit[ul])
resume by =
<> = subgoal
assert (ac = crit[ulc]); u'c = STEP(uc, addTime(ac))
resume by specializing alpha to ({uc}) { addTime(ac), u'c }
<> specialization subgoal
instantiate c:Tasks[M] by task(crit[ulc]) in *impliesHyp / c-op(.first)
prove u'c.basic.region[i] = s'c.basic.region[i]
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
[] case ic = uIc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp, theorem
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] conjecture
prove
(s'c.basic.region[i] = exit
=s s'c.bounds[task(rem[i] )].last < u'c.bounds[task(rem[i])] .last)
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
resume by =>
<> = subgoal
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(rem[ic]) in *impliesHyp
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instantiate c:Tasks[M] by task(rem[ic]) in theorem
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp / c-op(rem:--ActionTypes[M])
[] = subgoal
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] conjecture
resume by =
<> = subgoal
[] = subgoal
E] specialization subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 3: a = addTime(exit[ull)
resume by =:
<> => subgoal
assert (ac = exit[ulc]); u'c = STEP(uc, addTime(ac))
resume by specializing alpha to ({uc}) { addTime(ac), u'c }
<> specialization subgoal
instantiate c by task(ac) in *impliesHyp / c-op(.first)
prove u'c.basic.region[i] = s'c.basic.region[i]
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp, theorem
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] conjecture
prove
(s'c.basic.region[i] = exit
= s'c.bounds[task(rem[i])].last < u'c.bounds[task(rem[il])] .last)
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
resume by =-
<> =• subgoal
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(rem[ic]) in *impliesHyp
instantiate c:Tasks[M] by task(rem[ic]) in theorem
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp / c-op(rem:-+ActionTypes[M])
[] = subgoal
[] case - (ic = uc)
[] conjecture
resume by case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[i]))
<> case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
instantiate c:Tasks[M] by task(crit[ic]) in theorem
resume by case V j:UID - (s'c.basic.region[j] = crit)
<> case V j:UID - (s'c.basic.region[j] = crit)
[] case V j:UID - (s'c.basic.region[j] = crit)
<> case -V j:UID - (s'c.basic.region[j] = crit)
[] case -V j:UID - (s'c.basic.region[j] = crit)
[] case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
<> case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic])))
prove - enabled(uc.basic, task(crit[i])) by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
instantiate j by ulc in *contraHyp
[] contradiction subgoal
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[] conjecture
instantiate c:Tasks[M] by task(crit[ic]) in theorem
% We now know u'c.bounds[task(crit[ic])] = [s'c.now, (4*a) + (2*c) + s'c.now]
prove inv(s'c)
instantiate
s by sc, s' by s'c, a:Actions[TI] by addTime(exit[ulc]) in Invariants
[] conjecture
resume by A
<> A subgoal
prove -V j:UID -i(sc.basic.region[j] = crit) by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
resume by =
<> 4 subgoal
[] 4 subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by =
<> subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by =
<> subgoal
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(crit[ic]) in *impliesHyp
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(crit[ic]) in theorem / c-op(.last)
instantiate z by a+a+a+a+c+c+s'c.now in Transitivity
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
[] case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic])))
[] specialization subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
% CASE 4: a = addTime(rem[ul])
<> basis subgoal
resume by =
<> = subgoal
assert (ac = rem[ulc]); u'c = STEP(uc, addTime(ac))
resume by specializing alpha to ({uc}) { addTime(ac), u'c }
<> specialization subgoal
instantiate c by task(ac) in *impliesHyp / c-op(.first)
prove u'c.basic.region[i] = s'c.basic.region[il
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp, theorem
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] conjecture
prove
(s'c.basic.region[i] = exit
4 s'c.bounds[task(rem[i] )].last < u'c.bounds[task(rem[i] )].last)
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
[] case ic = ulc
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<> case - (ic = ulc)
resume by =:
<> = subgoal
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(rem[ic]) in *impliesHyp
instantiate c:Tasks[M] by task(rem[ic]) in theorem
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp / c-op(rem:--ActionTypes[M])
[] = subgoal
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] conjecture
resume by case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[i]))
<> case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
instantiate c:Tasks[M] by task(crit[ic]) in theorem
resume by case V j:UID - (s'c.basic.region[j] = crit)
<> case V j:UID - (s'c.basic.region[j] = crit)
[] case V j:UID - (s'c.basic.region[j] = crit)
<> case -V j:UID - (s'c.basic.region[j] = crit)
[] case -V j:UID - (s'c.basic.region[j] = crit)
[] case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
<> case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic])))
prove enabled(uc.basic, task(crit[ic]))
declare operator i'c: -* UID
fix i:UID as i'c in *caseHyp
resume by specializing i:UID to i'c
<> specialization subgoal
prove i'c ulc by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
instantiate j by i'c in *impliesHyp
resume by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
prove jc uc by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
instantiate j by jc in *impliesHyp
[] contradiction subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] conjecture
instantiate c:Tasks[M] by task(crit[ic]) in theorem
resume by A
<> A subgoal
resume by =E
<> = subgoal
instantiate c by task(seize) in *impliesHyp
prove enabled(sc.basic, seize)
declare operator i'c: -+ UID
fix i:UID as i'c in (*impliesHyp / c-op(s'c)) - c-op(sc)
resume by specializing i:UID to i'c
<> specialization subgoal
prove i'c ulc by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
instantiate j by i'c in *impliesHyp
resume by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
prove jc ulc by contradiction
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<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
instantiate j by jc in*impliesHyp
[] contradiction subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] conjecture
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by 
<> 4 subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by 
<> subgoal
declare operator i'c: -* UID
fix i:UID as i'c in *impliesHyp / c-op(stable:-+Status)
[] subgoal
[] A subgoal
[] case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic])))
[] specialization subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 5: a = addTime(seize)
resume by 4
<> subgoal
resume by specializing alpha to {uc}
<> specialization subgoal
prove
(sc.basic.region[i] = exit
= s'c.bounds[task(rem[i])].last < uc.bounds[task(rem[i])].last)
resume by 4
<> subgoal
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(rem[ic]) in *impliesHyp
instantiate c:Tasks[M] by task(rem[ic]) in theorem
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp / c-op(rem:-+ActionTypes[M])
[] = subgoal
[] conjecture
instantiate c by task(stabilize) in *impliesHyp
prove (a + a + c + s'c.now) < (sc.bounds[task(seize)].last + a + a + c)
resume by case a+a+c = infinity
<> case a + a + c = infinity
[] case a + a + c = infinity
<> case - (a + a + c = infinity)
instantiate t by a+a+c in Time
[] case (a + a + c = infinity)
[] conjecture
[] specialization subgoal
[] => subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 6: a = addTime(stabilize)
resume by 
<> => subgoal
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resume by specializing alpha to {uc}
<> specialization subgoal
prove
(sc.basic.region[i] = exit
4 s'c.bounds [task(rem[i] ) ].last < uc.bounds [task(rem[i] )].last)
resume by 4
<> - subgoal
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(rem[ic]) in *impliesHyp
instantiate c:Tasks[M] by task(rem[ic]) in theorem
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp / c-op(rem:--*ActionTypes[M])
[] 4= subgoal
[] conjecture
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(crit[i]) in *impliesHyp
prove (a+c+s'c.now) < (sc.bounds[task(stabilize)].last + a + c)
resume by case a+c = infinity
<> case a + c = infinity
[] case a + c = infinity
C> case - (a + c = infinity)
instantiate t by a+c in Time
[] case - (a + c = infinity)
[] conjecture
[] specialization subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
set log i2m
statistics
quit
A.6 The Simulation from Fischer's Algorithm to the Mile-
stones
set script f2i
thaw F2I
set name theorem
set immunity ancestor
set box-checking on
..%%%%% Preliminaries
% Put information in registry to speed up ordering
register height
__[__]:Bounds[F],Tasks[F]-+Bounds
> (.first, last, bdmap:Tasks F] -+Bounds, 3: Actions[ F] ,Bool-*Bool,
.basic:States[TF] -States[F], +:Time,Time-*Time)
register height
__ [__]:Bounds[I],Tasks[I]-*Bounds
> (.first,. last, bdmap:Tasks[I] -*Bounds, 3:Actions[I1 ,Bool-*Bool,
.basic:States[TI] -*States[I], +:Time,Time-+Time)
register height
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.bounds: States [TF] -+Bounds [F]
> (.basic:States[TF] -+States[F], enabled:States[F] ,Actions [F]-+Bool)
register height
.bounds:States[TI] -+Bounds[I]
> (.basic:States[TI] -+States[I], enabled:States[I],Actions[I]-+Bool)
register height __[__ :Regions,UID-+Region > V
% Introduce constants that will be used to replace variables
declare operato]
uc:
SC, S'C:
u'c, U"c:
ac, a'c:
- States[TI]
-+ States[TF]
- States[TI]
-+ Actions[I]
% Used by LP for u in hypotheses
% Ditto for s and s'
% To abbreviate STEP(uc, ...), STEP(u'c, ...)
% To abbreviate actions
% Put information in registry to ensure intended orientation of equations
register top uc, u'c, u''"c
register height u'c > u'c > uc
register height s'c > sc
% Define some abbreviations for useful sets of facts
define-class $firstHyp
define-class $wdef
*impliesHyp / contains-operator(.first)
(F2I / contains-operator(w)) - contains-operator(f)
% Some preliminary lemmas
prove effect(s, a, STEP(s, a))
rewrite conjecture with reversed F2I
[] conjecture
qed
prove
inv(s:States[TF]) A isStep(s:States[TF],
=. V j (j:UID i w(s',j) = w(s,j))
addTime(at[i]), s')
resume by }
<> 4= subgoal
resume by .
<> =. subgoal
instantiate
s by sc, s' by s'c, at by atc, i by ic, j by jc
in TimedFischer / c-v(at':ActionTypes[F])
instantiate
s by sc.basic, s' by s'c.basic, at by atc,
in AutomatonFischer / c-v(j:UID)
i by ic, j by jc
instantiate s by sc, i by jc in $wdef
instantiate s by s'c, i by jc in $wdef
resume by cases
sc.basic.pc[jc] = test,
sc.basic.pc[jc] = set,
sc.basic.pc[jc] = check,
- (sc.basic.pc[jc] E { test, set, check })
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<> case justification
[] case justification
<> case sc.basic.pc[jc] = test
[] case sc.basic.pc[jc] = test
<> case sc.basic.pc[jc] = set
[] case sc.basic.pc[jc] = set
<> case sc.basic.pc[jcl = check
[] case sc.basic.pc[jc] = check
<> case - (sc.basic.pcljc] E {test, set, check})
[] case - (sc.basic.pc[jc] E {test, set, check})
[] = subgoal
[] •= subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
7, Now the proof obligations to check the forward simulation
prove start(s:States[TF]) = 3 u (f(s,u) A start(u)) by =
<> = subgoal
declare operators nullbounds: -+ Bounds[I], startregs: -+ Regions
assert V i:UID (startregs[i] = rem)
assert V c:Tasks[I] (nullbounds[c] = unbounded)
resume by specializing u to [[startregs, start], 0, nullbounds]
<> specialization subgoal
resume by induction on c:Tasks[I]
<> basis subgoal
resume by induction on a3
<> basis subgoal
resume by induction on al
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
prove f(s,u) s:States[TF].now = u.now by =
<> • subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
set proof-method explicit-commands
declare variable alpha:StepSeq[TI]
prove
f(s,u) A isStep(s:States[TF], a, s') A inv(s:States[TF]) A inv(u) A StrongMutex(s)
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4 3 alpha (execFrag(alpha)
A first(alpha) = u A f(s',last(alpha))
A trace(alpha) = trace(a:Actions[TF]) )
by induction on a:Actions[TF]
<> basis subgoal
% CASE: nu(s'c.now)
resume by 
<> subgoal
set proof-methods normalization
assert u'c = STEP(uc, nu(s'c.now))
resume by specializing alpha to ({uc}) { nu(s'c.now), u'c }
<> specialization subgoal
resume by A
<> A subgoal
% Trying to prove V c:Tasks[I] (s'c.now < uc.bounds[c].last)
resume by induction on c:Tasks[I]
<> basis subgoal
prove s'c.now < (sc.bounds[c].last + t)
instantiate t by sc.bounds[c].last, tl:Time by t in Time
[] conjecture
resume by induction on a3
<> basis subgoal
resume by induction on al
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 1: c = task(try[ul])
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(try[ul]) in *impliesHyp
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 2: c = task(crit[ul])
resume by case -enabled(uc.basic, task(crit[ul]))
<> case -enabled(uc.basic, task(crit[ulc]))
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(crit[ulc]) in *impliesHyp
[] case enabled(uc.basic, task(crit[ulc]))
<> case - (- enabled(uc.basic, task(crit[ulc])))
declare operator dummyi:-+UID
fix i as dummyi in *caseHyp
declare operator critTask: -+Tasks[I]
assert task(crit[ulc]) = critTask
prove critTask = task(crit[sc.basic.x.owner])
instantiate
a:Actions[I] by crit[ulc], a':Actions[I] by crit[sc.basic.x.owner]
in AutomatonIntermediate
[] conjecture
resume by case sc.basic.pc[sc.basic.x.owner] = lvtry
<> case sc.basic.pc[sc.basic.x.owner] = lvtry
instantiate i by sc.basic.x.owner in *impliesHyp / c-op(lvtry)
[] case sc.basic.pc[sc.basic.x.owner] = lvtry
<> case - (sc.basic.pc[sc.basic.x.owner] = lvtry)
[] case - (sc.basic.pc[sc.basic.x.owner] = lvtry)
[] case - (- enabled(uc.basic, task(crit[ulc])))
130
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 3: c = task(exit[ul])
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(exit[ul]) in *impliesHyp
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 4: c = task(rem[ul])
resume by case -enabled(uc.basic, task(rem[ul]))
<> case - enabled(uc.basic, task(rem[ulc]))
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(rem[ulc]) in *impliesHyp
[] case - enabled(uc.basic, task(rem[ulc]))
<> case - (- enabled(uc.basic, task(rem[ulc])))
instantiate i by uc in *impliesHyp
resume by case sc.basic.pc[ulc] = reset
<> case sc.basic.pc[ulc] = reset
[] case sc.basic.pc[ulc] = reset
<> case -(sc.basic.pc[ulc] = reset)
[] case -(sc.basic.pc[ulc] = reset)
[] case - (-enabled(uc.basic, task(rem[ulc])))
[] basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 5: c = task(seize)
resume by case - enabled(uc.basic, task(seize))
<> case -enabled(uc.basic, task(seize))
instantiate c by task(seize) in *impliesHyp
[] case -enabled(uc.basic, task(seize))
<> case - (- enabled(uc.basic, task(seize)))
resume by case sc.basic.x.free
<> case sc.basic.x.free
declare operator ic:-+UID
fix i as ic in *hyp / c-op(seize)
prove w(sc, ic) > s'c.now
instantiate i by ic, s by sc in $wdef
resume by cases
sc.basic.pc[ic] = test,
sc.basic.pc[ic] = set,
sc.basic.pc[ic] = check,
- (sc.basic.pc[ic] E { test, set, check })
<> case justification
<> case justification
<>[] case sc.basic.pcica = test
C> case sc.basic.pc[ic] = test
<>[] case sc.basic.pc[ic] = set
<> case sc.basic.pc[ic] = set
[] case sc.basic.pc[ic] = check
<> case sc.basic.pc[ic] = check
<>[] case (sc.basic.pc[ic] E test, set, check)
<> case - (sc.basic.pc[ic] E {test, set, check})
[] conjecture
[] case sc.basic.x.free
<> case -sc.basic.x.free
% Now we know 3 i:UID (sc.basic.pc[i] = reset)
declare operator ic:-+UID
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fix i as ic in *caseHyp / c-op(reset:-+PC)
instantiate c by task(reset[ic]) in *impliesHyp / c-op(.last)
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp / c-op(reset:-+PC)
[] case -sc.basic.x.free
[] case - (- enabled(uc.basic, task(seize)))
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
7. CASE 6: c = task(stabilize)
instantiate c by task(stabilize) in *impliesHyp
resume by case - enabled(uc.basic, task(stabilize))
<> case -enabled(uc.basic, task(stabilize))
[] case -enabled(uc.basic, task(stabilize))
<> case - (- enabled(uc.basic, task(stabilize)))
declare operator ic:-UID
fix i as ic in *caseHyp
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp / c-op(set:-*PC)
[] case - (- enabled(uc.basic, task(stabilize)))
[] basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by A
<> A subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
prove w(s'c, i) = w(sc, i)
declare operator ic:-+UID
resume by generalizing i:UID from ic
<> generalization subgoal
instantiate s by sc, i by ic in $wdef
instantiate s by s'c, i by ic in $wdef
resume by cases
sc.basic.pc[ic] = test,
sc.basic.pc[ic] = set,
sc.basic.pc[ic] = check,
- (sc.basic.pc[ic] E { test, set, check })
<> case justification
<> case justification
<>[] case sc.basic.pcic] = test
<> case sc.basic.pc[ic] = test
<>[] case sc.basic.pc[ic] = set
<> case sc.basic.pc[ic] = set
<>[] case sc.basic.pc[ic] = check
<> case sc.basic.pc[ic] = check
<>[] case -(sc.basic.pc[ic] G test, set, check))
<> case - (sc.basic.pc[ic] E {test, set, check})
[] generalization subgoal
[] conjecture
[] A subgoal
[] A subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
resume by induction on a7
<> basis subgoal
resume by induction on a5
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<> basis subgoal
% CASE 1: try[ulc]
resume by =:
<> = subgoal
set proof-methods normalization
assert (ac = try[ulc]); u'c = STEP(uc, addTime(ac))
resume by specializing alpha to ({uc}) { addTime(ac), u'c }
<> specialization subgoal
instantiate c by task(ac) in $firstHyp
prove
(s'c.basic.pc[i] = crit A= sc.basic.pc[i] = crit)
A (s'c.basic.pc[i] = reset <* sc.basic.pc[i] = reset)
A (s'c.basic.pc[i] = set sc.basic.pc[i] = set)
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp / c-op(ulc)
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] conjecture
prove 3 i:UID (w(s'c, i) < u'c.bounds[task(seize)].last)
instantiate c by task(seize) in theorem
resume by case -enabled(u'c.basic, seize)
<> case -enabled(u'c.basic, seize)
[] case -enabled(u'c.basic, seize)
<> case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, seize))
resume by case enabled(uc.basic, seize)
<> case enabled(uc.basic, seize)
declare operator ic:-+UID
fix i as ic in *hyp / c-op(w)
resume by specializing i:UID to ic
<> specialization subgoal
instantiate
s by sc, s' by s'c, at: ActionTypes[F] by try, i by ulc, j by ic
in theorem / c-op(w)
resume by case ic = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
instantiate s by sc, i by ulc in $wdef
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] specialization subgoal
[] case enabled(uc.basic, seize)
<C> case -enabled(uc.basic, seize)
resume by specializing i:UID to ulc
<> specialization subgoal
instantiate s by s'c, i by ulc in $wdef
[1 specialization subgoal
[] case _-enabled(uc.basic, seize)
[] case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, seize))
[] conjecture
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
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[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate j by ic in (*impliesHyp, theorem) / c-op(ulc)
resume by A
<> A subgoal
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(crit[ic]) in theorem / c-op(u'c)
resume by case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
<> case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
[] case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
<> case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic])))
resume by -
<> = subgoal
declare operator dummyi:-*UID
fix i as dummyi in *caseHyp
[] = subgoal
[] case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic])))
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(rem[ic]) in theorem / c-op(u'c)
resume by =
<> = subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
<> case - enabled(u c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
[] case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
<> case - (-enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic])))
resume by =
<> •= subgoal
declare operator dummyi: -+ UID
fix i as dummyi in *caseHyp
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic])))
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by =-
<> = subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
instantiate c by task(seize) in theorem / c-op(u'c)
resume by case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize))
<> case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize))
[] case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize))
<> case (-enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize)))
resume by =
<> = subgoal
instantiate c by task(reset[ic]) in *impliesHyp
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
resume by case enabled(uc.basic, task(seize))
<> case enabled(uc.basic, task(seize))
[] case enabled(uc.basic, task(seize))
<> case -enabled(uc.basic, task(seize))
instantiate t by a+a+c in Time
resume by case a+a+c = infinity
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<> case a + a + c = infinity
[] case a + a + c = infinity
<> case - (a + a + c = infinity)
prove sc.bounds[task(reset[ic])].last < (sc.now + c)
instantiate c by task(reset[ic]) in *hyp
prove (sc.now +a) < (sc.now + c)
instantiate t by sc.now in Time
[] conjecture
[] conjecture
instantiate t by a in Time
[] case - (a + a + c = infinity)
[] case - enabled(uc.basic, task(seize))
[] = subgoal
[] case - (-enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize)))
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
instantiate c by task(stabilize) in theorem / c-op(u'c)
resume by cases - enabled(u'c.basic, task(stabilize))
<> case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(stabilize))
[] case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(stabilize))
<> case - ( -enabled(u'c.basic, task(stabilize)))
resume by =
<> = subgoal
instantiate c by task(set[ic]) in *impliesHyp / c-op(s'c)
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(stabilize)))
[] A subgoal
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] specialization subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 2: test[ulc]
resume by =
<> subgoal
set proof-methods normalization
resume by specializing alpha to {uc}
<> specialization subgoal
resume by case sc.basic.x.free
<> case sc.basic.x.free
prove 3 i:UID (w(s'c, i) < uc.bounds[task(seize)].last)
declare operator ic:- +UID
fix i as ic in *hyp / c-op(w)
resume by specializing i:UID to ic
<> specialization subgoal
resume by case ic = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
instantiate s by s'c, i by ulc in $wdef
instantiate s by sc, i by ulc in $def
instantiate
t by a, tl by sc.now, t2 by sc.bounds[task(test[ulc])].last in Time
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate
s by sc, s' by s'c, at by test, i by ulc, j by ic in theorem / c-op(w)
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[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] specialization subgoal
[] conjecture
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
instantiate c by task(stabilize) in *impliesHyp
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp / c-op(ulc)
resume by A
<> A subgoal
resume by =}
<> = subgoal
instantiate c:Tasks[F] by task(rem[ic]) in *impliesHyp / c-op(s'c)
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by 
<> subgoal
instantiate c by task(set[ic]) in *impliesHyp / c-op(s'c)
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] case sc.basic.x.free
<> case - sc.basic.x.free
prove s'c.basic.pc[i] = sc.basic.pc[i]
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp / c-op(ulc)
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] conjecture
resume by A
<> A subgoal
resume by 
<> subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by 
<> subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by 
<> subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by 
c> subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
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<> A subgoal
resume by 
<> = subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by =
<> = subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by case enabled(uc.basic, seize)
<> case enabled(uc.basic, seize)
declare operator ic:-+ UID
fix i as ic in *caseHyp / c-op(reset:-PC)
resume by specializing i:UID to ulc
<> specialization subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp / c-op(seize)
instantiate s by s'c, i by ulc in $wdef
instantiate c by task(reset[ic]) in *impliesHyp
prove (sc.now + a+a) < (sc.bounds[task(reset[ic])] .last +a+a)
instantiate t by a in Time
[] conjecture
[] specialization subgoal
[] case enabled(uc.basic, seize)
<> case -enabled(uc.basic, seize)
instantiate c by task(seize) in *hyp
[] case -enabled(uc.basic, seize)
[] A subgoal
[] case - sc.basic.x.free
[] specialization subgoal
[] =:: subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 3: set[ul]
resume by =;
<> = subgoal
instantiate j by s'c.basic.x.owner in *impliesHyp
% StrongMutex •= sc.basic.pc[i] crit, lvtry, reset
set proof-methods normalization
prove s'c.basic.pc[i] { crit, reset }
resume by case i = s'c.basic.x.owner
<> case ic = s'c.basic.x.owner
[] case ic = s'c.basic.x.owner
<> case - (ic = s'c.basic.x.owner)
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp
[] case - (ic = s'c.basic.x.owner)
[] conjecture
resume by case sc.basic.x.free
<> case sc.basic.x.free
prove 3 i:UID (uc.basic.region[i] = try)
resume by specializing i:UID to s'c.basic.x.owner
<> specialization subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
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[] conjecture
resume by case V j:UID (s'c.basic.pc[j] set)
<> case V j:UID (s'c.basic.pc[j] set)
assert (ac = seize); u'c = STEP(uc, addTime(ac))
assert a'c = stabilize; u''c = STEP(u'c, addTime(a'c))
resume by specializing
alpha to (({uc}) { addTime(ac), u'c }) { addTime(a'c), uc }
<> specialization subgoal
instantiate c by task(ac) in $firstHyp
resume by case i = s'c.basic.x.owner
<> case ic = s'c.basic.x.owner
[] case ic = s'c.basic.x.owner
<> case -(ic = s'c.basic.x.owner)
instantiate j by ic in *Hyp
resume by 
<> = subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] case - (ic = s'c.basic.x.owner)
[] specialization subgoal
[] case V j:UID (s'c.basic.pc[j] set)
<> case -V j:UID (s'c.basic.pc[j] set)
assert (ac = seize); u'c = STEP(uc, addTime(ac))
resume by specializing alpha to ({uc}) { addTime(ac), u'c }
<> specialization subgoal
instantiate c by task(ac) in $firstHyp
prove 3 i:UID (s'c.basic.pc[il = set)
declare operator ic:-+UID
fix j as ic in *caseHyp
resume by specializing i:UID to ic
<> specialization subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] conjecture
resume by case i = s'c.basic.x.owner
<> case ic = s'c.basic.x.owner
[] case ic = s'c.basic.x.owner
<> case -(ic = sc.basic.x.owner)
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp
resume by A
<> A subgoal
resume by 
<> subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *implies
[] r= subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by -
<> subgoal
instantiate c by task(set[ic])
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
[] case - (ic = s'c.basic.x.owner)
[] specialization subgoal
sHyp
in *impliesHyp
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[] case -V j:UID (s'c.basic.pc[j] set)
[] case sc.basic.x.free
<> case - sc.basic.x.free
resume by case V j:UID (s'c.basic.pc[j] set)
<> case V j:UID (s'c.basic.pc[j] set)
assert (ac = stabilize); u'c = STEP(uc, addTime(ac))
resume by specializing alpha to ({uc}) { addTime(ac), u'c }
<> specialization subgoal
instantiate c by task(ac) in $firstHyp
prove 3 i:UID (sc.basic.pc[i] = set)
resume by specializing i:UID to s'c.basic.x.owner
<> specialization subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] conjecture
resume by case i = s'c.basic.x.owner
<> case ic = s'c.basic.x.owner
prove -V i:UID - (sc.basic.pc[i] = set) by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
[] case ic = s'c.basic.x.owner
<> case -(ic = s'c.basic.x.owner)
instantiate j by ic in *Hyp
resume by ='
<> = subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] case -(ic = s'c.basic.x.owner)
[] specialization subgoal
[] case V j:UID (s'c.basic.pc[j] set)
<> case -V j:UID (s'c.basic.pc[j] set)
resume by specializing alpha to {uc}
<> specialization subgoal
prove uc.bounds[task(seize)].last = infinity
instantiate c by task(seize) in *hyp
[] conjecture
prove 3 i:UID (sc.basic.pc[i] = set)
resume by specializing i:UID to s'c.basic.x.owner
<> specialization subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] conjecture
prove 3 i:UID (s'c.basic.pc[i] = set)
declare operator ic:-*UID
fix j as ic in *caseHyp
resume by specializing i:UID to ic
<> specialization subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] conjecture
prove - V i:UID - (sc.basic.pc[i] = set) by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
resume by case i = s'c.basic.x.owner
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<> case ic = s'c.basic.x.owner
instantiate c:Tasks[I] by task(crit[ic]) in *impliesHyp
[] case ic = s'c.basic.x.owner
<> case -(ic = s'c.basic.x.owner)
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
resume by A
<> A subgoal
resume by =
<> 4 subgoal
[] E subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by -
<> 4 subgoal
[] 4 subgoal
[] A subgoal
[] case - (ic = s'c.basic.x.owner)
[] specialization subgoal
[] case -V j:UID (s'c.basic.pc[j] set)
[] case - sc.basic.x.free
[] 4 subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 4: check[ulc]
resume by -
<> =- subgoal
set proof-methods normalization
resume by specializing alpha to {uc}
<> specialization subgoal
prove 3 i:UID (w(s'c, i) < uc.bounds[task(seize)].last)
declare operator ic:-+UID
fix i as ic in *hyp / c-op(w)
resume by specializing i:UID to ic
<> specialization subgoal
resume by case ic = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
resume by case sc.basic.x.free A sc.basic.x.owner = ulc
<> case -sc.basic.x.free A sc.basic.x.owner = ulc
prove -enabled(uc.basic, seize) by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
declare operator icl:-+UID
fix i as icl in *contraHyp / c-op(reset:-+PC)
instantiate i by icl in *impliesHyp
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
instantiate c by task(seize) in *hyp
[] case -sc.basic.x.free A sc.basic.x.owner = ulc
<> case -(-sc.basic.x.free A sc.basic.x.owner = ulc)
instantiate s by s'c, i by ulc in $wdef
instantiate s by sc, i by ulc in $wdef
prove (sc.now + a+a) < (sc.bounds[task(check[ulc])].last + a+a)
instantiate t by a in Time
[] conjecture
[] case -(-sc.basic.x.free A sc.basic.x.owner = ulc)
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
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instantiate
s by sc, s' by s'c, at by check, i by ulc, j by ic in theorem / c-op(w)
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] specialization subgoal
[] conjecture
resume by case sc.basic.x.free
<> case sc.basic.x.free
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp / c-op(ulc)
resume by A
<> A subgoal
resume by >
<> subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by 
<> 4= subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] => subgoal
[] A subgoal
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] case sc.basic.x.free
<> case - sc.basic.x.free
prove
(s'c.basic.pc[i] = crit e¢ sc.basic.pc[i] = crit)
A (s'c.basic.pc[i] = reset {= sc.basic.pc[i] = reset)
A (s'c.basic.pc[i] = set ¢* sc.basic.pc[i] = set)
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
resume by case sc.basic.x.ouner = ulc
<> case sc.basic.x.owner = uic
[] case sc.basic.x.owner = ulc
<> case - (sc.basic.x.owner = ulc)
[] case -(sc.basic.x.owner = ulc)
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp
[] case - (ic = uic)
[] conjecture
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
resume by case sc.basic.x.owner = ulc
<> case sc.basic.x.owner = ulc
prove (a + sc.now) < (sc.bounds[task(check[ulc])].last + a)
instantiate t by a in Time
[] conjecture
[] case sc.basic.x.owner = ulc
<> case - (sc.basic.x.owner = ulc)
[] case -(sc.basic.x.owner = ulc)
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[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp / c-op(ulc)
resume by A
<> A subgoal
resume by 
<> subgoal
[] subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by 
<> = subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by 
<> = subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by 
<> = subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by 
<> subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by 
<> subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] case -sc.basic.x.free
[] specialization subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 5: crit[ulc]
resume by 
<> subgoal
instantiate i by ulc in *impliesHyp % StrongMutex!
set proof-methods normalization
assert (ac = crit[ulc]); u'c = STEP(uc, addTime(ac))
resume by specializing alpha to ({uc}) { addTime(ac), u'c }
<> specialization subgoal
instantiate c by task(ac) in $firstHyp
resume by A
<> A subgoal
prove
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-( 3 i:UID (s'c.basic.pc[i] = set)
A V i:UID (s'c.basic.pc[i] ~ { crit, reset }))
A -V i:UID (s'c.basic.pc[i] ~ { crit, reset, set })
A 3 i:UID (s'c.basic.pc[i] E { crit, reset })
resume by A
C> A subgoal
resume by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by specializing i:UID to ulc
<> specialization subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by specializing i:UID to ulc
<> specialization subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] A subgoal
[] conjecture
prove u'c.bounds[task(seize)].last = infinity
prove - enabled(u'c.basic, seize) by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
[] conjecture
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
[] case ic = uic
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate j by ic in (theorem, *impliesHyp) / c-op(ulc)
resume by A
<> A subgoal
resume by =
<> = subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by 
<> = subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] •= subgoal
[] A subgoal
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] A subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
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[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 6: exit[ulc]
resume by =}
<> = subgoal
instantiate i by ulc in *impliesHyp
set proof-methods normalization
assert (ac = exit[ulc]); u'c = STEP(uc, addTime(ac))
resume by specializing alpha to (uc}) { addTime(ac), u'c
<> specialization subgoal
instantiate c by task(ac) in $firstHyp
prove
(s'c.basic.pc[i] B { crit, reset } = sc.basic.pc[i] ~ { crit, reset })
A (s'c.basic.pc[i] E { crit, reset } 4 sc.basic.pc[i] E { crit, reset })
A (s'c.basic.pc[i] = set 4* sc.basic.pc[i] = set)
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] conjecture
prove 3 i:UID (w(s'c, i) < u'c.bounds[task(seize)].last)
resume by case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize))
<> case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize))
[] case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize))
<> case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize)))
prove - enabled(uc.basic, seize) by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
declare operator ic:-+UID
fix i as ic in *caseHyp / c-op(try:-+Region)
instantiate i by ulc in *hyp
prove ic ulc by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
resume by specializing i:UID to ic
<> specialization subgoal
prove inv(s'c)
instantiate
s by sc, s' by s'c, a: Actions[TF] by addTime(exit[ulc]) in Invariants
[] conjecture
resume by case s'c.basic.pc[ic] = check, s'c.basic.pc[ic] = test
<> case justification
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp, theorem
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp % StrongMutex
[] case justification
<> case s'c.basic.pc[ic] = check
instantiate s by s'c, i:UID by ic in $wdef
instantiate c by task(check[ic]) in theorem
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instantiate t:Time by a in Time
[] case s'c.basic.pc[ic] = check
<> case s'c.basic.pc[ic] = test
instantiate s by s'c, i by ic in $wdef
instantiate c by task(test[ic]) in theorem
prove (s'c.bounds[task(test[ic)] .last + a) < (sc.now +a+a)
instantiate t by a in Time
[] conjecture
prove (s'c.bounds[task(test [ic])].last + a) < (sc.now +a+a+c)
instantiate t by sc.now + a + a, tl by c in Time
[] conjecture
[] case s'c.basic.pc[ic] = test
[] specialization subgoal
[] case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize)))
[] conjecture
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
resume by case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize))
<> case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize))
[] case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize))
<> case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize)))
instantiate c by task(reset[ulc]) in *impliesHyp
prove - enabled(uc.basic, seize) by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
instantiate t by sc.now + a+a in Time
[] case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize)))
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate j by ic in (*impliesHyp, theorem) / c-op(ulc)
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
resume by case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(rem[ic]))
<> case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(rem[ic]))
[] case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(rem[ic]))
<> case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(rem[ic])))
[] case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(rem[ic])))
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] specialization subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
% CASE 7: reset[ull
resume by ='
<> = subgoal
set proof-methods normalization
resume by specializing alpha to {uc}
<> specialization subgoal
instantiate i by ulc in *impliesHyp / c-op(reset:-+PC) / c-op(.owner)
prove w(s'c, i) = w(sc,i)
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
instantiate s by s'c, i by ulc in $def
instantiate s by sc, i by ulc in $wdef
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate
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s by sc, s' by s'c, at by reset, i by ulc, j by ic in theorem / c-op(w)
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] conjecture
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
resume by A
<> A subgoal
instantiate i by ulc in *impliesHyp
instantiate
t by a, tl by s'c.now, t2 by sc.bounds[task(reset[ulc])].last in Time
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by specializing i:UID to ulc
<> specialization subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by specializing i:UID to ulc
<> specialization subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] A subgoal
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp / c-op(ulc)
resume by A
<> A subgoal
resume by 
<> subgoal
instantiate i
[] = subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
instantiate i bI
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
instantiate i b'
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
instantiate i bi
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
by ic in *impliesHyp
I ic in *impliesHyp
y ic in *impliesHyp
y ic in *impliesHyp
resume by specializing i:UID to ulc
<> specialization subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by specializing i:UID to ulc
<> specialization subgoal
[] specialization subgoal
[] A subgoal
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] specialization subgoal
[] = subgoal
[] basis subgoal
<> basis subgoal
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% CASE 8: rem[ul]
resume by =>
<> = subgoal
set proof-methods normalization
assert (ac = rem[ulc]); u'c = STEP(uc, addTime(ac))
resume by specializing alpha to (uc}) { addTime(ac), u'c }
<> specialization subgoal
instantiate c by task(ac) in $firstHyp
prove
(s'c.basic.pc[i] = crit ~¢ sc.basic.pc[i] = crit)
A (s'c.basic.pc[i] = reset ¢* sc.basic.pc[i] = reset)
A (s'c.basic.pc[i] = set ¢* sc.basic.pc[i] = set)
resume by case i = uc
<> case ic = ulc
[] case ic = ulc
<> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate j by ic in *impliesHyp / c-op(ulc)
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] conjecture
prove 3 i:UID (w(s'c, i) < u'c.bounds[task(seize)].last)
declare operator ic:-+UID
fix i as ic in *hyp / c-op(w)
resume by specializing i:UID to ic
<> specialization subgoal
resume by case -enabled(u'c.basic, seize)
<> case -enabled(u'c.basic, seize)
[] case - enabled(u'c.basic, seize)
<> case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, seize))
prove enabled(uc.basic, seize)
declare operator icl:--+UID
fix i as icl in *caseHyp / c-op(try:-+Region)
prove icl ulc by contradiction
<> contradiction subgoal
[] contradiction subgoal
[] conjecture
resume by specializing i:UID to icl
<> specialization subgoal
instantiate j by icl in theorem
resume by case j = ulc
<> case jc = ulc
[] case jc = ulc
<> case - (jc = ulc)
instantiate j by jc in theorem, *hyp
[] case - (jc = ulc)
[] specialization subgoal
[] conjecture
resume by case ic = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
instantiate s by sc, i:UID by ulc in $wdef
[] case ic = ulc
c> case - (ic = ulc)
instantiate
s by sc, s' by s'c, at: ActionTypes[F] by rem, i by ulc, j by ic
in theorem / c-op(w)
[] case - (ic = ulc)
147
[] case - (-enabled(u'c.basic, seize))
[] specialization subgoal
[] conjecture
resume by case i = ulc
<> case ic = ulc
[] case ic = ulc
<> case (ic = uc)
instantiate j by ic in (theorem, *impliesHyp) / c-op(ulc)
resume by A
<> A subgoal
resume by case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
<> case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
[] case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
<> case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic])))
resume by =.
<> = subgoal
declare operator dummyi: -+ UID
fix i as dummyi in *caseHyp
[] #= subgoal
[] case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic])))
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(rem[ic]))
<> case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(rem[ic]))
[] case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(rem[ic]))
<> case - ( -enabled(u'c.basic, task(rem[ic])))
resume by =
<> #= subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] = subgoal
[] case - (-enabled(u'c.basic, task(rem[ic])))
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
<> case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
[] case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic]))
<> case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit [ic])))
resume by #
<> #= subgoal
declare operator dummyi: --+ UID
fix i as dummyi in *caseHyp
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] -= subgoal
[] case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(crit[ic])))
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(rem[ic]))
<> case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(rem[ic]))
[] case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(rem[ic]))
<> case (-enabled(u'c.basic, task(rem[ic])))
resume by =
<> = subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] •= subgoal
[] case - (-enabled(u'c.basic, task(rem[ic])))
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize))
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<> case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize))
[] case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize))
<> case - (-enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize)))
resume by =
<> =:: subgoal
instantiate c by task(reset[ic]) in *impliesHyp
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
resume by case enabled(uc.basic, task(seize))
<> case enabled(uc.basic, task(seize))
[] case enabled(uc.basic, task(seize))
<> case -enabled(uc.basic, task(seize))
prove (sc.now + a + a + a) < (sc.now + a + a + c)
instantiate t by sc.now + a+a in Time
[] conjecture
instantiate t by a+a in Time
[] case - enabled(uc.basic, task(seize))
[] = subgoal
[] case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(seize)))
[] A subgoal
<> A subgoal
resume by case -enabled(u'c.basic, task(stabilize))
<> case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(stabilize))
[] case - enabled(u'c.basic, task(stabilize))
<> case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(stabilize)))
resume by =
<> #= subgoal
instantiate i by ic in *impliesHyp
[] 4= subgoal
[] case - (- enabled(u'c.basic, task(stabilize)))
[] A subgoal
[] case - (ic = ulc)
[] specialization subgoal
[] •= subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] basis subgoal
[] conjecture
qed
set log f2i
statistics
quit
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